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ABSTRACT
Although Uruguay Is the smallest country In South 
America, her economic problems are among the largest in the 
region. This paper studies the evolution of the Uruguayan 
economy during the postwar period, when those problems were 
becoming manifest. For during this period, Uruguay, once 
the brightest economic hope in South America, became a case 
of arrested economic development— a case study in economic 
stagnation.
Of first importance is Uruguay’s economic strength, 
which lies in its land, climate and people. The land is 
flat and fertile; the climate is temperate and bracing; 
the people are healthy and well educated.
On the other hand, persistent economic stagnation is 
evidence of severe underlying weaknesses plaguing the econ­
omy, and the more important weaknesses are a cumbersome 
bureaucracy, excessive welfare payments, monetary and fiscal 
mismanagement, and agricultural stagnation. The top-heavy 
bureaucratic structure of the Uruguayan government employs 
about 20 per cent of the work force, largely in "unproduc­
tive” work. Approximately one Uruguayan family in three is 
supported wholly or partly by welfare payments. This means, 
in addition, that welfare programs deprive the economy of the 
services of approximately one in every three potential
xii
xiii
workers. Furthermore, the economy must hear the cost of 
other fiscal and monetary mismanagement, which as this 
study indicates, has resulted in extreme inflation, a low 
investment/consumption ratio, and, perhaps worst of all, 
agricultural stagnation.
Uruguay’s agricultural output has been static for 
the past seventy years. This is tragic, for few agricul­
turally better-endowed countries exist anywhere. However, 
decades of fostering competitively disadvantaged urban 
industry at the expense of agriculture have undermined agri­
culture without creating a competitive advantage for urban 
industry. Thus has the economy, and perhaps most particu­
larly the export sector, been systematically weakened.
But there is yet another unfortunate and sometohat 
ironic twist in the downward spirals agriculture, espec­
ially stockraising, remains the only economic sector with a 
competitive advatage. So, on several occasions, the stock- 
ralsers have been able to blackmail the rest of the economy 
by threatehing to withhold exports from the market, thereby 
reaping major short-term profits without reversing the long­
term drift toward stagnating output levels.
Nonetheless, Uruguay’s economic prospects are not 
all bleak. The population level has been stable, and per 
capita income is still among the highest in Latin America. 
And one benefit of the prolonged slump has been official 
awareness of the economic problems, and a growing consensus
xiv
that some action, perhaps painful action, will he required. 
Whether the people— after years of increasing welfare— will 
accept the required belt-tightening is another question.
But the need is clearly shown by the data cited in the Alli­
ance For Progress Weekly Newsletter for March 1̂ , 1966:
After averaging a modest 2.8 per cent growth from 1950 to 
1955> Uruguay became the only nation in Latin America to 
show a negative growth rate in both the 1955-60 and 196I-65 
periods. Some indicated policies would Include reducing wel­
fare, streamlining government operations, increasing the 
investment/consumption ratio, and encouraging agricultural 
industries.
Different chapters cover the historical, geographical, 
and demographic background; the public sector, the private 
sector, and the foreign sector. Finally, the fifth chapter 
provides a statistical summation, along with a few modest 
projections.
INTRODUCTION
If Adam Smith were writing on Uruguay today, he 
would likely entitle his work An Inquiry Into The Nature 
And Causes Of The Poverty Of The Nation. The purpose of 
this paper is to study Uruguay's economy to see how a 
nation with so many advantages would allow its economy to 
degenerate as the economy of Uruguay has during the past 
two decades. First, the postwar economic growth began to 
taper off; then output failed zo grow at all; and for the 
past three years, income per person has actually been 
decreasing.
One major cause of the country's impoverishment has 
been the implementation of extensive government welfare 
programs. Realistically, the "poor welfare state" may be 
expected to proliferate, and Uruguay deserves study as the 
Latin American prototype of this phenomenon.
"Latin America" evokes a stereotype of a tropical 
climate, mountainous or desert terrain, an Indo-Spanish 
population, revolutionary politics, and a slow-paced, feud- 
alistic economy. Uruguay, in contrast, has a temperate 
climate, not a single mountain or desert, a European pop-ate-'
ulation predominantly Italian, with no Indians, and a 
stable government with a progressive philosophy. Only in 
economic matters does Uruguay conform to the Latin American
xv
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stereotype. Uruguayan agriculture is still feudal, and 
the economy is slow-paced at test.
This paper attempts to determine how the economy of 
Uruguay degenerated during the last twenty years, until 
during the first half of the 1960’s, it languished in a 
state of economic stagnation. Obviously, an economy does 
not decay overnight, so some historical background is 
necessarily included. Because Uruguay’s history is so 
interesting, its Inclusion is no burden, either to the 
reader or to the writer. Just as one cannot divorce the 
present from the past, neither can one divorce the present 
from the future. So, finally, a projection of possible 
future development in the Uruguayan economy is included.
A rather interesting theoretical problem, or lapse, 
emerges, when one discusses the development of an economy 
such as Uruguay’s, and it is this: Economic theory has
much to say regarding growth rates of developed (i.e., 
high-income or well-structured) economies. Much has been 
said regarding the initiation of economic growth in under­
developed societies that are escaping the so-called "low- 
level equilibrium" trap. However, Uruguayan economy is 
neither "developed" nor "underdeveloped." Is it more aptly 
described as a case of arrested economic development. The 
country broke out of the underdevelopment trap, but failed 
to reach the plateau of self-sustaining growth in invest­
ment, savings, and income. The result is that Uruguay has
xvii
sunk Into a sort of economic limbo about which accepted 
theory is largely silent. It is not the aim of this paper, 
nor is it within the writer's competence, to provide a 
theory of arrested economic development. However, there 
are some points in economic theory which may, when brought 
together, explain much of Uruguay's unfortunate experience.
ORGANIZATION 
To represent the economy of such an area— not
j
generally well-known, still partly feudal, and largely 
dominated by the government— the following organization 
will serve conveniently:
Chapter I introduces the country through its his­
tory, its geography, and its politics.
The following chapters examine in detail the econ­
omy of Uruguay. Chapter II covers the government's exten­
sive involvement in the country's economy. Chapter III is 
a study of the restricted private sector. Chapter IV 
covers Uruguay's foreign business relations, conducted by 
both government and private enterprise. Finally, Chapter V 
presents a largely statistical assessment of the country's 
overall economic situation, and projects likely future 
developments.
SOURCES
Uruguay has virtually no subsistence sector in her 
economy, which means that almost all economic activity 
occurs in the market. This, In turn, means that data are
xviii
more accessible to Uruguayan collection agencies than they 
are In other countries of la tin America. Data are prepared 
and released by the government and by the Association of 
Banks. The consensus of observers is that the bankers* 
data are reliable. While this study was being prepared, 
the data of the Comislon de Inversion y Desarrollo Econo- 
mico (CIDE) became available. This commission is one of 
the better data-collecting and publishing agencies in Latin 
America, and their study was of great help in preparing 
this study.
External sources of published data include period­
icals and pamphlets by the Organization of American States, 
the United Nations, and the Bank of London & South America.
Studies of the country have been few, and most are 
out of date; however, some of the better ones available ares
The most recent study was published by the CIDE: 
Estudlo Eoonomlco del Uruguay s Svoluclones y Perspectivas, 
a two-volume work published in Montevideo in 1963. There 
are no translations of this paper known to the author, and 
only a relatively few copies originally prepared.
Another worthwhile work is P. B. Taylor*s Govern­
ment and Politics of Uruguay, written in i960 and published 
by Tulane University in 1962. It is fairly recent, but 
treats intensively only the political aspects of the coun­
try. The only other study of reasonably recent date is 
George Pendle*s Uruguay, published by the Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, London, 1957* It is a popular
xix
area study rather than an economic analysis*
There are five other studies of Uruguay which are 
often referred to: Pendle's 1952 work, Uruguay: South
America's First Welfare State (published by the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs); Russel H* Fitzgibbon's 
Uruguay: Portrait of a Democracy (published by Allen and 
Unwin, London, 1952), and best known for its excellent bib­
liography; two by Julio Martinez Lama: Riqueza y Pobreza
del Uruguay (published by Tipografia Allantida, Montevideo,■ 
19^6), and Economfa del Uruguay (published by Claudio Gar­
cia, Montevideo, 19*1-3)5 and Simon G* Hanson's Utopia in 
Uruguay (published by Oxford, New York, 1938)*
CHAPTER I
THE COUNTRY OP URUGUAY
Introduction
This chapter introduces Uruguay to the reader. The 
first section covers the country’s history and some of its 
prehistory as well. Uruguay’s past has been unusual from 
its very beginning. The original inhabitants, the Charrua 
Indians, a uniquely fierce and colorful group, were killed 
off completely by the colonists in a series of ferocious 
military campaigns. The country’s location on the east 
coast of South America, wedged between Argentina and Bra- 
.zil, made it a prize to be fought for by Spain and Portugal 
during the colonial period; and subsequently It became an 
area to be fought over by Argentina and Brazil. At the 
same time, a strong nationalistic spirit developed among 
the Uruguayans, which made them willing to fight for their 
independence. Consequently, the story of Uruguay’s emer­
ging nationhood and independence is one of the most inter­
esting in all Latin American history.
Similarly, the country’s history since Independence 
has been a gripping story of great, visionary leaders such 
as Jose Batlle y Ordonez, who united the country and set it 
on Its present progressive course during his two terms as
1
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president, from 1903 to 1907, and from 1911 to 1915* and 
Juan Pedro Varela, who was responsible for Uruguay's educa­
tional system and who literally worked himself to death in 
that cause.
Yet the history of Uruguay is more than a story of 
selfless men performing great deeds. It is also the story 
of power-hungry caudillos— political bosses; it is the 
story of political parties making pacts not always in the 
public interest; it is the story of vast political inertia 
caused by a form of progressive seduction, and causing, in 
turn, delay, bribery, graft, and misery; and most recently, 
it is the story of a nation on the edge of bankruptcy and 
under martial law as 180,000 government workers threaten 
to paralyze the country in a strike. In sum, the history 
of Uruguay has all the elements of a very satisfactory 
story, and an understanding of this history is necessary 
to an understanding of the development of the Uruguayan 
people, their hopes and their goals. Without knowing the 
historical background, one cannot reach an understanding 
of the present deeply depressed condition of the economy—  
a condition caused, tragically, by these people in their 
attempt to reach their goals and realize their hopes.
Finally, to complete the introduction to Uruguay, 
this chapter will cover the land— its geography and its 
raw materials; and the people— their general ethnic, cul­
tural and demographic features.
3
History
From the very start, the territory which was to 
become Uruguay was different from other areas of Latin 
America because the natives were different from those 
found in the rest of Iatln America. Uruguay had but one 
tribe— the Charrua, and they were fiercely individualistic, 
more like the Plains Indians of the United States than the 
other Indians of Latin America. The world*s thinking 
regarding the Latin American Indians has been strongly 
influenced by Prescott's The Conquest of Mexico and The 
Conquest of Peru, so that the most common view of the 
beginning of Latin American cultures, as we know them 
today, is as follows:
Typically, a highly organized and perhaps somewhat 
effete Indian civilization was taken over from the top by 
a small group of ruthless Conquistadores fighting grimly 
for God, gold, and glory. Once deprived of leadership, the 
Indians became ineffective as individuals and as a group.
In countries where this happened, the results are obvious 
to this day: a despised Indian population lives on the
margin of the Spanish community's social, economic, and 
political life. The mestizos (mixed breeds) have repud­
iated, so far as they were able, their Indian connections, 
and have identified as much as possible with the Spanish. 
Thus, the gap between the Indians and the rest of the soc­
iety has been made impassable by the removal of the only
1
available bridge— the mestizos.
In most Latin American countries, colonial adminis­
tration was simplified by the existence of more than one 
Indian tribe In the administrative unit, which made effec­
tive Indian counter-measures difficult, since fragmented 
Indian opposition was set against a unified European admin­
istration. The effect of all this on the present structure 
of the typical Latin American society is well-recognized, 
and one of the main effects was to provide a ready-made 
source of peon labor. However, because the Charrua Indian 
preferred death to peonage, Uruguay never had the supply 
of peon labor available in many Latin American countries.
Now, It is generally felt that the present Uruguayan 
society has roots going back no further than the turn of 
the century, when the unifying influence of Jose Batlle y 
QrdoSez was felt. In fact, Uruguay can trace the reasons 
for the present form of Its society back to pre-colonial 
times, although its early history is quite unlike the typi­
cal Latin American pattern described above.
The Indians. Uruguay was the only Latin American 
country to have been populated by only one Indian tribe—  
the Charrua— who were a nomadic people who also inhabited 
much of Argentina and Brazil.2 The main tribe was divided
■̂ Michel del Castello, "The Cry of a Silent People," 
Realltgs, No. 151 (1963), p. 59.
2Serafin Cordero, Los Charruas (Montevideos Edi­
torial Mentor, i960), Ch. TT~
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into five subtribes, and these were split into groups which 
averaged about fifty members. They have been described as 
a tall, taciturn people. Like the Plains Indians of the 
United States, they carried with them the bones of their 
ancestors when they traveled, and sought to achieve Indiv­
idual supernatural visions.
Historians have not studied and recorded the tribe 
or its struggles with the conquering Spanish, as thoroughly 
as in other cases,^ because the level of civilization was 
not so high as the other more familiar tribes and the mili­
tary encounters were not so interesting from a tactical or 
strategic standpoint. However, the material available 
shows that the military campaigns of the Spanish and the 
Charrua made up in ferocity what they lacked in finesse.
In their battles, as well as in the other features men­
tioned earlier, the Charrua bore a closer resemblance to the 
Indians of the United States Southwest than to the "typical" 
Latin American Indians. But it should be noted that the 
Charrua were similar in most respects to the other Indians 
of Patagonia because the level of civilization of that area 
was lower than that of the regions further north.
^E.g., George Murdock speaks of "exceedingly meager available Information" on the Charrua in the Outline of South American Cultures (New Haven: Human Relations Area
m e T  1951")"," p .hsz:----
kJ. Fred RIppy, Historical Evolution of Hispanic America (New York: Appletbn-Century-drofts, Tnc., 19^5)»
P. 29.
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The Colonial Period. In 1516 the Charrua killed 
the first of their European invaders, Juan Diaz de Solis, 
but, because the area lacked gold, not until 162^ did Euro­
pean colonization really get under way After the Indian 
population was subdued and decimated, the resulting society 
naturally assumed a different form than in areas where 
Indian labor was available. Thus, today, Uruguay is the 
only Iatin American country without an Indian component in 
the population.^
7However, before the ’’Spanish temperament” should 
be held responsible for the nature of the Spanish colonies 
in South America (and for the reprehensible reduction in 
the native population), one should consider the colonies of 
the other European powers in areas where conditions were 
more closely analagous to Latin America. For instance, in 
British Kenya an estimated one million net reduction in the 
native population occurred (from four down to three mil- 
lion), and In the Belgian Congo, native loss of life has
^Robert S. Kane, South America A to Z (New York: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962), p.l77. ~
^Cordero, o£. cit., p. 1^.
?For an excellent discussion of this concept, see
V. S. Pritchett, The Spanish Temper (New York: Harper 
Colophon Books, 135*0, pp.
^Clarence Barring, The Spanish Empire in America 
(New York: Oxford Press, 19̂ ')', p. 388*
7
gbeen estimated, at between fifteen and twenty million.
In matters of climate, native population, and pro­
duction, the African colonies were perhaps closer to the 
South American than were the North American colonies, and 
the administration was more similar also, in spite of being 
English, French, and Belgian rather than Spanish.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the religious 
and legal formalism of the Spanish was unique. For instance, 
reading the requerlmlento before destroying the native pop­
ulation made the act of quelling opposition b6th legal and
10moral, to the Spanish. However, slavery was prohibited 
on moral and legal grounds. Even if the population were 
pagan, their humanity made them potential Christians, and 
therefore not fit subjects for slavery. In place of slav­
ery, the eoomienda was institutionalized, which gave a 
Spanish colonizer (the enoomendero), the right to the labor 
of the residents of a certain area. The encomendero re­
ceived an allotment of land with one or more Indian vil­
lages. He had the right to the use of the land and the 
labor of the Indians. In return, he was expected to care
^S. L. Clemens, King Leopold's Soliloquy (Boston:
P. E. Warren Company, 19 0'5") 7 pT 4$ and Robert Park, "The Terrible Story of the Congo," Everybody's Magazine, VX 
(1906), ?65.   ----
10The requerlmlento was a statement which was re­quired to be read (and translated) to the natives, explain­
ing that they were to embrace Christianity and Spanish rule, and that any opposition would have to be eliminated.
8
for the religious and general welfare of the natives, and
keep the peace. In practice the system was so abused, it
was very like slavery, and was abolished by Charles V at
11the urging of churchmen on the scene.
Clearly, the results of the Spanish formalism and 
the Spanish temperament in general were different in Uru­
guay than in the rest of Latin America, and there are sev­
eral reasons for the differences. First, as noted, the 
native population was different. The Charrua were not a 
people easily controlled after being conquered. In this 
respect, the difference between the Charrua and, for exam­
ple, the Aztecs, was like the difference Machiavelli noted 
between the French and the Turks. The more organized soc­
iety may be more difficult to conquer, but easier to control 
after being conquered; while the more Individualistic soc­
iety will be harder to keep under control even if it should 
prove easier to defeat initially. Because they were too 
independent and Individualistic, the Charrua did not pro­
vide peon labor.
Furthermore, the climate and resource base of the 
Banda oriental del Uruguay ("the eastern shore of Uruguay") 
was unlike the tropical areas of Latin America. Gold and 
exotic tropical products were not available, and the com­
bined effect of climate, resources, and native population
“w* t»
■^David E. Moore, A History of Latin America (Rev. 
ed.; New York: Prentlce-HaXl, Inc., 1^2), p. 14o.
similar to North America made Uruguay’s development unlike 
most of Latin America in spite of the same "temperament” 
of the conquerors,
A final difference in the history of Uruguay was 
that while the rest of Latin America had a stable adminis­
tration under Spanish or Portuguese rule, Uruguay did not; 
this was largely responsible for Uruguay’s emergence as an 
independent nation. This development will be traced in 
the following section.
Independence. Although the Papal Bull of 1493 and
the treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 supposedly settled the
administration of Latin America between Spain and Portugal,
Uruguay remained a bone of contention. Finally, the Span-
ish-Portuguese rivalry led to the creation of Uruguay as a
buffer between Argentina and Brazil. British intervention,
mediated by Sir John Ponsonby, is generally regarded as the_
deciding factor in the creation of an independent Uru- 
12guay.
Despite being swapped back and forth between Argen­
tina and Brazil, Uruguay developed a clear spirit of 
nationalism. Finally, nationalism prevailed; Uruguay was 
born on August 28, 1828. Independence occurred under a 
treaty concluded by Argentina and Brazil with British med­
iation. The treaty guaranteed the nation's independence
12Rippy, o|>. cit., Ch. 3.
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for a five-year period.1-̂
Although Uruguay*s external independence was guar­
anteed by treaty, internal politics were not, in fact, in­
dependent of Argentina and Brazil for some time. Rival 
parties within Uruguay were perfectly willing to use for­
eign influence to help gain domestic power. Both Brazil 
and Argentina offered support to Uruguayan politicians, 
since both still desired the region. Many of the powerful 
political leaders (the caudillos), men such as Juan 
Antonio lavalleja, Fructuoso Rivera, Manuel Qribe, and 
Venancio Flores, made foreign arms and money a force in
ill,Uruguayan politics, and the effect was unsettling.
Rlppy reports that some thirty administrations existed in 
the country between 1830 and 1911» whereas constitution­
ally, only twenty should have ruled the land.1-*
In one respect— the importance of the caudlllo—  
Uruguay*s history is similar to that of the rest of Latin 
America. This pattern seems to be fairly constant in Latin 
American politics: the emergence of a political strong
man, a boss who controls his party by means of his powerful 
personality. The names of the two major parties— the Colo- 
rados (reds) and Blancos (whites)— were derived from the
•^George Pendle, Uruguay (New York: Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 1963), Ch. -3.
1 hMoore, oj>. cit., pp. 292-297.
•^Rippy, Q£. cit., pp. 189-190.
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banners of two such caudlllos.
The Emergence of Political Stability. Uruguay's 
early political history was chaotic: a story of fights
between parties and revolts within parties. Prom the first 
the opposing positions were drawn around the autocratic 
Blancos under Orlbe, favoring discipline, authoritarian 
rule, and religious intolerance for all but the Roman Cath­
olic faith; while the more democratic Colorados, under 
Rivera, favored theoretical liberalism of conscience, in­
dustry, and press.1^
The autocratic group has never been as powerful in 
Uruguay as in the rest of Latin America. They have never 
been numerous nor could they draw strength from a ready­
made peon group in a large subdued Indian population as in 
other parts of Latin America. As a result, throughout the 
1811-1868 period-chaotic as it was— the one discernible 
pattern was the emergence of the Colorados as the nation's 
dominant political group, and of liberalism as the dominant 
philosophy. And, as the country's political philosophy 
developed during the first part of the twentieth century, 
membership in a political party became more a matter of 
personal conviction, and less a question of family
■^Philip B. Taylor cites evidence that the liberal 
elements very early in Uruguay's history favored a colleg­
iate executive modeled after the Swiss. See Government and 
Politics of Uruguay (New Orleans: Tulane University,iw), ppTlBIT?.
12
tradition.
The distinction between the parties is revealed in 
the words of Alberto Zum Felde, quoted by Taylors
A Blanco Congress, convened after 190*1- in 
order to adopt policies and attitudes, recog­
nizes and declares, with pride in itself and 
scorn for the opposition, that the naoionalistas 
represent the gentlemanly, pure-blooded', and 
patrician tradition of Uruguay, while the _7 
Colorados are the party of the immigrants. ^
However, despite tendencies toward liberalism, and 
even despite the fact that Uruguay, by the early twentieth 
century, was the most liberal of the Latin American na­
tions, it cannot be said that all traces of "Latin Ameri­
can politics" have been removed. Even recently, Uruguayan 
politics have had as ingredients caudlllos, quiet deals 
between parties, attempted revolutions, assassinations, and 
other direct approaches which one has come to expect in the 
politics of Latin America,
Probably the best known figure in Uruguayan poli­
tics was Jose Batlle y Ordonez, who was president from 
1903 to 1907 and again from 1911 to 1915* Himself a cau- 
dillo, he made his life's work the liberalization of the 
politics of his country. He felt the then-existing consti­
tution encouraged caudilllsmo— authoritarian and generally 
elitist government— .and attacked the problem both by con­
stitutional change and social reform. Some contend that
■^Quoted in Taylor, op. cit., p. 18.
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modern Uruguay began with him, that all Uruguayan exper­
ience since him is merely his lengthened shadow. There is 
no doubt that he was a charismatic leader who left an 
indelible mark on the institutional development of his
nocountry.
Toward the end of Batlle*s life, and shortly after 
his death in 1929 > the government experienced a number of 
peculiar changes. A coalition of Blancos and conservative 
Colorados wanted executive power to be vested in a presi­
dent, while the Batllista wing of the Colorados wanted a 
council. Also, because the two factions fought over the 
form of the legislature, it was enlarged to accommodate 
both views.
A sluggish, unwieldy government resulted, which 
proved to be unable to respond adequately to the demands 
caused by the iworldwide depression of the 1930*s. For 
example, the national deficit and unemployment grew alarm­
ingly, and meat exports fell in both value and volume. At 
the same time, the government agencies Involved in pensions, 
public health and real estate lending were near bankruptcy. 
The government seemed unable to respond to, much less cope 
with, the situation.^9 There was widespread talk of, and 
some preparation for, revolution. This 1933 coup d*etat
l^Pendle, og. cit., pp. 30-32.
19Ibid., pp. 33-3^.
resulted in a mild dictatorship and also the 193^ constitu­
tion* There followed an unhappy period of bargains, com­
promises, and pacts between the leaders and parties, at the 
long-run expense of the country. Gabriel Terra, leader of 
the Colorados, was not able to command all of the factions 
of his party, and resorted to an agreement with Luis 
Alberto Herrera, leader of the Blancos. Meanwhile, Herrera 
could not control his own party, with the result that a 
significant movement began, to create a new party: Blancos
O AIndependientes.
The 1938 election revealed deep splits within the 
parties as Alfredo Baldomir, the Colorado president, was 
unable to muster much more support than Terra in his vic­
tory. A series of upheavals kept the country off balance} 
the understanding between Terra and Herrera collapsed;
Terra himself lost strength after Baldomir*s election; 
Herrera was shown to be receiving payments from Hitler*s 
agents in anticipation of services to be rendered; and 
general dissatisfaction was felt for the 193^ constitution 
as a device for maintaining the strength of the two leading 
parties.
There were several rather clear manifestations of 
the imminence of a coup, such as a notice in Baldomir*s
20M. Schurmann Pacheco and M* L. Coolighan 
Sanguinetti, Hlstoria del Uruguay, (3rd edition; Montevideo 
A. Monteverde y Cia, l^SS), pp. 500-501.
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newspaper, El Tiempo, on February 9> 19^2, that no elec­
tion would be held "within the present court." So, accord­
ing to Taylor, "when the blow actually fell on February 21, 
19*1-2, it was anticlimactic."21 The election was postponed 
nine months until November 29> 19*1-2, and during that per­
iod, a new constitution was written, based on the results 
prepared by study groups in 19**0 and 19*1-1*22 The new con­
stitution was accepted, and Dr. Juan Jose Amezaga was 
elected in a surprisingly light vote (just under 67 per 
cent of the 858,713 qualified voters).2-̂
The "new" constitution of 19*1-2 was in fact very 
much like the 193*1- edition, in retaining practically the 
same unwieldy structure of government; the fact that the 
country was able to operate under it for ten years was due 
to the renewed spirit of the Uruguayans rather than to any
i
substantial improvement in their machinery of government.2^ 
Finally, the leaders of the Batlle wing of the Col­
orado party split as a nephew, Luis Batlle, broke with the 
sons of Jose Batlle, Cesar and Lorenzo. The victorious 
Colorado faction, under Luis, made a new pact with the now 
frustrated and impatient Blancos, and the result was put
Taylor, 0£. cit., p. 29.
2^Schurmann, op. cit., pp. 512-51*1-.
2^Taylor, o£. cit., p. 30.
22jIbid., pp. 30-32, 153.
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before the voters in the plebiscite of 1951* which has 
shaped Uruguayan politics up to the present.2^
The Present Political Situation. The changes which 
began in 1951 developed as follows: The liberal Colorados
had always accepted the idea of a collegiate administration 
almost as an article of faith. The conservative Blancos 
traditionally had favored the executive power centered in 
a single head. However, the party's views were changed by 
the consistent Colorado victories. In 1951,' another pact 
of the parties was concluded, to permit a nine-man colle­
giate executive council patterned after the Swiss govern­
ment, distributing membership between the two top parties 
in the voting. Six members would belong to the majority 
party, and three to the minority, in order to protect the 
interests of both parties by insuring representation to 
both, in any government. ° Historically, this was almost 
always true of the pacts. The Colorados saw a chance to 
install their long-cherished aim of a group executive; and 
the Blancos, an opportunity to have at least some represen­
tation even though they had been unable to win elections. 
Since the Blancos won the 1958 election after ninety-three 
years of trying, and have remained in power ever since,
25Ibid.
2^Schurmann, oip, cit., pp. 520-526.
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the decision might have been regretted.*^
Under the 1951 pact, at least, the parties* at­
tempts to carry out their own purposes seems to have 
worked to the advantage of the nation. Evidently this was 
the general feeling, for in 1962 the voters rejected a pleb­
iscite to replace the nine-man council with a single presi­
dent1. The disinclination to change is all the more strik­
ing since the election occurred during a period of very 
severe economic problems.
In the years 1952-1967, the liberal dreams of a 
collegiate executive actually developed into a very conser­
vative- organ. The nine-man team bogged down in a mass of 
detail; no effective leadership developed; and change be­
came impossible with no one to control over-all policy.
It was partly as a result of lack of leadership 
that the 1958 election went to the Blancos. There were 
other contributing factors:
(1) One was the deep and formal split between the 
Luis Batlle and Cesar Batlle factions of the Colorado party.
(2) The Blancos, on the other hand, had learned an 
important lesson from their earlier splits, and consoli­
dated three major factions to make up their list of candi­
dates •
(3) Rural support, which means the two-thirds of
27'Christian Science Monitor, "Blancos Keep Council 
Hold," November 27, 1962.
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the nation’s nearly two and a half million population liv­
ing outside of Montevideo, had swung over to the Blancos. 
This swing took place because a long-standing Colorado pol­
icy had been to subsidize development of urban industry at 
the expense of agriculture, by means of a system of multi­
ple exchange rates.
(*0 A final Important factor in the 1958 election 
was the severe downturn in the business cycle. The ten­
dency of the terms of trade to worsen had been growing 
since 1950, and had become very serious by the end of the 
1950's.28
In the 1962 election, the Blancos kept their lead­
ership in the council. However, there were three minority 
parties, which prevented either major party from winning a 
majority in the Senate or in the Chamber of Deputies. In 
the thirty-one seat Senate, Blanco membership fell from 
seventeen"to fifteen, with the Colorados winning fourteen 
seats. The pro-Castro Leftist Liberation Front won one 
seat, as did the Roman Catholic Democratic Party. In the 
Chamber of Deputies, with ninety-nine members, the Blancos 
won forty-six (down from fifty-one), the Colorados forty- 
five; the Communists and Catholics, three each; and the 
popular Union won the remaining two seats.
28Taylor, op. cit., pp. 40, 41, 48, 49, 63-65. 
2^Christian Science Monitor, op. cit., p. 13.
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Uruguay has consistently "been willing to esqperi- 
ment, trying to find the best way for the country, which, 
in a sense, is to discover the general will. However, the 
net result of all the country*s political experimentation 
has been unsuccessful to date, and presently, the politi­
cal and economic situation is chaotic. Extreme inflation 
has led to demands for higher wages by 180,000 government 
workers, and the government, faced with bankruptcy, appar­
ently unable to pay its workers, its pensioners, or its 
overseas creditors, and aware of the pressing need to halt 
runaway inflation, has refused the workers* demands. The 
result of this Impasse, in October, 1965, was a threatened 
strike by the workers, and the imposition of martial law 
by the government.3° As this is being written, the un­
wieldy nine-man council executive has been voted out in 
favor of a single president. ^  As an earnest of further 
change, this may be the most portentious development in 
the country*s recent political history.
The History of Education. Like her political his­
tory, Uruguay's history of education is largely the story 
of one man's work; however, in this area, the name is not 
Batlle, but Jose Pedro Varela, the frail son of a family 
of educators. Varela left Uruguay in 1867 on a trip to
3°Tampa (Florida) Tribune, October 8, 1965, p. 4-A. 
^Ibid., November 29, 1966, p. 2-A.
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Europe and the United States, where the ideas on education 
he absorbed led him to write a series of letters on educa­
tional reform which were published in Montevideo news­
papers. Then, on his return in September, 1868, he made 
his first public address in Montevideo, which resulted in 
the formation that same night of the Society of the Briends 
of Popular Education. In I869, the society established an 
experimental school where many of Varela's ideas were 
tried. In 1874, he published The Education of the People, 
followed by a second book In 18?6, On School Legislation. 
The book was a proposed law, whose features so impressed 
the then dictator, Lorenzo Latorre, that one year later,
In I877, the first school reform law was passed, using 
Varela's proposals almost verbatim.
This was the start of his career, but It was also 
the beginning of the end for Jose Pedro Varela. He was 
appointed national Inspector of the General Administration 
of Primary Education, and the additional duties helped to 
undermine his frail health. He died in October, 1879.^
The History of Pensions. By 1942, virtually ev­
ery worker had been brought under some pension plan, but 
since the "system" resulted from a century of piecemeal 
growth, it was ultimately complex and cumbersome, despite
32Russell H. Fitzgibbon, Uruguay: Portrait of a 
Democracy (London: Allen & Unwin," 1956), pp. 201-202.
33lbld.
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one unification attempt in 1919* In order to rationalize 
the situation and to build a true, workable system, the 
various plans brought under three major individual funds 
in 19^8, covering first, industrial and commercial workers; 
second, civil and educational employees; and third, rural 
and domestic employees, along with retired pensioners.
Each of the three has been organized as an autonomous agen­
cy in its own right, and three are combined to form (and 
are supervised by) the Retirement and Pensions Institute 
of Uruguay. ^
The structure of pension arrangements is extremely 
complex as well as extremely liberal. Most social welfare 
programs had an early start in Uruguay, and the pension 
plans are no exception. Once the I830 constitution had 
been promulgated, the country did not delay in sanctioning 
the right of all national employees to a pension. This 
right was established by the law entitled Number 173, 
passed in 1838.33
The first groups of government workers to be eli­
gible for pensions were named in I83O. More and more 
groups were added, until the 1838 law established the eli­
gibility of all government workers to retirement benefits.
3^Cesar Martinez Degiorgis, "Jubilaclon Para Los 
Funclonarios En Uruguay,11 Seguridad Social, No. 6, Ano LX, 
Epoca III (November-December, i960)' Mexico, D.F., pp. 5-12.
35Ibid.
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The same process was going on among groups of non-govern­
ment workers. However, not until 19^2 did legislation 
specifically state the principle that every member of 
society was entitled to at least a minimum level of liv-
The Early History of Government Ownership of 
Industry. The first entry of the government into business 
ownership happened accidentally, and since it involved 
banking— one of the main areas of direct government in­
volvement— it makes a good starting place for this part of 
the story.
In his book, Jose Batlle y Ordonez of Uruguay, 
Milton I. Vanger describes the situation:
In the late 1880*s, Argentine speculation 
flowed over into Uruguay and contaminated local 
businessmen. A fabulous promoter, Emilio Reus, 
was at the center of the boom. He was full of 
schemes— for new business (500 new companies 
were Incorporated), for real estate develop­
ments (in 1902 the unfinished streets still 
stood on the outskirts of Montevideo), for a 
new private bank under government sponsorship, 
the Banco wacional. When the Banco Nacional 
failed, the government almost failed too, 
since it had to settle with the creditors. 
Government debt shot up, its income dropped 
precipitately; government workers took 15 per 
cent pay cuts. The government was left with 
the Montevideo electric power system on its 
hands, something salvaged from the crash.
The total cost to government and busi­
nessmen of the economic disaster was at least 
200 million gold pesos, almost equal to the 
entire declared property value of the country. 
Later the government set up a new Bank of the 
Republic to act as its agent and to engage in 
general banking. The Bank of the Republic was 
intended as a joint state-private bank, but
23
though the new tank was conservatively managed,
private capital refused to invest.37
This, then, was the start of government ownership 
in Uruguay. It was the result of supporting private enter­
prise, and not the result of a socialist plan, hut it in­
stalled the government as owner of a hank and a public util­
ity. Presently, the government has three major hanks; the 
Central Bank (Banco de la Repuhlica), the Mortgage Bank 
(Banco Hipotecario), and the Insurance Bank (Banco de 
Seguro del Sstado). All three were established during 
Batllefs 1911-1915 term.38 
Geography
Position. Uruguay is located between 30° and 35° 
South Latitude, and 53° and 59° West Longitude. That 
places the northenmost part of the country several hundred 
miles south of the Tropic of Capricorn; about equivalent to 
Los Angeles in the Northern Hemisphere.
It is located on the east coast of South America, 
and is considerably further east than the easternmost part 
of the United States. (Maine’s east coast extends to 670 
West Longitude, while Uruguay’s western border is 59° West 
Longitude). Its location on the South American continent 
is south of Brazil and east of Argentina.
37(Cambridge, Mass.* Harvard University Press, 1963),pp. 7-8.
38Schurmann, op. cit., pp. 475-^76.
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A little larger than North Dakota, Uruguay Is the 
smallest country In South America, with 72,153 square 
miles. However, "small" is only relative, since, as a 
Uruguayan professor put it, "You could put Belgium, the 
Netherlands,[Denmark, and Switzerland inside Uruguay, and 
still have plenty of room left over."39
Borders and Hydrographic Features. The shape of 
the country is roughly triangular, or rather like an In­
verted heart. More than 'half of Uruguay’s borders are 
formed by navigable waterways. The western boundary Is the 
Uruguay River, which is navigable for 200 miles past the 
Rio de la Plata to Salto, where a chain of falls and rapids 
bars further river steamer passage. The confluence of the 
Uruguay with the Parana and Negro forms the Rio de la Plata 
which Is an unusual hydrographic feature. If it is a river 
it is the world’s widest, being 137 miles across. It is a 
sort of estuary, but geographers argue with that descrip­
tion on technical grounds. Perhaps the early Spanish ex­
plorers had the best description; they called It on the 
maps "Mar Dulce"— fresh water sea. However, when the wind 
is off the ocean, the water becomes almost as salty as the 
ocean Itself. Tides in the Rio de la Plata change the 
water level as much as six feet and have been known to vir­
tually empty the area, leaving a great flat marsh.
3^Quoted In Luis Marden’s article "The Purple Land 
of Uruguay," National Geographic, XCIV (November, 1948),
623.
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The Brazilian border starts at Bella Union and 
Cuareim in the north on the Uruguay River, and then runs 
generally south and west along the Yaguaron River to the 
Laguna Merln, where the last hundred miles run generally 
southward.
There are several fairly important hydrographic 
features in the interior, including the embalse^0 of the 
Rio Negro itself, which traverses the country from east to 
west until it runB into the Uruguay River on the western 
border. Right in the center of the country, the Rincon 
del Bonete Dam was constructed to back up the Rio Negro 
into a ramified lake. The Rincon del Bonete power project 
is important to the country because of the scarcity of coal, 
oil and sources of power other than hydroelectric,
Uruguay Is well-known for its recreational facili­
ties, Salto, the head of navigation on the Uruguay, is 
famous for salmon fishing. There are more than fifty 
beaches on the Uruguayan "Riviera** around Montevideo, The 
sandy, lagoon-dotted coast between the capital and Brazil 
has been made the Santa Teresa National Park, .
There are a number of inland rivers, such as the YI 
and the Cebollatl, which are not so Important economically 
as the Negro and the Uruguay,
Land Forms. There is little new which can be said
^ Embalset a forced collection of waters; artifi­
cial lake.
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concerning the land forms of Uruguay. The landscape has 
been well publicized by writers as early as W. H. Hudson
hiin The Purple Land That England Lost, published in 1885.
Uruguay is a land of rolling hills. It is a mono­
tonous landscape; however, it is one which gladdens the 
eye and heart of the economist, virtually all the land is 
arable. There are no mountains, deserts, jungles, rain­
forests, swamps, limestone sink holes, or other features 
typical of Latin American geography, and which enchant vis­
itors and impoverish the nation.
Even the "mountain" from which the capital derives
its name is purely a euphemism. (One version of how the
city got its name is that one of Magellan’s sailors cried,
"Monte vld eu"— "I see a mountain.") The highest point
around Montevideo is ^50 feet, which does look high in con-
Ilotrast to the surrounding land. However, the highest 
point in the entire country is the Cerro de las Animas near 
Piriapolis, east of Montevideo, and it is only 1,6*J4 feet 
high.
Most of this rolling land is in natural pasture, 
and almost all of the country Is suitable for some sort of 
agriculture. Virtually none of the land has natural forest 
cover, although some tree farms have been started
.^(Londons Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1885) 
Vol. I, 286 pp.; Vol. II, 265 pp.
b2.Marden, oj). cit., Pitzgibbon, og. cit., p. 623.
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'successfully. Much of the tree planting has "been for wind­
breaks, for the land is subject to strong winds sweeping 
across the pampas. Particularly severe storms are called 
pamperos, and it is the pamperos which have been known to 
clear the Rio de la Plata of water, leaving the coast at 
Buenos Aires— 125 miles upstream from Montevideo— a bare 
mud flat.^
Natural Animal and Vegetable Life. In the time of 
the Spaniards, the main types of natural animal life were 
the puma, the rhea (American ostrich), and several types 
of small rodents. Now, the puma and rhea have largely 
been destroyed. Occasionally, penguins venture as far 
north as Uruguay, and some seals live on the offshore 
Islands.
Natural vegetation consists almost entirely of 
prairie grass and the wild flowers which give Uruguay the 
name "the purple land." There were a few species of hard­
woods, but no real forest cover, and some palm trees 
around Montevideo in the sandy stretches. Practically no 
new palms grow because cattle eat the tender young plants.
Mineral Resources. Uruguay is rather deficient in 
many important mineral resources. There is no gold, which 
explains the Spaniards* original indifference to Uruguay. 
The only coal is a little low-grade lignite, and there are
^Ibia., p. 625
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no proved oil reserves. In The Mineral Resources of the 
World, practically the only attention given to Uruguay Is 
to admit the possibility of oil, and to acknowledge a cer­
tain water power potential.^ There are also small amounts 
of pyrites and superphosphates. Until recently, Uruguay 
was thought to be completely deficient in metallic re­
sources. Iron ore deposits have been discovered, but so 
far have not proved economically workable.
Political Divisions. The country is divided into 
nineteen departments which vary in size and in density of 
population frcm Montevideo, with 256 square miles and 
around 3500 persons per square mile, to Tacuarembo, with 
8,112 square miles, and around fourteen persons per square 
mile.
The Capital.. Any discussion of the geography of 
Uruguay should, perhaps, begin with Montevideo itself, be­
cause probably in no other country of the world is national 
life so dominated by one city. About one-third of the 
country’s 2.7 million population live In Montevideo. It is 
the political capital, the financial center, the cultural
William van Royen and Olver Bowles (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952).
^One of the departments and its capital are named 
for the number of Invaders who once crossed the river to 
attempt to take the country from the Portuguese hands-- 
Treinta y Tres (Thirty-three)• The heroic and sublime 
impossibTlity of thirty-three men liberating a country 
helped to rally the people, and they were a major factor 
in the country’s ultimate Independence.
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center, the trading center of the nation. Over 75 per 
cent of the nation's foreign commerce passes through the
port of Montevideo.^
Like many of the American cities which were early 
European settlements, Montevideo has grown in fairly dis­
tinct waves. The "Old City" was only ahout one-half of a 
square mile in area, and dates back to 1726, It is on the 
small peninsula which reaches out to protect the bay. From 
an early start of two wooden and forty hide houses in 1726, 
the city grew steadily until the middle of the 19th cen­
tury, Then, a wave of growth, which lasted half a century, 
caused the "New City" to be built. The New City was sev­
eral times the area of the Old City, and built up around 
the bay. Finally, in the early part of this century, 
another wave of growth hit the city, and the "Newest City" 
grew to several times the combined size of the Old and New 
cities. It is expected that another growth wave will per­
haps double the city's size in the next generation.^
Rapid growth should prove troublesome to the city, 
because it is not planned in the current usage of the term, 
which Implies an architect's scheme for the physical layout.
^Aside from being almost self-evident, authority 
can be found for this statement of Montevideo's uniquely 
important role. See, for instance, Cayetano DiLeoni and 
Santa DiLorenzo, Geographia (*fth Edition; Montevideo: 
Monteverde, 1957)7 PP. i^O, 141, and 150.
^Fitzglbbon, 0£. cit,, pp. 2?-39.
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The city grew naturally. It is a clean city, with conven­
ient markets and parks. It Is a city whose comforts and 
facilities have made tourism one of Uruguay*s ma^r indus­
tries. But it does have shortcomings, and probably the 
main shortcoming involves transportation within the city 
itself. Like most old cities, the original section is the 
financial and business center, and builders in the 1700*s 
did not visualize the internal transportation problems of 
the 1900*s. Traffic congestion is compounded by the midday 
siesta, which Is customary even though it Is not required 
by the climate.
In general, the city gives a prosperous middle- 
class appearance which is quite genuine. However, a slum 
area does exist, because even though Montevideo is not 
highly Industrialized, there Is sufficient industry to have 
produced an industrial slum area in the far northwest part 
of the city.
The People
The people of Uruguay, are relatively prosperous.
In per capita gross national product, Uruguay is In 19th 
place In the world, with $569; ln Latin America, second 
only to Venezuelas*s $762*̂ ® (Venezuela is recognized as a 
special case; Uruguay*s gross national product Is certainly
This and the following data are taken from Norton 
GInzberg*s Atlas of Economic Development (Chicago: Univer­
sity of Chicago PressfTTSSTJ.
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more evenly distributed.
Uruguay shares 76th place with Ecuador in popula­
tion density, with 14- persons per square kilomater. By 
comparison, the United States has 21, China 63.9* and 
Bussia 8.9. Uruguay has not experienced the population 
pressures of much of Latin America. The annual growth 
rate in Uruguay is 1*4 per cent, which compares with 2.3 
or 2.4 for all of Latin America. Only three Latin American 
nations have experienced slower rates of population growth; 
Uruguay*s low rate of population increase may be due to a 
large number of abortions— perhaps as many as three-fourths 
of all pregnancies end in abortion.5°
As the economy broadens and diversifies, the pro­
portion of people engaged in agriculture becomes smaller.
The United Kingdom and the United State are the world 
leaders in this respect, with 5 per cent and 12 per cent of 
the population in agriculture. Worldwide, Uruguay shares 
21st place with Puerto Rico, and in Latin America, they 
share 3rd place after Argentina and Chile.
Between 80 and 85 per cent of the population are 
literate, second to Argentina (85 to 90 per cent) in Latin 
America, and in 29th place worldwide. The country is first
^United Nations, Estudio Bconomico de America 
Latina 19^3> as quoted in Banco de la Republics. Oriental del 
Ur,uguay~T3oTetin, Nos. 271-272-273 Jullo-Agosto-Setiembre 
1965 (Montevideo), p. 17.
"Population: The Problem of Our Time," Time,
LXXXVI (August 20, 1965), 34.
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among Latin Americans in daily newspaper circulation; 
twentieth in the world. However, in proportion of children 
between the ages of five and fourteen in primary schools, 
Uruguay is fifty-fourth (^5 per cent), about the mid-point 
of the world’s distribution, and slightly better than 
average in Latin America,
Another important measure of education is the per­
centage of the total population in post-primary schools. 
Uruguay shares 28th place with Panama, and only Puerto Rico 
rates higher in Latin America (second in the world).
In terms of income and education, the Uruguayan 
population is one of the two or three best qualitatively 
in Latin America, but there is considerable room for im­
provement compared with Western Europe and North America.
In all Latin America, Uruguay probably has the strongest 
middle class and the most even distribution of income. 
Conclusion
To sum up briefly, this chapter has introduced the 
unique land and people of Uruguay. The country’s history 
is not only a most interesting story, but also a key to the 
present goals and future economic development of the coun­
try. The land lies in the temperate zone; possesses sea­
port facilities; and could best be described as a huge 
prairie with almost unlimited agricultural potential. How­
ever, the land is almost totally lacking in mineral wealth. 
Finally, the chapter covered the basic ingredient in any
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economy, the people, in a brief demographic study of the 
country.
Uruguay is in severe economic trouble, but the 
blame cannot be laid on the people, who are generally of 
European stock, well-educated, and middle-class. Neither 
can the blame be placed on the land itself. Although 
deficient in minerals, it is flat and fertile, and has 
hydroelectric potential enough for the country. The blame 
for Uruguay's recent political and economic paralysis, as 
well as the blame for long-standing problems of economic 
stagnation, must be placed on the country's welfare philo­
sophy, and its implementation by the government, the topic 




In this chapter, the economic role of the Uruguayan 
government is examined and evaluated. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Jose Batlle y Ordonez, in his two terms 
as president at the start of this century, put Uruguay on 
the road to extensive social legislation, widespread wel­
fare benefits, and substantial government ownership of 
industry. He initiated these government policies in the 
belief that they would further the general well-being of 
the people. The country has followed Batlle*s lead, so 
that now the government is involved in virtually all phases 
of the economy, either directly as employer, producer, or 
disburser of benefits; or indirectly as rulemaker or ref­
eree. In recent years, the government's monetary and fis­
cal policies have cause such extreme inflation and conse­
quent unrest, that at the time of this writing, the country 
has been placed under a state of siege.
In many underdeveloped countries, the public sector
3^
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is regarded as a "catalyst in economic development.
However, in Uruguay, the public sector has been anything 
but a development catalyst. Particularly in two ways, 
under the Mesmer theory, the Uruguayan government has 
followed policies which have resulted in choking off, 
rather than stimulating the economic growth. First, as a 
generator of savings, the Uruguayan government has been an 
outstanding failure. Perhaps 90 per cent of the govern- 
ment's receipts go to current expenditure, leaving possi­
bly no more than 10 per cent to be saved. The second point 
is the large number of relatively unproductive government
IIworkers. But, whereas most other countries with the pro­
blem of large numbers of unproductive government workers 
can blame it on the maintenance of a large army, in Uruguay 
the problem is due entirely to a huge, cumbersome bureau­
cracy. The significance of these two points will be fur­
ther pointed up in the development of the chapter and in 
its statistical appendix.
There is also a third point in the Mesmer thesis 
which is applicable to the case of Uruguay; that is, a 
country may use its tax structure to stimulate economic
1Theodore C, Mesmer, "The Public Sector in Latin 
America: Its Role in the Process of Economic Growth,"




development. In this regard, also, Uruguay has done the 
reverse; particularly by falling to provide any tax Incen­
tive to Improve the economic performance of farms and 
ranches. However, this question is considered further in 
the following chapter. The country's failure to stimulate 
the economy through a different tax structure is under 
discussion currently in Uruguay, and is subject to change.
This chapter is developed as follows: Pirst,
Uruguay's concept of the welfare state Is examined, and con­
sideration given to the country's labor legislation. Then, 
public health is studied. Medical services are usually a 
basic area for government involvement in- many countries, 
yet in Uruguay most medical service is provided by private 
facilities; the reasons are rather Interesting. The third 
topic of this chapter is education. Uruguay now offers free 
education from grade school through graduate school, but 
despite education's brave beginning under the guidance of 
Jose Pedro Varela, as recounted in the previous chapter, 
education In Uruguay today is beset by problems which are in 
great part reflections of larger difficulties facing the 
entire society. The fourth topic is the Pandora's box of 
welfare payments; Uruguay's public coffers were first opened 
in 1830 to pay pensions to selected government workers. Like 
Pandora's box, the first small troubles flew out unnoticed. 
Now the troubles and payments have grown to such a size that 
they threaten the very stability of the country, and this
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part of Uruguay’s story could be instructive for many 
nations presently building a welfare structure. The fifth 
topic to be studied is the government ownership of indus­
try. Then the public sector is evaluated; and finally, 
data pertinent to this chapter are appended in a Statis­
tical Annex.
The Uruguayan Concept of the Welfare State
The historical development of the Uruguayan welfare 
state has been described in Chapter I, so this section will 
be confined to an outline of the present role of the govern­
ment in the economy. The government has entered most ac­
tively into labor relations, health services, education, 
pensions (and other transfer payments), and ownership of 
certain industries. To perform these functions, the gov­
ernment has become by far the nation's largest employer, 
hiring some 21 per cent of the work force.^
The aggressive entry of the government into the 
welfare area is indicated by Pltzgibbon, who cites over 
eighty separate pieces of legislation involving such fields 
ass working hours; annual vacation and weekly rest periods; 
minimum wages; dismissal and unemployment compensation; 
child, rural, domestic and female labor; bakery night work; 
labor exchanges; occupational diseases and accidents, and
■̂ United States Embassy, Summary of CIDE Report 
(Montevideo, 1963), p. 3.
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a variety of other compensatory and transfer payments, and
£
other subsidized services, such as health and housing.
This impressive, though partial, list covers only the more 
important aspects of the Uruguayan welfare state.
The cost of government operations has been under 
10 per cent of gross national product, and the rapid in­
crease has been due more to rising prices than to any re­
cent extension of government services. Tables 2, 3s and 5 
show that increases in the cost of government have about 
matched increases in the price level. As may be seen in 
Table 2, the value of central government consumption in 
1961 pesos increased so little from 1955 to 1961, that it 
could almost be considered a constant— the annual increase 
averaged around one and a half per cent. However, central 
government expenditures in current prices increased more 
than four-fold (Table 3) almost matching the five-fold in­
crease in the wholesale price index as shown in Table 5.
Tables 2 and 8 show that social security payments 
and collections have been greater than the sums involved 
in the other aspects of operating the central government. 
The large social security item is to be expected with Uru­
guay’s emphasis on welfare, and as Mesmer points out, it is 
a primary cause of the government’s failure to generate 
savings•̂
^Fitzgibbon, op. cit., p. I79f.
nMesmer, op. cit., p. 26.
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Public Health
Uruguay has escaped, most of the health problems 
facing the majority of Latin American nations. The coun­
try’s temperate climate and superior income levels have all 
but wiped out tropical diseases and malnutrition. The 
leading causes of death in Uruguay sound very much like 
those of the United States, and none of the major killers 
in Latin America generally appear on the Uruguayan list. A 
study made in the 1950's revealed that Uruguay had one of - 
the lowest decth rates in the world at that time, and an 
earlier study in the 19^0's showed that the country had not 
only the lowest death rate in all the Americas, but the low-
Q
est of all the countries surveyed.
Even though Batlle's political philosophy included 
the idea of freely available health service, and despite 
the elaborate welfare arrangements in other areas, Uruguay 
has no national health insurance. More than half the popu­
lation belongs to scxne form of mutual health insurance pro­
gram, and another third receives private medical treatment. 
Less than 10 per cent of the population depends on the gov­
ernment-operated clinics. The reason for this lack of pat­
ronage is the bureaucratic administrative difficulties
o("typically Latin" y  facing prospective patients.
Q
Pltzgibbon, o£. cit., p. 169.
^Taylor, 0£. cit., pp. 112-113.
*J-0
Surveys agree unanimously that Montevideo has a 
disproportionately large share of the nation*s health fac­
ilities.1  ̂ However, during the last two decades, two 
successful programs have increased and improved medical 
care outside the capital. The InterAraerican Cooperative 
Public Health Service— (Servicio Cooperativo Interameri- 
oano de Salud Publica) SCISP— was a joint Uruguayan-United 
States program which within its first few years was serving 
over 100,000 patients in four rural areas.11 The Ministry 
of Health has also put medical centers in all of the de­
partment capitals as well as other towns, but still most 
of the public and even more of the private medical facili­
ties are in Montevideo.12 Even though budgetary problems, 
starting in i960, required curtailment of certain facili­
ties, such as the recently completed hospital, of the Uni­
versity, comparative data on death rates and disease show 
Uruguay*s public health situation to be one of the* best in 
Latin America,1  ̂so the nation is in generally good physi­
cal health, but not because of governmental programs. 
Education.
A more effective government program can be found in
10Pendle, og. cit., p. 1*1-5.
11Pitzgibbon, op. cit., pp. 176-179.
12Taylor, oj>. cit., p. 113.
13-uPendle, op. cit., p. *1-5.
public education, but even though Uruguay's literacy rate 
is higher than most of Latin America, a continuing hard 
core of illiteracy plagues the educational system. The 
law has provided for free compulsory lay education since
but strict enforcement was (and still is) imposs­
ible (see Table 6), because of the difficulty of reaching 
all of the rural children.
Presently, public education is controlled by four 
autonomous agenoies--ente s autonomos— all coordinated, and 
to some extent controlled by, the Ministry of Public In- 
structlon and Public Welfare. The National Council for 
Primary and Normal Teaching is in charge of three years of 
kindergarten, six years of grade school, and grade school 
teacher training. The National Council of the Labor Uni­
versity supervises the trade school system (which started 
out as houses of correction under the military dictator, 
Lorenzo Latorre). The Central University Council manages 
the University of Montevideo; however, the students them­
selves have Increasingly demanded a voice In the adminis­
tration of the school, and this agitation has been in­
creasingly criticized.
^Fitzgibbon, op. cit., p. 182.
^Aldo S. Solari, Sociologia Rural Nacional (Monte­
video: Facultad de Derecho, p."*R>5ff~
1^Taylor, op. cit., pp. 12^-125.
17Ibid., p. 127.
kz
Even though public education through advanced uni­
versity degrees is "free" except for books and supplies—  
(see Table ? for the cost per student)— patronage of pri­
vate schools has been increasing faster than that of public 
schools, partly for reasons of prestige and religion, but 
also because of the quality of education, since low pay in 
public schools has resulted in considerable emigration of 
teachers, and in a lowering of quality.1  ̂ So, in education
Ias in other areas of public welfare, the attempt to offer 
as much as possible seems to have been self-defeating, and 
may not have best served the public welfare.
Transfer Payments
Similarly, the welfare philosophy of Uruguay has 
resulted in a proliferation of pensions, compensations, 
benefits, and other transfer payments, and here, too, the 
effort to provide too much has been self-defeating. Some 
30 per cent of all Uruguayans either receive government 
pensions or have close relatives that do.-1-̂  Pension pay­
ments are high in Uruguay for two interrelated reasons. 
First, organized pressure groups represent both pensioners 
and labor groups .in their programs. Since there is consid­
erable overlap in the aims of the two groups, their combined 
pressure has been perhaps partly responsible for the
1^Ibid.; Marcha, May 13, i960, p. 2.
•^Taylor, og. cit., p. 55.
second factor, which Is that a large majority of Uruguayans, 
some 71 per cent of them, favor more benefits to pension-
OAers. So transfer payments are highly important now, and
pressure for still larger payments continues to grow, (See
Tables 1 and 8.) Since pensions account for the income of
21the equivalent of 30 per cent of the labor force, the 
result is that every 3.3 workers are supporting one retired 
member of the work force. This deactivates a large part 
of the labor force of an economy whose major need is to 
increase output and control inflation, rather than to cor­
rect insufficient demand.
The goal of the Institute remains to insure retire­
ment payments for all Uruguayans who either reach old age 
or are unable to work. However, the effectiveness of the 
scheme is greatly weakened not only by inflation but also 
by bureaucratic delay. For instance, Taylor quotes from an 
interview with Deputy Gervasio Domenech in which the Deputy 
says that some 20 per cent of all applicants die before ever 
receiving any benefits.22 The CIDE study of the Uruguayan 
economy likewise concludes that only about 80 per cent of 
all claims ever get paid.2  ̂ With an average processing
20"Uruguay," Time, (November 27, 19W ,  p. 4-6.
21United States Embassy, og. cit., p, 2,
22Taylor, og. cit,, p. 230. .
2^Comlsion de Inversion y Desarrollo Economico, 
Estudio Economico del Uruguay, Tomo II (Montevideo: CIDE, 1963), pT~ZZ.
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delay of two to three years, the 20 per cent attrition rate 
among old-age claimants is quite understandable, and the 
delay must also cause considerable hardship for other can­
didates on relief. Because of this, considerable graft
24exists in the form of payments to expedite certain claims.
Retirement under Uruguayan Social Security is based 
on a point system: one point per year of age and one per
year of job longevity. Provided that he earned at least 
thirty points for Job longevity anyone retiring with ninety 
points accrued is entitled to full pay, which is computed 
as his average wage for the last five years he was employed. 
Retirees with less than ninety points total, or less than 
thirty points longevity, receive correspondingly smaller 
benefits. However, bonuses are paid for completion of 
thirty years work (six months pay) and thirty-six years 
(twelve months pay). Also, after thirty-six years of ser­
vice, withholding contributions to retirement funds (monte- 
Ei°> are collected only for four years after retirement.
For retirement after forty years of service, no monteplo 
contributions are withheld after retirement; the bonus is 
increased to eighteen months pay, and the retirement pay 
itself is computed on the last year’s pay rather than the 
five-year average, as in other cases. This program was 
started in 1951 to encourage longer active participation in
24Domenech, as quoted in Taylor, op. cit., p. 230.
45
the work force.2^
When one considers the sharply Increasing cost of
26the government's presently existing social commitments, 
it becomes clear that a stagnating economy cannot long con­
tinue to sustain higher welfare payments. But at the same 
time, the powerful pressure groups representing labor and 
the retired sector will do nothing but press for further 
benefits for themselves,2? which could only continue infla­
tionary pressures. Furthermore, the wastefully expensive 
administrative morass appears to be an equally enduring part 
of the Uruguayan welfare situation.2®
In another sort of transfer payment, Uruguay also 
subsidizes agriculture. Under the Exchange Reform Law, 20 
per cent of exchange deductions imposed on exporters goes to 
an agricultural subsidy for fertilizer, seed, and the like, 
as part of a Plan For Agricultural Development.2  ̂ However, 
in October, 196**, the Ministry of Livestock announced a poss­
ible suspension in subsidy payments, and the reason given 
was insufficient collections from exporters to support the
2^Taylor, o|>. cit., pp. 11^-115.
26Associacion de Bancos del Uruguay, Resumen de los 
Prlncipales Aspectos de la Actividad Economica' del Uruguay 
en el Ano lff53 (Montevideo; Asociaclbn de Bancos. 1964), 
Cuadro Estailstico No. 86.
2?United States Embassy, op. cit., p. 18.
28Taylor, og. cit., p. 133.
2^Ministerio de Ganaderia, Boletin Informativo,
Ano XXI, No. IO36, October 29, 1964.
program.3° That announcement appeared to be doubly signi­
ficant, First it showed an official awareness of a need to 
finance subsidy programs out of current income, a point made 
individually by influential Uruguayans.̂  Second, the 
announcement showed an awareness that positive action by the 
central government must be taken to retard Inflation, and 
the 196^ announcement was a first, hesitant.portent of the 
state of siege, or martial law, declared a year later in 
November, 1965* when the fight against inflation had pro­
gressed from a tentative inclination to a desperate need. 
Government Ownership of Industry
Although Uruguay is much more a welfare state than
a socialistic state, government ownership of business is
quite extensive and has a long history. However, since 1952
no new industries have been nationalized, and there is con-
32siderable dissatisfaction with many government enterprises. 
Batlle felt that in many areas of the economy, government 
ownership and operation could provide better "social per­
formance" than could private ownership. As is often true, 
"social performance" was undefined or at best, vaguely 
defined as "more output with less profit.” However, he was
3°lbld.
^Carlos Quijano, La Reforma Agraria en el Uruguay 
(Montevideo: Ediciones del ETo de la Plata,' 19^3)“ p.' m  ?f and p. 93 ff.
32Taylor, o£. cit., p. 133.
^7
not a socialist; rather, perhaps, an empirical collec­
tivist.^
Presently, large government involvement exists in 
the ownership and control of business in Uruguay. There 
are twenty-eight autonomous entities and decentralized ser­
vices which administer the government's businesses and most 
welfare services. The autonomous entities are in fact
administratively autonomous in their day-to-day business;
*5 Atthe decentralized services are less so.
Financial Institutions
The Central Bank does not have a monopoly in com­
mercial banking, but it does control the bulk of the na­
tion's banking business.The remaining smaller share of 
the banking business is shared by some seventy other pri­
vately owned banks. ^  The CIDE points out that the private 
banking sector is not only permanent, but has increased
•^See Francis Coker, Recent Political Thought (New 
York: Appleton-Century-Croft, 193^) pp. ^5-5^9» or an ex­
cellent discussion of the difference between the two terms. 
Basically, where the socialist favors public ownership on 
principle, the empirical collectivist has no such predis­
position, but would vest ownership in either public or pri­
vate hands, whichever promised to be more efficient In any 
given situation.
^Taylor, og. cit., pp. 92 and 210.
^Fitzgibbon, og. cit., p. 101, estimates the Cen­
tral Bank handles 65 per cent of the total commercial bank­
ing; and Pendle, og. cit., p. 74, estimates about half.
Bank of London & South America, Limited, "Uruguay: 
Exchange and Banking Difficulties," Quarterly Review, V 
(July, 1965), 130. ---------------
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relatively during the last several years,3? and this also 
is one indication that Uruguay is not presently evolving 
into a socialist economy.
Originally, the main purpose of the Central Bank 
was to provide low-cost agricultural credit,but more 
recently the lending emphasis has shifted to financing 
foreign trade.^ Along with its activities as the country's 
major commercial bank, the Central Bank exercises the other 
primary functions— rediscounting and note issuing— and in 
spite of the country's liberal political philosophy, one of 
the charges most often aimed at the Central Bank is that its 
conservative policies unduly restrict the nation's business. 
At the same time, since inflation has also been a major 
problem, the contrary case has been argued: that the Central 
Bank has provided the economy with an excess of liquidity.
The CIDE in their report stated that credit and monetary in­
creases went into higher prices rather than into an increase 
in the volume of transactions.^0 (See Tables 5 and 9.) Note 
especially the approximately equal percentage increase in the 
stock of money and the wholesale price index— prima facie ev­
idence that the quantity theory of money has been working in
3?CID3, op. cit., p. 40.
38Fitzgibbon, op. cit., p. l6l,
39-^Bank of London & South America, op. cit., po. 125- 
13^. --
^°CID3, og. cit*, p. ^3? Taylor, og. cit., p. 2^6.
49
Uruguay. Or, In other words, "Keynesian*1 efforts to In­
crease output by Increasing aggregate demand have not worked 
because other factors arrested the development of real GNP. 
Since a great part of the credit expansion moves directly 
into consumption through various pension and welfare plans, 
the coexistence of severe inflation and scarce business 
credits is entirely possible. This phenomenon is a simple 
reversal of the theory of forced saving— credit fosters con­
sumption rather than investment activities.
The Mortgage Bank became the State Mortgage Bank 
when, in 1912, President Batlle authorized the purchase of 
the company’s stock.^ Aside from the obvious business of 
mortgage finance, the State Mortgage Bank also engages in
koregular commercial banking. One major function of the 
Mortgage Bank is to handle one of the welfare programs for 
employees; that of providing low-cost loans for home build­
ing and remodeling.^ The Mortgage Bank has also been res­
ponsible for limited success in retarding inflation by en­
couraging private saving through extensive advertising.^ 
However, much more direct action than this is needed if the 
government seriously plans to protect the economic welfare
^Pendle, op. cit., p. 74.
^Taylor, 0£. cit., p. 188.
43Ibid., pp. 102, 115-116.
^Ibld., p. 148.
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of the people "by fighting inflation effectively.
The Insurance Bank is the third major government 
entry into the country’s financial business* Of the govern­
ment-owned banks, the Insurance Bank alone does no commer­
cial banking. It effectively controls the insurance market 
in Uruguay, but its potential legal monopoly is not exer­
cised, since a grandfather clause permits continued opera­
tion of insurance companies in business at the time the law 
was passed (1911), although no new insurance companies can 
be started.^
Public Utilities, Transportation and Communications
As mentioned in the quote from Vanger cited above, 
(page 21), a public utility was the second business which 
the government salvaged from the crash of the 1880*s. Also, 
as in the case of banking, the government has become Uru­
guay’s major supplier of public utility, transportation, and 
communication services.
General Administration of Electricity and Telephones 
(Administraction General de las Uslnas Electrlcas y Tele- 
fonos del Estado) UTE— is the government's monopolistic
^There is conflict among authorities regarding the 
degree of monopoly exercised by the Insurance Bank. Pendle 
(p. Zk) says, "Private companies operating before the forma­
tion of the Bank were allowed to continue with Life, Fire, - ’ 
and Marine insurance," while Taylor (p. 93) says, "The Insur­
ance Bank of the State competes with a number of foreign and 
domestic privately-owned companies in regards to some lines 
of insurance, but has a monopoly in Fire, Workmen’s Compensa­
tion, Life and Auto Accident lines."
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supplier of electric power and telephone service. Although
a potential monopoly existed in electricity from 1912, and
in telephone service from 1931, the monopoly power was not
46exercised until 1947.
The UTE developed in two ways. It expanded its own 
facilities and it absorbed existing private concerns. By 
1936, every city and major town was supplied with electric 
p o w e r T h e  first acquisition mentioned above was the 
Montevideo power plant (the first electric plant in South 
America), which was constructed in 1886 and was acquired by 
the state In 1887.̂ ®
Because virtually the entire country Is rolling 
prairieland (see Chapter I), and because of transmission 
costs, most of the electricity until recently was produced 
with coal or oil. However, more recently, large-scale hydro­
electric power projects have been undertaken. The first, on 
the Rio Negro, produced the largest artificial lake in South 
America.
A second plant on the Rio Negro was started in 1956 
with a loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) to UTE. The installation was
46Taylor, op, cit., p. 211; United Nations Depart­
ment of Economic anSHSocTal Affairs, Foreign Capital In Latin 
America (New Yorks United Nations, 1955), p. Wz".
^7Ibld.
^8Pendle, op. cit., p. 59.
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completed in i960, and it increased the country’s output of 
electricity by 25 per cent. The IBRD favored the project 
because most of the increase was intended not for Montevideo 
but for the i n t e r i o r E v e n  so, the distribution of elec­
tric power strongly favors the capital— some 73 per cent of 
the total groing to Montevideo in 1961.̂ ° By 1961, the 
hydroelectric system, consisting of the two Interconnected 
installations, produced 78 per cent of the country’s elec­
tric power.Enlargement of the country’s hydroelectric 
capacity, now in progress, are ejected to furnish suffi­
cient power for the coming decade,^2
Batlle’s original plan was to provide electric 
power even if it was necessary to operate at a loss. He 
argued that “whenever private initiative is lacking, or the 
class of public service constitutes a natural monopoly, it 
is the state, safeguarding the interests of society, which 
must take over the ownership and operation." He went on to 
say;
Neither official Industrialism, with strictly 
business aims and fiscal profits, nor the carry­
ing out of any Socialist doctrine is behind this 
preference: . . .  rather [it iŝj higher motives 
of a social and economic order and interest in
^Taylor, oj). cit.; Pendle, op. cit., p. 60, 
5°CIDE, 0£. cit., I, 67.
53-ibid.
52Taylor, og, cit., pp. 135 and 238.
53
the widest diffusion and distribution of all 
classes of services which are presently con­
sidered necessary for the general welfare, 
comfort, and hygiene,33
However, this program may have been pushed too 
enthusiastically, because the CIDE considers that the low 
rates— to bring electricity to the masses— have been res­
ponsible for the UTE*s consistent losses, and in order to 
permit the expansion of power output required by economic 
expansion, a more remunerative rate should be charged.-'
The Telephone Division of UTE had 102,000 tele­
phone connections in the country in 1961, with 70,000 of 
these in Montevideo and 32,000 in the rest of the country.-55 
In contrast to the electric rates, telephone rates more 
than cover operating costs, mainly because of a 1^7 per cent 
increase between 1957 and 1959; and another 75 per cent from 
1959 to 1961.^ perhaps because of the sharply increasing 
rates, telephone usage shows only a slow but regular in­
crease from 83,000 units in 1955 to 102,000 in 1961.37 it 
appears that UTE is serving the country's welfare in provid­
ing electric power and telephone communications in increas-
33as quoted in Vanger, op. cit., p. 22^.






ing amounts at a reasonable cost, but the same cannot be 
said of the agency responsible for providing telegraphic 
communlcati on•
The General Administration of Telecommunications 
(Direccion General de Telecomunlcaclones) is a dependency 
of the executive power under the Ministry of National De­
fense. The General Administration of Telecommunications 
regulates telecommunications and also offers telegraphic and 
radio-telegraphic service.
Clearly, the country’s telegraphic business has 
been poorly managed. The CIDE reports that some 70 per cent 
of the equipment is more than ten years old, and some 32 per 
cent is over twenty years old. Compounding the problem of 
old equipment, the CIDE adds that 60 per cent of the trans­
mission lines are of iron rather than copper.58 Further­
more, charges have averaged only about one-third of the Gen­
eral Administration’s expenses. Typically, for example, on 
the average telegram charges run $1.20, while the cost is 
$7.00. However, despite this sizeable subsidy, the use of 
telegraphic communications was stable between 1955 and. 1961, 
while use of other means of communication has increased over 
the same period.59
Radio and television communications are not owned 




government control and because of the traditional linking 
of transportation, communication, and public utilities in­
dustries, this discussion is included in this section.
Radio and television are centered in Montevideo. With one- 
third of the population, the capital has twenty-six radio 
stations; twenty-four are commercial and two are government- 
owned, Two commercial television stations existed as of 
July 8, 1961, with two more— one of them a government sta­
tion— under construction. All of these stations are compet­
ing for the attentions of viewers of some 30,000 sets. In 
addition, they must face the competition of stations in 
Buenos Aires across the Plata.
Telecasting operates from four in the afternoon 
until midnight, and as a result men do not watch much, be­
cause they customarily come home around nine or ten in the 
evening. The audience is restricted in other ways. Since 
so many stations serve such a small audience, radio and tele­
vision stations tend to specialize their programs in order 
to acquire a faithful following.̂ 1
The only rural radio to achieve renown was the 
Radio Rural of Benito Nardone. In 19^9 he split with the 
rurual movement, and during the 1950*s he attempted to 
create a rural movement representing the smaller farmers.
^°Henry W. Roller, "Sprouting Antennas," Christian 
Science Monitor, July 8, 1961, p. 5.
6lIbid.
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According to Taylor, rural activity stopped twice daily in 
response to his “broadcast of weather • • • market news • • 
and almost unadulterated political scurrility.1̂ 2
Sanitary Facilities (Obras Sanitarias del Estado) 
OSE— is the government agency which operates the Montevideo 
water supply. This operation was one of the last acquired 
by the government (in 1952) when a privately-owned British 
enterprise was purchased.
Municipal Transport Administration (Admlnlstraoion
Municipal de Transportes) AMDET— according to Taylor, became
a nationalized agency in 1946, when the stock of one of the
two street transportations systems was purchased by the gov- 
64eminent. On the other hand, Pendle refers to AMDET as 
being owned by the Montevideo municipal government, having 
been acquired from British interests.^
Service is generally inadequate, despite consider­
able modernization after the change in ownership. An attempt 
to raise fares to provide income for additional equipment 
was defeated by a plebiscite in July, 1951. Although this, 
type of vote had been permitted by the Constitution, the 1951 
vote on bus fares was the first. The improvements were
^2Taylor, op. cit., p. 64.
63Ibid., pp. 71-72.
^Ibid., pp. 123, 133 and 210.
^Pendle, op. cit., p. 71.
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6 6financed by a bond issue and by increased municipal taxes.
State Railroad Administration (Admlnlstracion de 
los Ferrocarriles del Estado) AFE— holds a monopoly of the 
country’s railroad transportation system, Uruguay’s rail­
roads started in the 1860's and during the following forty 
years, the system was developed into its approximate present 
form by British investment. By the end of the 19^0*s, Uru­
guay had more railway Coverage in proportion to its area 
than any other South American country. ^  Nationalization 
started early in 191*1- and 1915 during Batlle’s administra-
flQtion, when two sections of the line were purchased,00 The 
process of nationalization did not again resume until after 
World war II. However, P e n c i l  cites several Unsuccessful 
attempts by Batlle to nationalize the industry, but on the 
other hand, Vanger^0 maintains that he preferred foreign 
capital in this particular field. In any case, there is 
agreement that Batlle reduced the railroads' earnings and 
furthermore, during the period of British ownership, motor 
freight competition was subsidized and encouraged.̂ 1
66Ibid., pp. 71-72.
^Fitzgibbon, op. clt., pp. 102-103.
^Taylor, op. clt., pp. 131-132.
^Pendle, op. cit., p. 69.
?GVanger, op. clt., p. 225.
71Ibid; Pendle, op. clt., p. 69; Taylor, op. cit., 
p. 13*J-. ---
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By the time of nationalization in 19^9» the rail­
road system had developed an Imposing set of problems, and 
essentially the same problems exist today* The CIDE report 
cites specifically the following:
First, the 3,000 km* fan-shaped rail network rad­
iating from Montevideo is closely paralleled by the highway 
network. This duplication (designed originally to reduce 
rates) has actually resulted in an uneconomic splintering 
of traffic.
Second, railroads pifeeently are suffering from a 
collection of difficulties, such as poor internal adminis­
tration, decreasing freight loads, too much short-haul pass­
enger traffic, and severe long-term losses. Total income 
does not cover labor costs. Also, problems exist in physi­
cal carriage of goods due to antiquated cars, poor road 
maintenance, and poor choice of engines in certain areas.
Third, railroad rates, like the prices of many 
government services, have lagged far behind the general 
price level, so the steep operating deficits are in part due 
to grossly inadequate rates.
Fourth, CIDE also indicates that another main source 
of AFE1 s trouble is a lack of coordination among the various 
divisions.
National Fort Administration (Admlnlstraclon
72CIDE, 0£. cit., pp. 70-71.
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Haciortal de Puertos) AMP— was founded under a law of 1916
and gained complete control of ports in 1 9 3 2 . The Port of
Montevideo dominates Uruguay*s foreign trade, just as the
city dominates the country. Some 75 per cent of Uruguay's
74imports and exports flow through the port. To facilitate 
movement of the import/export traffic, AMP controls all 
the port's facilities, the principal lighterage, warehous­
ing, stevedoring, and tughoa,t services, as well as a small 
merchant marine.?5
The coastal navigation fleet includes seven vessels 
totaling 19,700 tons capacity used for the Argentine, Para­
guay a,nd Brazil trade} and fourteen vessels totaling 9*500 
tons for use in domestic cabotage. The national fleet is 
practically inactive, although the seven vessels in the 
international fleet receive moderate utilization.*^
The maritime fleet consists of ten ships with a 
cargo capacity of 112,500 tons. Of this total, slightly 
less than one-third (32,500 tons) pertains to AMP. Almost 
half of the total (55*000 tons) belongs to another govern­
ment agency, ANCAP, which will be discussed in some detail
?3Q3aylor, op. cit., p. 244.
74Fitzglbbon, op. cit., pp. 28 and 87.
?5pendle, op. cit., p. 71.
*^CIDE, op. cit., p. 71.
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77later. The remaining 25*000 tons are privately owned.'
Uruguay has only a small share of the carriage of 
her foreign trade— k per cent of exports, 19 per cent of 
liquid and one per cent of dry imports. Uruguayan vessels 
carry more liquid than dry cargo because the biggest part 
of the merchant fleet is the 55*000 ton ANCAP fleet of 
tankers. The large proportion of total trade carried on 
foreign vessels causes an important drain of foreign ex­
change— one of a variety of causes of the country’s persis­
tent balance of payments deficit.
Uruguayan Airlines (Primeras Lineas Uruguayas de 
Navigacion Area) PLUNA— is the national monopoly of commer­
cial air travel. Because of the size of the country, the
78length of the average trip is 350 km.f The only paved 
strip in the country is the international airport at Car- 
asco; all the interior airstrips are grass; and PLUNA*s 
international service is limited. Therefore, plans are 
for the airline to acquire equipment suitable for grass 
and dirt strip operations.Because of the country's 
small size and limited immediate potential for domestic air 







Aside from government's entry into the more or less 
traditional areas of hanking, transportation, communica­
tions and public utilities, Uruguay has nationalized a 
number of other enterprises.
National Admlnlstrati on of Combustibles, Alcohol, 
and Cement (Admlnistracion Naclonal de Combustibles, Al­
cohol y Portland) ANCAP— is the most unwieldy, complex, and 
confusing of all the government enterprises, although at 
the same time, it is one of the most efficiently run (or 
the least inefficiently run.)®0
To take ANCAP's major functions in order, the "C" 
(for combustibles) represents a monopoly in petroleum re­
fining, with the refinery, La Teja, in Montevideo. No gov­
ernment monopoly exists at the service station level; Stan­
dard Oil, Shell, and Texaco all compete with ANCAP's own 
stations.
ANCAP exercises a great deal of autonomy. For ex­
ample, even though Uruguay normally does little trade with 
Russia, in 1958-1959 a wool-petroleum barter arrangement 
was arranged with Russia. As a result, Soviet petroleum, 
with a large sulphur content, was marketed through all the 
retail outlets. Because the sulphur was not refined out, 
much consumer dissatisfaction and futile brand changing
80Taylor, £p. cit., p. 99.
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resulted..®1
The tanker fleet mentioned above is another part 
of ANCAP's petroleum operations. Most of the crude is 
imported from the Caribbean and Middle Bast, but some also 
comes from Chile, a convenient three-and-a-half days from 
Montevideo compared with up to thirty days transport time
Opfrom other sources.
The "A" is for ANCAP*s alcohol monopoly, which 
includes agricultural enterprises growing and refining 
sugar for the production of alcohol, as well as a monopoly 
over the importation of alcohol.
Finally, the "P" is for Portland cement. Since 
1957 > Uruguay’s requirements have been met internally, and 
a growing part of the country's output is from the produc­
tion of ANCAP*s facility near Minas, Lavalleja.
Although this concludes the "combustibles, alcohol 
and Portland" of the agency's name, it falls short of des­
cribing all its activities. ANCAP acts as the import agent 
for all the other state enterprises, as well as for itself. 
The final major division of this seventh largest business 
firm in Latin America,is the chemical division. In
81Ibid., p. 210.
®2Pendle, on. cit., p. 62.
^Acc o r d i n g  to McGraw-Hill's figures in Ingeneria 
Internacional Industrial, July, 1959t and quoted in Taylor, 
op. cit.~iTp.~2 -̂6'.
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1959* when ANCAP was rated the seventh largest Latin Amer­
ican firm, it employed some 7,000 workers, including 1,200 
in administration,
In its role as the country’s largest Importer,
ANCAP subsidizes the operations of UTE, PLUNA, AFE, and 
AMDET by selling them fuel below world market prices, 
and it also gives a smaller subsidy to taxis and trucks, 
and provides fuel oil for low-income homes which ca,nnot 
use the expensive gas of the British-owned Montevideo & Dry 
Dock Company.
ANCAP is one of the most autonomous of the entes 
autonomos, and has, in fact, been accused of exploiting its 
monopoly position, on one occasion, for profits of over 
*K3 million p e s o s . O n  the theory that high profits, like 
high prices, can mean that efficiency is less than the com­
petitive level, and that some exploitation may be occurring, 
such acitivities indicate that the agency may have lost 
sight of the welfare goals which prompted its existence.
Oceanographic and Fishing Service (Servicio Oceano- 
grafico y de Pesca) SOYP— established in 1933 and given a 
potential monopoly, this agency operates a small fishing
8^Ibid., p. 123.
o/rQ Ibid., and Pendle, 0£. cit., pp. 62 and 78* 
^Taylor, og. cit., p. 237.
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oofleet and the country*s sealing industry. The original 
purpose of SOYP was to provide the population with cheap 
fish in order to vary the national diet. However, the 
people have maintained their overwhelming preference for 
meat, and partly because of the resulting weak demand,
SOIP has consistently shown a loss in its operations.
Taylor reports that despite the commercial insolvency of 
this and certain other nationalized agencies, their con­
tinued existence has became a matter of national pride.9°
Cooperative Naoional de Productores de Leche— Cona- 
prole— was started in 1935 by the nationalizing of existing
dairy firms. Farmers supply the milk, which is processed
and distributed in the form of milk, butter, and cheese by
91Conaprole to the retail market.
The National Meatpacking Plant (Frigorofico Mac- 
lonal)— FRIGONAL— was started in 1928 with a monopoly in 
the Montevideo market. The aims of the government in 
creating Frigonal were complex. One aim was to provide low- 
cost meat to the Montevideo market. Another was to have a 
standard for checking private meat packers as to their 
economic output for the home and export market. These aims
®®Pendle, op. cit., p. 64.
®^Taylor, op. cit., p. 133.
9°Ibid.
^Pendle, op. cit., pp. 64-65; and Ibid., pp. 121-122.
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led to problems when efforts to slow inflation caused far­
mers to smuggle cattle out of the country to higher-price 
foreign markets in the 19^0's and 1950's.^2 This long­
term supply problem led to the major British-owned firm's 
closing in 1952,^3 and the same supply problem compounded 
by labor problems in 1956, and fraud charges in 1957 (mis­
statements in subsidy matters), caused the two American 
meatpacking plants to be closed. Closing the major foreign 
owned plants left the nationalized FRIGONAL the dominant 
firm in a most important industry.^
The Government as Employer
As employment in the public sector grew, the state 
tended to have the same labor problems which would confront 
a private employer. Despite the welfare optimizing alms 
of state ownership, state employees demanded higher wages, 
shorter hours, and better working conditions; and again, 
despite the welfare optimizing aims of state ownership, the 
state vigorously resisted these demands,^ until at the 
time of this writing, the country has been placed under a 
state of siege— under martial law— because of a strike
92Taylor, o£. cit., p. 1^0.
93pitzgibbon, op. cit., p. 91.
^Taylor, op. clt., pp. 75, 235, 26l; Pendle, op. 
cit., p. 63.
95Taylor, og. cit., pp. 56-57.
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9 6threatened by 180,000 government workers.7 Thus we have 
the sad spectacle of Uruguay, the nation in all Latin Amer­
ica with the longest history of freedom and democracy, 
suffering under martial law imposed because of a dispute 
between the government and the government's employees.
And the entire conflict is the result of monetary and fis­
cal mismanagement.
Evaluation of the Government Sector
In the current usage of the term, mere government 
ownership -is not socialism in a meaningful sense. Along 
with title to and control of nationalized industry, soc­
ialism implies the existence of a central economic plan.
But Uruguay's technique in nationalizing Industry has been 
to create autonomous and decentralized agencies. The 
nationalized agencies all share a high degree of autonomy, 
even to the management of pension funds. There is no cen­
tral plan, and one of the main features of the CIDE report 
__was the lack of any sense of direction or planning in the 
government's economic activities.
So one of the world's most complete welfare states—  
and one which has undergone a very substantial amount of 
nationalization— is not basically a socialistic state.
Large welfare costs are a drain on the economy, and have 
apparently retarded the economic growth of a country which
96Tampa (Florida) Tribune, October 8, 19&5* p. ^-A.
67
made a good early start and has outstanding potential. The 
main result of the country’s welfare programs has been to 
reduce sharply the government's saving ability, by putting 
some 90 per cent of public spending into consumption and 
thereby reducing the government's effectiveness as a stim­
ulator of economic growth. Extensive labor legislation 
and generous retirement plans have reduced the work force 
and the work week, and in addition, an overly large bureau­
cracy has further reduced the number of productive workers 
in the economy.
A secondary result has been to cause hardship among
*
worthy welfare and pension recipients who cannot be served 
by the overworked administrators of the various programs.
The effect of government influence in the banking 
Industry is ambiguous. Despite the current inflation, the 
actual operation of the various government banks appears to 
be quite conservative in practice. While it is true that 
inflation has been severe, it can scarcely have been due 
to overly easy money policies pursued by the banks on their 
own initiative. Rather, the cause appears to have been the 
Central Bank's validating the government's welfare programs 
by providing the funds necessary for their operation. This 
is a matter in which the Bank had little choice, however 
conservative its natural bias.
Much more could be said on the role of the govern- 
• ment in Uruguay's economy, but perhaps the most important
68
question is, ”Has the goal of optimizing welfare been 
achieved?” The need to impose martial law, a decade of 
stagnation, severe inflation of long standing, and years 
of waiting for deserved welfare and pension payments all 




Consolidated Account of Sources and Uses of Funds
of the Public Sector 1961*
Current Account 
(In Millions of Pesos)
Uses Sources
Total................. Total.................
1. Consumption of goods
and services.......... 1. Taxes. ................. 2,516
2. Transfer payments . . . . 2. Income from services . . . 195a. Producers . . . . . .
b. Families . . . . . . 3. Social contributions . . . 1,459c. Others ............
4. Other sources of social
3. Net transfers of business contributions.,. . • . • 76
In public sector. . . . . 3 76
5. Balance on current account4. Net savings . . . . . . . of business in public
sector........... . -50
♦From a detailed "Sources and Uses of Funds" statement, 1955-61• Only a very 
preliminary statement vias available for more recent years.
Comision de Inversion y Desarrollo, Estudio Economlco del Uruguay, II 
(Montevideo: CIDE, 1963), 23.
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TABLE II






I Total Values In Millions of Pesos
1955 1,371 244 1,615
1956 1,379 246 1,625
1957 1,390 250 1,6401958 1,404 2 56 1,660
1959 1,436 269 1,705I960 1,502 298 1,800
1961 1,539 306 1,845
II Value per capita in Pesos
1955 587 105 692
1956 583 104 687
1957 580 104 684
1958 578 105 683
1959 584 109 693
I960 603 118 723
1961 610 . 121 731
Ill Overall per Cent
1955 84.9 15.1 100
1956 84.9 15.1 100
1957 84.8 15.2 100
1958 84.6 15.4 100
19 59 84.2 15.8 100i960 83.7 16.3 1001961 83.4 16.6 100




of the Central Government 






1955 311,461 57,822 369,283
1956 314-,092 56,198 370,290
1957 427,028 83,132 510,160
1958 480,280 87,757 568,037
1959 515,140 94,197 609,337
I960 842,123 164,648 1,006,771
1961 1,299,296 240,677 1,539,973
CIDE Report, II, 132,
TABUS IV 
GNP in 1961 Prices








CIDE Report, II, 124.
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TABLE V









1957 14-9.1 132.6 167.6
1958 211.9 164.6 272.7
1959 357.0 371.2 343.3
I960 466.6 420.6 517.7
1961 501.2 426.7 588.7
1962 527.8 458.3 607.8
1963 755.7 755.7 914.5
Asociacion de Bancos del Uruguay, Resumen de los 
Prlnclpales Aspectos de la Actividad Eoonomlca cTelHIjfruguay 
en el Ano~T9^3» (TflontevlgeoY 1964).' Cuadro Estadistico #64.
75
TABLE VI
Percentage of Students Who Complete 
a Primary Cycle of Six Years
System Year Per Cent Completion
Public schools I960 36.0
Urban schools i960 ^6.5
Rural schools I960 13-3
Private schools 1954 53.0
Total 195^ 31.0
CIDE Report, II, ^8.
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TABLE VII 
Cost of Education in 1961
Type








*These figures are obtained by dividing the cost of operating 
each type of school by the number of students and graduates.
CIDE Report, II, 53.
TABLE VIII
Distributions and Collections of the Principle Social Security Institutes
(Millions of Pesos)
i
Institute I960 1961 1962 1963
I. DIs tributions
Industrial and Commercial Fund 
Civil and School Fund 
Rural, Domestic Service, and Old Age 















Total 1,032.0 1,666.8 2,124.1 2,445.9*
II. Collections
Industrial and Commercial Fund 
Civil and School Fund 


















Total 1,146.5 1,852.4 2,266.0 2,533.9*
^Estimated figure.










In hands of 
private banks Total
1954 432,257 59,438 491,695
1955 451,935 65,235 517,170
1956 513,911 66,825 580,736
1957 551,867 81,818 633,685
1958 708,930 87,932 796,862
1959 897,153 110,218 1,007,371
i960 1,222,213 175,924 1,398,137
1961 1,528,195 210,903 1,739,098
1962 1,728,961 248,948 1,977,908
1963 2,167,960 301,325 2,469,285
Asoclacion de Bancos del Uruguay 0p. cit.. Cuadro 




Even though the government has assumed the domi­
nant role in Uruguay*s economy, private enterprise retains 
a significant role.1 But the private sector has been 
handicapped by the difficulties caused by the government*s 
activities. Some of the problems facing the private sec­
tor are obvious: inflation, competition with;'public enter­
prise, and scarcity of business credit. But there is 
another, more subtle handicap for Uruguay*s private busi­
ness. The country does not have a free market system be­
cause of the all-pervasive nature of the government’s econ­
omic involvement; at the same time, there is no central 
economic plan. As a result, Uruguay has a sort of free­
form, unstructured economic environment, which one can say 
intuitively must be one of the most severe handicaps on the 
economy, but which, unfortunately, one cannot evaluate 
statistically.
Another statistical difficulty Is that the data do
^Camera Nacional de Comerclo, "La empresa privada, 
factor del desarrollo," Revista, LXIII (August, 19?!), 1.
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not distinguish the output of private and nationalized 
agencies in all cases, and this will be pointed out where 
necessary. For an overall view of recent developments in 
output in the various sectors of the economy, see Table 1.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the govern­
ment is mainly involved in utilities, communications, and 
transportation and warehousing (using the breakdown of 
Tables 1, 2 and 3). A somewhat smaller, but sill signi­
ficant government involvement exists in fishing, manufac­
turing, construction and housing. Crops, stockraising, 
commerce, and services (including medical) are mainly left 
in private hands in Uruguay. This chapter follows Colin 
Clark1s organization,2 with one section devoted to each of 
the primary, secondary, and tertiary Industry groups.
Private foreign capital, especially British and 
German, provided the start of certain public utilities and 
transportation facilities, but these were among the primary 
targets for nationalization under President Batlle and in 
subsequent regimes. The feeling seemed to exist that over­
seas remission of profits weakened the national economy.-̂  
And in time, as mentioned in the foregoing chapter, most of 
the formerly privately-owned public utilities and transport­
ation firms fell into the hands of the government. Unfor-
2Col:in Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress 
(London: Macmillan, 195TJ, Chapters^V^and TXi
3Pendle, op. cit., pp. 77-78.
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tunately, today there seems to be no general understand­
ing of the much more generally valid point that current 
dissaving in these industries is more damaging to the 
economy than was the foreign ownership*
Primary Industries
Agriculture. Only about 5 per cent of all Latin
4 ^American land is suitable for agriculture, but in contrast 
virtually all of Uruguay is prairieland, and stockraising 
naturally developed early as the dominant industry, with 
stockraisers as the dominant class. However, despite the 
early dominance of ranching, the typical ranch family is 
no better off today than the other agricultural workers. 
Most are poorly clothed in mass-produced, mail-order garb; 
poorly housed in straw-roofed houses made of locally avail­
able materials; and not especially well-fed.^ The average 
diet of agricultural workers is adequate in cereal, meat, 
sugar and milk; deficient in fruit, vegetables, potatoes, 
grease, and eggs.^
Over the past decade, agriculture has shown the 
same tendency to stagnate already noted in the rest of the
^Simon G. Hanson, Economic Development in Latin 
America (Washington: Inter-American Affairs Press^~T951)
P. 3V.
£$-'Aldo E. Solari, Sociologla Rural Naclonal (Monte­
video : Pacultad de Derecho, 1958) , pp'.‘ "2U1-211.
6Ibid.
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economy. Heat production particularly has been stable, 
while wool production has increased only slightly. This 
stagnation in the production of two major export commodi­
ties, taken in conjunction with increased domestic demand, 
has caused a shortage of foreign exchange. Prior to VJorld 
War II, some 5^ per cent of all agricultural output was 
exported, while the proportion has shrunk to 30 per cent at 
the present time.? The combination of stagnation and 
dependence upon agricultural exports has been of particular 
significance to the economy, because foreign exchange re­
ceipts have had to depend on the vagaries of world agri­
cultural prices as well as on low productivity.
However, Uruguayan agriculture could be highly pro­
ductive, because the country is extremely well endowed by 
nature, with 88 per cent of the land surface suitable for 
crops or cattle. (See Chapter II.) Unfortunately, because 
the land was good enough to provide a living even when it 
was inefficiently worked, Uruguayans developed a casual, 
careless approach to agriculture. The land was abused in 
Uruguay as was the land in the southeastern United States 
during the early cotton movement.
The land tenure system compounds the country*s agri­
cultural problem. One per cent of the landowners own over 
a third of the land, while three-fourths of the landowners
?Letter from United States Department of State, 
July 29, 1963.
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own only 8-if per cent of the land. Thus, large farms, and 
especially, large ranches are typical. Mechanization is 
Impractical on small landholdings, and large landowners 
have shown no interest in increasing their income beyond 
the non-mechanical level, since they are already at the top 
of the relative income scale. The vast inertia of the sit­
uation has been reinforced by a tax structure which dis­
courages mechanization.^
The gloomy tone of current data and commentaries 
contrasts sharply with the hopeful note of a few years ago. 
For instance, in happier days, the Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations reported in 1957 that 
agricultural output per capita had declined in Latin Amer­
ica during the prewar and postwar years, but that Uruguay 
was an exception. Not only did food production per capita 
rise in Uruguay during that period,10 but also Uruguay*s 
performance in wool production was the best of any major
Latin American wool producer, and far surpassed the area*s
11average. The report concluded that of all the areas in 
Latin America, the temperate zone, including Uruguay, had
OComision de Inversion y Desarrollo, Estudio Econo- 
mico del Uruguay (Montevideo: CIDE, 1963), I,“3$T~
9Ibid.
•^Food and Agricultural Organization, The Selective 
Expansion of Agricultural Production in Latin‘"Ameri“ca
(New ^ork:H7nite& Nat!'on's',~ 1957)'> p. *£9.
lxIbld., p. 55.
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1 ?the greatest growth potential. And this same tone may 
he seen in other reliable works such as Norton Ginsburg’s 
Atlas of Economic Development.1  ̂ An examination of the 
main aspects of Uruguayan agriculture shows the difficul­
ties which have reversed the optimism of the late 1950*s.
The most important part of Uruguay’s agricultural 
industry is the production of livestock. In terms of 
area, nearly nine-tenths of the country’s area (187,000 
square kilometers) is used in agriculture, and four-fifths 
of the agricultural land is devoted to livestock, with 
only about 9 per cent of the land devoted to crop■farming. 
Of all the Latin American nations, Uruguay has the greatest
number of livestock both per square kilometer and per head 
1 h,of population. ' Never has the proportion of livestock 
fallen below 65 per cent of total exports, and the percen­
tage has gone over 80 per cent in some years.^
A United Nations study of livestock in the area 
begins with two points: "(1) the country’s economy has
depended largely on the development of the livestock indus­
try; (2) livestock production shows a clear trend towards
12Ibid., p. 6l.
^Glnsburg, og_. cit., pp. 48-49.
l4Pood and Agricultural Organization, Livestock in 
Latin America: Status, Problems and Prospects ('New' 'York: 
United Nations,' 19627, p.' 49’.
■^cids, og. cit., pp. 90-91.
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stagnation,”1  ̂ Fortunately for purposes of statistical 
analysis, data on livestock in the country are adequate, 
because of regular agricultural censuses since 1924, and 
data in Tables 1 and 4 show the lack of any dynamic devel­
opment in the industry recently.
The figures may be misstated, as noted in the pre­
vious chapter, in order to disguise smuggling and domestic 
black market operations. However, the misrepresentation 
has been a problem for years. It did not happen suddenly. 
Therefore, Uruguay's primary industry has apparently been 
stagnating. Although current livestock census data are 
lacking, the most recent available output data show in­
creased production in 1 9 ^ 3 ® Perhaps the cycle has turned 
upward; only the next few years will show whether or not 
this is the case.18
Some of the major problems facing agriculture are 
listed below:
First, agriculture in Uruguay is of the extensive 
type, particularly in stockraising. Over 95 per cent of 
the usuable grassland is natural pasture; only a little over
1•^Food and Agriculture Organization, Livestock, 
op. cit., p. 49.
^Asociacion de Bancos del Uruguay, Resumen de los 
Prlncipales Aspectos de la Actividad Economica del Uruguay 
en el Ano 1963 (Montevideo: Asociaclon de ga.ncosT~1964T«
1 8It may be that the programs of the national gov­
ernment's Department of Agronomy and of Livestock, and of 
the O.A.S. have begun to show results.
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4 per cent Is. in artificial pasture or in fodder. Further­
more, of the available grazing land, an estimated minimum 
of one million hectares are rendered useless by weed infes-
19tation. Consequently, much land is required per animal 
to provide even poor nourishment, and the problem becomes 
more serious over time, as weeds spread and natural pas­
ture Is further depleted.
Second, the average large landowner has little in- 
20centive to change. This lack of dynamism on the part of 
large stockraisers is evidenced in a decline in the cattle 
population of almost one million head from 1908 to 1958*21
Third, as long as stockraising is dependent on 
natural pasture, subject to winter freezes and summer 
droughts, the industry’s capacity will be static at best. 
Since the country’s exports are predominantly beef and wool, 
the future of foreign trade depends in part on programs to 
improve natural pasture and its carrying capacity.
Fourth, livestock disease is another serious pro­
blem. The U.N. estimates that the annual losses from infec­
tions and parasitic diseases run over 500 million pesos, or 
approximately one-third of the annual value of livestock
19■̂ Food and Agricultural Organization, Livestock, 
op. cit., p. 58. 1
20CIDE, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
PI^United States Department of Commerce, Basic Data 
on the Economy of Uruguay, Part K, No. 60-3^ (Washington: 
tT7ST~Government“TrIntlng Office, i960), p. 5.
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production.Programs to control animal disease have 
been implemented, and have begun to show results. Half of 
the country is free of ticks, and the whole area should 
shortly be rid of them. Uruguay is a Latin American 
leader in foot-and-mouth disease innoculations; however, 
the disease remains a problem.2^
Finally, agriculture is plagued by poor farm man­
agement, largely as a result of the country’s landholding 
system, which has the bulk of the country’s land.in the 
hands of a relatively few people, with little incentive to 
improve the management of the land, as mentioned above.
To combat this, the government has instituted a coloniza­
tion program to put small farmers on land of their 
own.2 »̂ 2 5 Agricultural analysts have concluded that effi­
cient management could double production of beef and wool, 
which, in turn could mitigate or reverse the unfortunate 
current situation in foreign trade.
22Pood and Agriculture Organization, Livestock, 
op. oit., p. 59.
23ibid.
2^Ibid.
2^The facts observed by the CIDE regarding the un­
willingness of large landowners to use more efficient farm­
ing and stockraising methods seem to support the relative 
income hypothesis. But, however secure the landed gentry 
may be within Uruguayan society, their mere maintenance of 
the status quo has been unfortunate for the country.
26Bank 0f London & South America, Ltd., Quarterly 
Review, V, No. 1 (January, 19^5), *K).
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Field crops present another economic challenge to 
Uruguay. Even though the country*s land resources would 
permit it to operate as one huge farm, agricultural output 
has been so low that there are definite dietary deficien­
cies, particularly in rural areas as noted above. Further­
more, part of the trade deficit has been caused by food 
imports.2?
The potential output of farm crops is not unlimited. 
In the interior, seasonal rainfall patterns and thin top- 
soil restrict production and make the land much more suit­
able for livestock than for crops. However, the country’s 
agricultural potential (if efficiently exploited) is more 
than sufficient to feed the country adequately. This poten­
tial is not efficiently exploited, as Table 6 reveals, and 
part of the story is told by data on total investment in 
the different aspects of agriculture. Table 5 shows the 
very minor amount of investment in agriculture, particular­
ly for the production of field crops. Uruguayan agricul­
ture has an overall capital/output ratio of 0.2,28 evidence 
of the primitive state of the country’s agricultural tech­
nology, which is particularly unfortunate in the case of 
crop fanning.
Furthermore, much of the meager agricultural
2?Ibid.
2^CIDE, 0£. cit., pp. it-6-̂ -7.
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investment has not increased production, but rather has 
reduced the amount of hand labor needed for the same out­
put.Agricultural employment fell between 1955 19^1
from 226,000 to 20^,000,3° and Taylor^1 cites an 8.2 per 
cent drop in the farm population from 1951 to 1956* Any 
primarily agricultural nation seeking economic development 
must free part of its agricultural labor to work in indus­
try, but this has not been the pattern in Uruguay. For 
successful farm-to-industry migration, agricultural output 
should rise at the same time, but in Uruguay ’’agricultural 
production has at best remained steady over the last 65 
years, although in some cases it has actually fallen.”^2 
Table 6 shows Uruguay*s low agricultural productivity comw 
pared with output in other countries. Uruguay*s urban 
migration is not symptomatic of dynamic growth, with agri­
cultural employment declining because of a brisk demand for 
more labor in manufacturing. It is, rather, one more symp­
tom of stagnation.
Table 5 shows clearly that stockraising receives 
most of the agricultural Investment and that field crops 
are relatively neglected. More crop farmers than stock-
29Ibid. 
3°lbid.
^Taylor, op. cit., p. 139.
32ibid., p. 138.
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33raisers are tenants, and tenancy compounds the problem 
of farm management and partly explains the extreme scarcity 
of capital invested in crop farming.
To sum up, Uruguay’s agriculture is plagued with 
problems stemming from several sources, and some of the 
points on which a consensus has been reached are the fol­
io wing:
(1) Productivity per unit of land must be increased 
through the use of more intensive farming methods.
(2) Farms must be of sufficient size to permit 
efficient methods. The government’s efforts to diffuse 
land ownership among the lower classes have not been very 
successful, and the lack of succe$ in that program may 
prove fortunate in the long run, because small, family 
farms are usually uneconomical.
(3) However, the present landholding system, even 
though it permits large landholdings, has not encouraged 
agriculture to become efficient. Incentives to efficiency 
should be instituted, and changes in the tax.structure 
could be most useful in this regard.
(*0 Livestock will likely remain the basis of 
Uruguay's economy, so diseases and parasites which current­
ly reduce output by as much as one-third must be eliminated. 
Some progress is being made, and agricultural extension
33cide, og. cit., pp. 51-52.
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rth.work can help do the rest.->
(5) Natural fodder on weed-infested prairieland is 
Insufficient. Improved feeding could greatly increase 
livestock output, and could be achieved by increasing sup- 
lemental feed crops and improving natural grassland,
(6) More general agriculture should be encouraged 
along rational lines. Some promising crops may be surpris­
ing at first glance; e.g., parts of Uruguay produce 
greater yields of sugar cane than Java or Louisiana.35 The 
country*s agriculture could permit a better balanced na­
tional diet without a large volume of imports and should 
provide a surplus for export.
These six points represent the feelings of Uruguayan 
commentators, and the implementation of their ideas would 
do much to rationalize Uruguayan agriculture.
Forests. Uruguay is not naturally a forest land; 
it is an area of natural grasslands. However, the nation’s 
forests are a primary industry which deserves attention.
Much of the country is suitable for tree farms, and Uruguay, 
like most Latin American countries, uses more wood than is 
produced domestically. The country's lumber imports almost
3^w. j. Ralston, "Que Podemos Ssperar de la Exten­
sion en la Agricultura,11 Boletin Informative, Ministerio 
de Ganaderia y Agricultura XXI (November 5, 196^), 8.
^Elisio Salvador Porta, Uruguay: Realidad y Reforma 
Agraria (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1 '$61*), 
P. 70.
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36equal the value of meat exports. Therefore, an impor­
tant foreign exchange saving would result from increased 
wood production. Other significant benefits would also 
result. Since virtually the entire country is pralrieland, 
forests prevent erosion by acting as windbreaks. Forests 
also conserve water in the soil, and conservation of water 
would especially benefit certain areas where seasonal rain­
fall is a problem.
Most of Latin America has to import lumber and 
pulp wood, not because of a shortage of trees, but because 
the trees grow in mixed stands in inaccessible jungles, 
making economic exploitation impossible. Uruguay also im­
ports wood, but in contrast with the rest of Latin America, 
Uruguay's forests are all accessible— all available to 
economic exploitation.
Minerals and Mining. As noted above, the country is 
quite deficient in mineral wealth, and this deficiency 
accounts for metropolitan Spain's disregard for the area 
during the early period of colonization. In fact, while 
doing research on this question, the writer could find no 
official mining survey more recent than the 1930's.^
There were two recent flurries of excitement, one
36United Nations, Latin American Timber Trends and 
Prospects (New York: United Nations, 196'3), p. 21.'
3?lnstituto de Geologia y Perforaciones, Boletin 
XIV (September, 1930), 35 pp.
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when traces of petroleum were discovered in Canelones 
province, and the second when a body of iron ore with man­
ganese was discovered in Rivera.-^ There is also an un­
economical iron ore deposit at Valentines in Florida pro­
vince. 39 Since both the oil and the iron have proved to 
be uneconomical, it Is now clear that the country will not 
find its economic salvation in some dramatic mineral dis­
covery. The oil did not prove out, while the iron and man­
ganese are not rich enough for export and there is no coal
4 ofor domestic exploitation.
However, there is mineral wealth of a less dramatic
sort. The country does possess and has exploited deposits
of construction materials such as marble, granite, gypsum,
hr\calcium, sand, and clay. Presently the only Insignifi­
cant activities in the extractive industries are in sand 
and building stone. ^
Fishing. The final primary industry for considera­
tion is fishing. A large part of the country*s fishing is 
carried on as a state enterprise by the Servicio Oceano- 
grafico y Pesca (SOYP). However, a significant part of the
•^Taylor, op. cit., p. 83,
39Ibid., pp. 2^2-243.
Zj'°IMd.
in■‘■Salvador Porta, eg. cit., p. 7.
U.O‘"'di Leoni and di Lorenzo, op. cit., pp. 91-93.
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country*s production Is carried on "by private fishermen and 
another substantial part of SOYP’s output is produced under 
contract with private fishermen, (See Table 7*) SOYP’s 
proportion of total production of fish has fallen sharply 
over the years for which data are available, because cost 
per unit of output In the public sector is twice that of 
the private sector. The reasons for this great difference 
in unit costs are: (1) a far larger proportion of admin­
istrators in the public sector, and (2) a lower yield per 
boat because of fewer trips per public boat compared with 
private fishing boats,^
The popular taste prefers meat to fish as a source 
of protein, but some dietary variety is welcome; and Uru­
guay is generally Roman Catholic, so there is a domestic
demand for fish. Furthermore, since there are some twenty
Zj.ii.varieties of fish in Uruguayan xvaters, and since all 
sources agree that fishing could be greatly increased, it 
may be expected that the upward trend in that industry’s 
output will continue in spite of the inefficiency of SOYP, 
so long as private enterprise is allowed to operate. (So 
far the only monoploy exercised by SOYP is in operating the
hr>^Banco de la Republica, Suplemento Sstadistico de 
la Hevista Bconomica XXI (June, July), 90-92^ (Unfort u n ~  
ately, output-fTgures were not available.)
^CIDS, op. cit., p. 82.
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seal rookery on the Isle of Lobos.)^
Secondary Industries
Manufacturing. In recent years, Uruguayan manu­
facturing has been increasing relative to agriculture. 
During the postwar period, the number of manufacturing 
establishments, their value, and the volume of output have 
increased while agricultural output has been almost
h,£stalled. Manufacturing benefitted from postwar economic 
growth, which averaged an annual rate of 8-J- per cent for 
much of the period.^ However, in 1961 a business reces-
UOsion began, and the country’s growth rate fell below
hf 9one-half of one per cent.
Although the official reference date for the re­
cession is mid-1961, the country's manufacturing Industry 
had started to slump much earlier, and per capita output 
of manufactured goods had been declining since 195&• (See 
Table 8.) And it is significant that the country's demand 
for importseheld up rather well, while the external demand 
for Uruguayan manufactures decreased. CID3 sums up this 
situation by saying !,the reduced size of the national
^■%i Leoni and di Lorenzo, op. cit., pp. 93-9^.
Bureau of Foreign Commerce, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, ojd. cit., p. 7.
Ibid.
IlaCIDE, 0£. cit., p. 56.
^United States Department of State, op. cit.
96
market put a maximum limit on the dimensions of the manu­
facturing sector.*1̂ 0 This applies particularly to the 
dynamic or non-traditional industries,'^ and helps to ex­
plain how the manufacturing downturn could precede the 
general recession by so long a lead.
Since agriculture is the country’s economic base, 
much of the manufacturing has traditionally been based on 
agriculture. For instance, one Uruguayan source-*2 spends 
several pages on industries related to agriculture such as 
food and fiber processing, animal feed, etc., and only 
half a page listing the other branches of manufacturing.
One of the most interesting features of the CIDE's 
Study of the Uruguayan Economy is their considerable atten­
tion to a breakdown between "traditional industries” and 
"dynamic industries.” When per capita income begins to grow 
again, increased domestic consumption of agricultural out­
put will become increasingly difficult as the pressures 
described under Engel’s law are encountered; i.e., demand 
for food will Increase more slowly than income. But aside 
from potential market growth, one must also consider the 
present conditions. Only about 7 per cent of consumption
5°CIDS, op. cit., p. 59. (Author’s translation.)
-*̂ CIDE uses "traditional” to describe industries 
based on agriculture--leather goods, food processing, and 
the like— while "dynamic” in their usage refers to indus­
tries not based on agriculture.
-*2dl Leoni and diLorenzo, op. cit., pp. 88ff.
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in "traditional" goods are imported, while over 30 per 
cent of the "dynamic" goods are from abroad.*^ If import 
substitution is to occur in manufactured goods in the ex­
isting market, there is more hope of success in the dy­
namic industries.
Uruguay*s manufacturing industry is in an inter­
mediate stage of development, and its awkward position—  
neither "developed" nor "underdeveloped"— has caused con­
siderable difficulty in Latin American Free Trade Assoc­
iation (LAFTA) relationships.
Despite the difficulties involved, the decision to 
diversity industrially can be considered a consensus by 
now. However, it was reached only after much discussion. 
Batlle was the first Uruguayan leader to argue that de­
pendence on other nations for Industrial goods was a sort 
of colonialism, and in Latin American terms, any sort of 
colonialism Is bad. Batlle*s government encouraged indus­
trialization and was quite willing to take over part of the 
job itself.-^ But even in Batlle*s day and still existing 
today is a conservative group who argue that the country*s 
endowments are agricultural and that the-only sound growth 
is in agriculture and related industries. Although the 
traditionalists do not represent the general opinion,
53ciDE, op. cit., p. 59
^Vanger, op. cit., Chapter 8.
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traditional industries still produce the bulk of the econ­
omy* s manufactured goods even though the dynamic industries 
have shown faster growth, (See Table <?•)
Since the state has entered so freely into the 
country's economy and since the national accounting does 
not distinguish between output of private industry and out­
put of the nationalized firms mentioned in the chapter 
above, it will not be possible to state precisely the pro­
portion of consumable goods produced by private as opposed 
to public firms. Some branches of industry are dominated 
by public enterprise; some are shared; and some are domi­
nated by private enterprise. These will be identified as 
the different types of manufacturing are considered.
Power is the first need in any process of indus­
trialization. As Uruguay is without domestic coal or oil, 
the country depends largely on electricity. As mentioned 
above, UTE exercises a government monopoly over electric 
power. Likewise, petroleum imports and refining are state 
functions performed by ANCAP. (See Chapter II.) Coal 
imports have fallen off about 75 per cent since 1957,^ be­
cause of substitution of other sources of power (and because 
the recession reduced demand generally). The remaining 
source of power, gas, is produced from coal by an old, long- 
established British firm, the Montevideo Gas and Dry Dock
^Banco de la Republica, og. cit., December 1963.
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Company. ^  At the present time, the country’s development 
is closely tied to fuller use of its hydroelectric power 
potential•
Oldest and most important of the traditional indus­
tries are those concerned with processing animal products. 
Meat packing, especially beef, is Uruguay’s most funda­
mental industry and it produces the country's staple food 
and main export item. The industry is dominated by FRIG- 
OKAL, the state-owned packing plant. A number of smaller 
private domestically-owned meat-packing plants operate in 
the interior. The few large foreign-owned meat packers 
were practically driven from the industry. (See Table 16 
for output data.)
Much of the country's land is devoted to sheep, and
wool is the other most important export item. Recently
exports of raw wool have been replaced in large part by 
scoured wool and wool tops in an effort to obtain part of 
the value added by manufacturing. This industry is in 
private hands.
Leather and leather goods are other important tra­
ditional industries. In 172?, the city had two wooden 
houses and forty constructed on hides. ^  Pendle cites a 
dispatch from General Auchmuty on the capture of Montevideo
J Pendle, op. cit., p. 78.
•"Fitzgibbon, op. cit., p. 27.
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in 1807* He wrote that his artillery breached the walls of 
the town but that at first the assault party could not lo­
cate the breach in the dark, since "the enemy had covered 
it with hides."-^ At the present time, shoes, belts, wine­
skins, and other leather articles as well as hides are 
important traditional items in Uruguay’s commerce.
Flour mills, sugar mills, and textile firms are 
other traditional enterprises in private hands and are 
better distributed through the country than most industries.
The state, through the agency of CONAFROLE handles 
most of the country's dairy business, buying from farmers 
and performing the processing and distributing functions.
So even though dairy production is carried on by private 
enterprise, the state has preempted the remainder of the 
dairy business.
Beverages, tobacco products, furniture and other 
wood products, a.long with paper and cardboard, are other 
privately owned Industries of long standing. Unlike the 
traditional industries, much of the wood is imported for 
paper and wood products, and all of the tobacco is imported.
The construction materials industry is considered 
traditional, since it is of long standing and much of the 
raw material is local. However, the industry is a transi-' 
tional case, since building materials, especially cement,
^Pendle, ojo. cit., p. 1^ and pp. 67-68.
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are so closely related to the growth process. Much of the 
country’s output of Portland cement is produced by ANCAP's 
plants. So the output of building materials is shared by 
private and public enterprises.
CIDE has revealed Uruguay’s now official bias by 
choosing to describe nontraditional industries as ''dynamic,tr 
(Some of the still-vocal critics of the present policy 
might have chosen "ill conceived” or something similar in 
preference to "dynamic.”) But in fact, the term is des­
criptive. The only reason that Uruguay was able to show a 
positive growth rate for as long as it did was because the 
"dynamic” industries grew fast enough to offset a decrease 
in the traditional industries. Only this prevented Uruguay 
from replacing Argentina in last place in Latin American 
economic growth. Also during the 19^5-195^ decade, when 
Uruguay showed such economic promise, it was the dynamic 
industry group which raised the country's growth rate to 
8.5 per cent. (See Tables 9 and- 10). This faster growth 
rate in the dynamic group meant that, despite their opposi­
tion and relatively late start, by 1961 they accounted for 
more than half the country’s total manufacturing output, as 
shown in Table 18.
Chemicals, among the more important dynamic indus­
tries, are produced by the Instituto de Quimlca Industrial 
and ANCAP as well as the Instituto Nacional de Higiene, all 
state operations, but also by some private firms, including
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the Montevideo Gas & Dry Dock Company. The country has
59made itself self-sufficient in most basic chemicals.
Rubber goods, including tires, have been produced 
in Uruguay for some time. In the 1930*s the Fabrica Uru- 
guaya de Neumatlcos— FUNSA— was established with technical 
help from Goodrich. It was given tariff protection and a 
monopoly and became one of the country’s most profitable 
industries.^0
Other important dynamic Industries are metals and 
related industries (which have performed erratically), 
plastics, electrical goods (which have shown good growth), 
and finally, transportation equipment, primarily automobile 
assembly plants. (See Table 11 for a summary of the per­
formance of all manufacturing industry groups.)
However, it must be remembered that manufacturing 
output (as shown in Tables 1 and 2) is stated in protected 
and therefore overpriced terms. Ninety-five per cent of 
Uruguayan manufactures are consumed domestically, while 
agricultural products make up nearly the total of exports.1 
However, agricultural output not only competes on the world 
market but also must in effect subsidize the less efficient 
manufacturing sector. Thus it appears that the country’s
59rbid., p. 67.
6oIbid., p. 66.
Banco de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay, Suple. 
mento Estadistico de la Revista Economica (Julio 1965)
Ano' 227 Mos, 253-3-^ THontevideo, I965)» pp. 36-^0.
^2Taylor, 0£. cit., p. 1^1.
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relative advantage lies in agriculture and especially in 
stockraising, but up to the present, most of the country’s 
economic efforts have been to encourage manufacturing at 
the expense of agriculture, completely disregarding compara­
tive advantage. Table 6 indicates Uruguay’s relative in­
efficiency compared with other selected countries. Unlike 
manufacturing, with its competitive disadvantage, no funda­
mental reason other than poor farm and ranch management 
exists to explain the discrepancy.
Construction. Construction has traditionally been 
an important industry in Uruguay, and one reason was 
brought out in the previous chapter: under various programs,
building receives a consirable amount of subsidization. As 
Table 12 indicates, public financing is involved in over ©, 
third of all homebuilding.
In 1961, the last year for which data are available,
private construction was distributed as follows: 76 P®**
cent for housing; 15 per cent, agriculture; and 9 per cent,
63industrial, commercial and office building.
Hecently construction has added about 5 per cent to 
the country’s GNP (as shown in Tables 2 and 3), although In 
Uruguay as elsewhere the construction Industry shows a 
cyclical pattern. (See Table 13«) So the most recent data 
available reveal a rather sharp continued decline in the
63CIDE, 0£. cit., p. 63.
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Industry. (See Table 1.) The combined forces of rising 
inflation and falling real income are no stimulus to con­
struction* (See Table 14 for index of rising construction 
costs*)
Prom 1952 through 1961, almost 60 per cent of the
homes built were classified by the government as "comfort-
64able and sumptuous," which seems to indicate that the 
depressed economy hurts the poor most, despite the housing 
and other welfare programs.
Tertiary Industries
Distribution. Uruguay’s distribution is largely In 
private hands. The exceptions have been cited above—  
most notably AUCAP’s marketing efforts through the retail 
level, COMAPROLE’s distribution of dairy products, and most 
utilities sales.
The problems facing the secondary Industries also 
plague the distribution of goods in the economy. Rising 
prices, limited markets, falling real income, and re­
stricted commercial credit all cause difficulties In the 
distribution of goods. However, there are certain of Uru­
guay's economic shortcomings which leave distribution 
relatively well off when compared: with other sectors of the 
economy. For Instance, the large credits created for
6Zj-Ibid., p. 64.
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welfare payments pump purchasing power Into consumers' 
hands. While this process reduces the amount of credit 
available to the business sector, the effect on distribu­
tion is more benign than on the rest of the economy, be­
cause welfare credits normally go quickly into consumer 
purchases.
Perhaps as a result of the country's welfare struc­
ture, "commerce" accounts for around 13 per cent of the 
national product, a larger share than stockraising and 
second only to manufacturing in its contribution to the 
nation's GHP.
Services
Finance. The country's financial needs are met by
private and public enterprise. Both banking and insurance,
as reported in the previous chapter, have large dominant
public agencies surrounded by a f t in g e of private firms.
It should be noted that private banks do a larger total
business than the national bank^ and there are some seven-
66ty private banks with about one hundred and seventy-five 
branches.^ However, the existence of a number of private 
firms does not make a free market. The dominance of the
65Ibid., II, 38.
^Bank of London & South America, Ltd., Quarterly 
Review, V, No. 3 (Julio 1965), 130.
^Taylor, og. cit., p. 1*1-7.
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public enterprises in these industries prohibits competi­
tive responses by private firms. Furthermore, the lack of 
coordination among public enterprises prohibits the benefits 
of a planned economy. The end result is that welfare 
programs take precedence over business needs, so that busi­
ness credits have been unavailable in the midst of severe 
inflation.
However, despite the abundance of both public and
private banking facilities, checks are treated with sus-
69piclon, and their use is limited.
Transport and Warehousing. Transport and ware­
housing are essential services in any econoriiy, and in Uru­
guay their operation is shared by the public and private 
sectors. The public agencies, mentioned above, are: the
railroad monopoly (AFE), the airline (PLUNA), ANCAP's ship­
ping, and the lighterage and warehouse facilities of the 
Port of Montevideo.
The internal transportation net is fan-shaped and 
radiates out from the capital. Railroads face growing com­
petition from private truck, bus, and automobile carriage. 
Most of the interior roads are dirt, but the proportion of 
hard-surfaced roads is growing. Presently work is progress­
ing on an all-weather road linking Montevideo in the south
^8CIDE, op. cit., I, 61.
^Taylor, og. cit., p. 148.
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with Rivera in the extreme north.
There is little domestic competition with PLUM, as 
the small size of the country makes much air travel unnec­
essary. However, there is considerable competition with 
foreign companies for international air travel.
As another indication of depressed business condi­
tions, domestic movement of freight has fallen in recent 
years, and as usual, railroads have suffered most. Passen­
ger movement internally has been stable in total, but 
again, railroads have lost part of their share of the mar- 
tot. 7°
One of the country's main transport needs is for 
better links with Brazil. Particularly in the future, as 
LAFTA becomes more important, will Uruguay need closer 
physical links with her huge neighbor.^1
The Professions. A final type of "service” to be 
considered is really a sort of human, capital. Any success­
ful economy requires professionals (including entrpreneurs, 
managers, engineers and the like). Compared with many 
underdeveloped and stagnating economies, Uruguay is rela­
tively well endowed with this important resource. Uruguay's 
population brought from Europe a love of learning as well 
as a European economic tradition. This background, plus
?°CIDE, op. clt., pp. 68-69,
71Xbld., p. 72.
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freely available education, have produced a large number of 
trained professionals, including business and political 
leaders.
Summary and Conclusions
Uruguay has not lived up to its agricultural pro­
mise because agriculture is inefficient, with the landhold­
ing and tax systems compounding the problem. Lumber is a 
promising industry, as is fishing, but the country is de­
ficient in most minerals, except for certain building mater­
ials .
A start has been made in manufacturing, which now 
contributes more than agriculture to GUP. Manufacturing 
is split between the conservative, traditional industries—  
mostly based on agricultural resources— and the newer, dy­
namic industries, which now account for most of the output. 
But because of its protected position, the value of manu­
facturing output is overstated relative to agricultural 
output. Construction is another important part of the pri­
vate sector, and it receives aid in the form of building 
subsidies.
The tertiary industries and human skills are avail­
able to suport the primary and secondary industries, but 
the entire economy has been in a recession for most of the 
past decade.
The reasons for the continued poor economic per­
formance are varied and complex, and will be considered in
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some detail in the following chapters* However, some of the 
more obvious difficulties brought out in this chapter are 
inflation from excessive credit, small markets, widespread 
inefficiency, and the lack of either a free market or a 




Index of Uruguay’s Real GNP Physical Volume 
by Sector at Constant Factor Cost 
(Base=196l)
(Provisional - subject to modification)
Sector 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963
Crops 123.3 117.2 107.9 . 110.0 88.1 69.2 100.0 96.5 107.7Stockraising 91.4 92.6 89.3 88.1 89.7 96.7 100.0 84.5 99.8Fishing 41.9 63.2 71.4 53.0 68.8 92.8 100.0 — 100.0
Manufacturing 96.7 101.5 103.6 103.0 101.5 101.8 100.0 99.5 95.0
Construction 97.5 102.3 194.7 99.7 104.0 113.8 100.0 86.3 72.7Commerce 98.6 96.1 104.5 89.7 86.2 91.6 100.0 101,1 97.3Transport and 
Warehousing 100.7 102.0 102.6 94.3 93.5 100.4 100.0 96.3 91.8Communications 88.6 92.3 95.0 97.7 99.1 99.5 100.0 108.7 115.7Utilities 71.7 77.5 83.6 90.0 85.9 90.5 100.0 109.5 110.2Housing 82.6 86.2 89.1 91.9 94.8 97.3 100.0 103.7 106.1Services 95.8 99.4 100.6 101.4 102.6 99.4 100.0 98.0 97.7
GNP 96.2 98.5 100.0 97.4 96.3 97.6 100.0 97.3 97.0
Banco de la Republica, Suplemento Estadlstico de la RevistaEconomica, Ano 21, 




Uruguay*s GNP by Sector 
(in millions of pesos at current market prices)
Sector 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 i960 1961 1962 1963












Construction 207 214 248 269 381 599 7^9Commerce 4-87 569 724 603 93^ 1,732 1,998Transport and 
Warehousing 329 375 436 ’ 477 586 925 1,199Communications 30 36 44 48 53 97 141Utilities 71 81 90 95 80 213 296Banks and other 
Financial inter­





Other services 376 523 631 830 1,153 1,489
GNP at current 
cost factors 3,978 4,4 55 5,35^ 5,725 7,810 11,995 14,764Less subsidies 
from taxes 427 449 568 570 703 964 1,724
GNP at current 
market prices 4,405 4,904 5,922 6,295 8,513 12,959 16,488 17,800** 21,300**
* Tnr«1 nrtoo a+ifwoe; ovtrl m vi 0 e
** Preliminary official estimates Banco de la Republica, op. cit., p. 36.




Uruguay's GNP by Economic Sector 
(In percentage of the total according to value added by factors)
Sector 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 i960 1961
Crops 6.1 5.5 5.0 5.7 4.8 4.2 4.8Stockraising 10.3 10.1 12.1 9.7 14.7 16.7 12.5Pishing — «*«• -- 0.1 -- 0.1 0.1
Manufacturing* 21.8 22.2 20.4 22.2 22.9 21.1 22.1Construction 5.2 4.8 4.6 4.7 4.9 5.0 5.1Commerce 12.2 12.8 13.5 10.5 12.0 14.4 13.5Transport and 
Warehousing 8.3 8.4 8.1 8.3 7.5 7.7 8.1Communications 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.0Utilities 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.0 1.8 2.0Banks and other 
Financial 
Intermediarles 4.4 4.6 4.6 5.0 4.7 4.3 4.6Housing 10.4 10.3 9.7 10.1 8.2 6.0 5.8Government
Services 9.3 8.7 9.6 10.1 8.1 8.4 10.3Other services 9.4 10.0 9.9 11.1 10.5 9.5 10.1
GNP at current 
cost factors 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
♦Includes stores and mines.




Uruguay’s Livestock In Selected Years 
(000*s omitted)
1937 1946 1951 1956 1959
Cattle 8,297 6,821 87154 7,433 7,600
Sheep 17,931 19,559 23,409 23,302 21,259
Pigs 3 46 2?4 259 381 400
Poultry 5,405 5,7 83 5,569 6,139 6,200
F.A.O., U.N., Livestock in Latin America (New York: 
United Nations, 1962), p#' ■£!, '
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TABLE V
Total Agricultural investment In Uruguay 
Percentage "by Sector (196*0
Livestock
Housing 18,0$
Sheds and other Improvements
Pastures 0.3$
Machinery and equipment 1?.0^
Crops 2.9#
Bank of London & South America, Ltd* Quarterly Review, V, No. 1 (January 1965) P» *K). IWo mention is made of the missing 0*h%)
TABLE VI
Output per Hectare in Selected Products 
(Kilograms per hectare)
1960-61
Product Uruguay Argentina Chile U.S. Mexico Italy
Wheat 722 219 1,261 1,607 1,384 1,737
Corn 564 1,800 2,000 3,521 925 3,260
Rice 3,516 3,316 2,676 3,814 2,058 5,175
Flax 591 686 770 524 967 803
Sunflower 459 691 1,023 — 1,41-6
Peanuts 714 1,247 — 1,340 1,280 2,400
Potatoes 4,688 9,406 8,455 20,954 — 10,199












1957 2,660 2,510 1,720 6,880
1958 2,660 960 1,850 5,^00
19 59 1,600 1,600 2,590 5,900
I960 3,180 . 4,340 950 7,930
1961 5,200 5,310 670 8,480
CIDE, ©£. cit., I, 62.
TAKLE VIII
Value of Industrial Production 


















CIDE, op, cit., I, 58*
TABLE IX
Cumulative Annual Growth Rates 







1936-1945 4.4 - 7.3 0.5
1945-1954 5.6 15.0 8.5
1954-1961 — 1 #4 2.5 0.3
Participation 
in 1961 48$ 52$ 100$
CIDE, oj>. cit#, I, 5^*
TABLE X
Industrial Growth 
in Latin American Countries 










Latin America 5.4 8.4
CIDE, cit*, I, 5^*
TABLE XI
Manufacturing Output Index of Physical Volume by Branch of Activity
(Base=196l)
Activity 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 i960 1961 1962
Pood 114.3 115.8 104.1 105.8 93.0 101.5 100.0 101.7Beverages 91.3 91.0 89.0 95.5 88.8 94.6 100.0 115.1Tobacco 74.6 78.4 94.5 97.7 98.2 100.4 100.0 108.9Textiles 113.2 140.4 123.1 117.7 125.3 96.7 100.0 89.1Clothing 83.0 98.2 114.9 128.4 122.2 104.4 100.0 87.9Wood products 160,1 158.3 164.4 133.1 126.6 102.2 100.0 103.1Furniture 98.5 99.0 121.8 99.1 82.8 87.1 100.0 92.5Paper 59.9 49.4 ' 117.1 107.5 112.9 131.8 100.0 103.8Printing 87.2 85.4 105.7 112.5 99.5 123.6 100.0 95.2Leather 120.7 119.0 104.6 119.2 111.8 94.5 100.0 109.2Rubber goods 39.3 86.4 81.5 120.7 90.6 134.2 100.0 —Chemicals 86.4 76.9 101.2 97.9 99.0 96.2 100.0 93.9Construction materials 101.5 89.9 90.0 89.8 88.8 99.1 100.0 111.0Metals 81.7 88.3 107.1 108.9 111.1 114.2 100.0 91.3Metallurgy 125.9 105.0 140.8 111.9 123.1 114.2 100.0 88.8Metallurgical machines 143.2 162.1 135.5 103.8 114.8 119.0 100.0 97.5Electrical goods 102.6 91.6 125.3 109.6 117.6 123.0 100.0 116.9Transportation
^3.8 69.5 86.1equipment 67.9 59.8 70.5 82.5 100.0Plastic goods 47.6 64.4 55.8 70.7 81.2 88.9 100.0 104.4Manufacturing
9 6.6generally 101.5 103.6 102.8 101.2 101.3 100.0 99.5





Number of Dwellings Constructed by Source of Financing
Financing Agency Annual Average 1952-1961 % of Total
Public sector - directly 796 7
Private sector - with public credits 3,386 28
Private sector - directly 7,728 65
Total 11,910 100
CIDE, 2E* , I, 65*
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TABLE XIII
Index of Physical Volume of Construction
(1955 - 100)
Year Private Construction Public Construction TotalMontevideo interior Total
1955 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1956 105.8 96.1 102.3 116.9 104.9
1957 IO8.3 105.0 107.1 108.6 107.4
1958 107.1 99.8 104.5 91.9 102.3
1959 115.8 110.3 113.8 74.1 106.7
i960 117.4 124.0 118.9 102.4 116.7
1961 94.0 114.7 101.6 107.0 102.6
CIPE, 0£. cit., I, 63.
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TABLE XIV
Cost of Private Building in Montevideo (Base=l96l)(Provisional data)
Year
Multifamily Dwelling of Five Floors
Comfortable Single Family Dwelling
AverageIndustrialBuilding
19 55 24.7 24.9 24.5
1956 26.9 27.0 26.7
1957 29.6 29.9 29.3
1958 34.5 34.4 33.6
1959 48.8 48.9 48.0
I960 77.0 76.6 77.**
1961 100.0 100.0 100.0
1962 113.2 113.3 112.0




The foregoing chapters have inescapably led to the 
conclusion that Uruguay’s economy is in trouble, but there 
is another equally inescapable conclusion: The country
must trade to live. Coal, oil, metals— the list could be 
expanded to cover most of the industrial needs of present- 
day society— are lacking. Other products— particularly 
beef and wool— are produced in greater abundance than two 
and a half million people could possibly use. The surpluses 
must be traded off; the lacking requirements must be ac­
quired. The only means is foreign trade.
Despite .the undeniable need for trade, Uruguay has 
experienced a general worsening of the terms of trade since 
the early 1950*s. (See Table 1.) Furthermore, year by 
year, external debts have grown larger and larger. (See 
Table 2.) Exchange problems have been increasingly severe, 
and a variety of remedies have been tried. None has been 
successful, because the difficulties In the foreign sector 




The recent history of the foreign sector has not 
been a pretty story. Interest groups have been vying for 
special benefits ever since exchange controls were imposed 
during the 1930's. (See Chapter II. Exchange controls 
were imposed nineteen months after the March, 1933 Terra 
takeover.)
One manifestation of exchange controls was a system 
of multiple exchange rates, and during the period of multi­
ple exchange rates, for example, "it was notable that busi­
nesses which had unruly unions were quite likely to enjoy
better treatment by the government than businesses which
1enjoyed more regular relations with their employees.*1 In
1959 the Reform law abolished multiple exchange rates, but
businesses in the foreign sector "remain almost as subject
to manipulation for political reasons as before the change,
2so that preferment can be indicated as clearly as ever." 
However, while pressure groups do manipulate the economy 
to their own advantage, their manipulation is probably mar­
ginal in its effect, but it is difficult to adduce direct 
evidence on this point.
The first part of the chapter surveys exports; the 
second part, imports; and the third part is an analysis of 
the trade and its financing. The final section consists of 
summary and conclusions.




Any economy, but most especially a small economy 
such as Uruguay, must import to function satisfactorily*
On the other hand, imports— however necessary— must be fin­
anced somehow, and the greatest part of the ability to im­
port comes from export sales. So exports receive the first 
consideration.
Even though the country is one of the world1s major 
wool exporters, Uruguayfs export situation is precarious. 
Since the 1930,s, there has been no diversification of ex­
ports, but rather a tendency to greater concentrationj The 
ability to import has become dependent on the sale of fewer 
goods. As Table 3 reveals, during the 1930fs, there were 
six industries which accounted for 5 per cent or more of 
total exports per capita (agriculture, livestock, food, 
textiles, and leather) and by 19&1, only five industries 
contributed as much as 5 per cent of total exports. At 
the same time, the total value of exports per capita had 
fallen by about one-third.
The only conclusion to be drawn from the data in 
Table 3 is that the country has become progressively less 
effective as an international competitor. The total amount
^The use of per capita data, as in Table 3, is well 
suited to a country like Uruguay. Per capita data not only 
give the best indication of changes in economic conditions 
as they affect the members of a society, but also provide a 
reliable picture of overall change, since the rate of popu­
lation increase has been low and stable. Refer to Chap­
ter I.
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of output that each Uruguayan can produce efficiently 
enough to sell on the world market has fallen. At the same 
time, production for export has become increasingly concen­
trated in fewer goods. Only in agriculture, (especially 
stockraising), where the comparative advantage is over­
whelming, can Uruguayan products compete now, but the coun­
try has been devoting most of its efforts to developing 
manufacturing rather than agriculture. Furthermore, domes­
tic inflation has been proceeding at a rapid pace, while 
exchange rate devaluations occur after the fact. This 
adjustment lag reduces the comparative advantage of beef 
and wool exporters in world markets.
The story told in the export data by product is a 
sad one of manufacturing industries not developing vis-a-vis 
the rest of the world, but rather the opposite. They are 
infant industries that never grew up.^ The "infant indus­
try" aspect of Uruguay's economic problems is revealed in 
Table k. Some irony is involved in labeling the data "Dev- 
eleopment of the Manufacturing Sector in Foreign Trade," 
because the "development" has been negative. Exports of 
manufactured items have decreased sharply while production 
of manufactured items has more than doubled during the post­
war years. So, despite the effort devoted to manufacturing
h.Supporting data, which may be of interest to some 
readers, are available in the Suplemento Estadistico de la 
Revista Economica published by~the Uepar"tamento de Invests, 
“gaciones"Economicas of the Banco de la Republica Oriental 
del Uruguay in Montevideo.
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despite application of the nation*s resources in such as 
way that manufacturing increased while agriculture lan­
guished— manufactured goods remain high-cost and noncom­
petitive in the world markets, because they are produced 
at a comparative disadvantage.
Table ^ provides a clear lesson for the country:
Even though diversification of production and of exports 
may be desirable, diversification must proceed along the 
lines of comparative advantage. And Uruguay’s comparative 
advantage lies in agriculture and agriculture-based indus-, 
tries, Furthermore, the above analysis seems still to be 
true even though only the "dynamic” (i.e., non-agricultural) 
industries showed any growth at all. Given sufficient pro­
tection and encouragement, a hot-house atmosphere can be 
created in which any industry can flourish artificially.
But in International competition, Uruguayan manufactured 
products are overpriced and consequently unable to provide 
any diversification of exports to improve the country’s 
international economic position.
However, it seems unnecessary and even impractical 
for Uruguay to build an economic hot-house for manufactur­
ing products, for as Professor T. V/. Schultz points out
The production of farm products in Latin 
America in general is likely to increase enough 
to satisfy this very much enlarged demand, pro­
vided public economic policies do not discrim­
inate against agriculture, as they have in 
many of these countries in recent years, 
and provided programs are developed which
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will make available to farmers knowledge rel­
evant to agricultural production*5
Even though demand for agricultural commodities will in­
crease only slowly in economically advanced countries, the 
income elasticity of demand for agricultural products is 
relatively high in Latin America. Furthermore, although 
Uruguay’s rate of population’growth is low, in Latin America 
as a whole the population growth is relatively high. These 
two facts together indicate that Uruguay can expect a high 
demand in the Latin American market for her agricultural 
production for the foreseeable future.^
In addition, any value added by processing agricul­
tural products prior to export should improve the country’s 
terms of trade while still permitting best use of compara­
tive advantage. Thus, particularly within the Latin Ameri­
can Free Trade Association (LAFTA), agricultural commodities 
should provide a good, dependable source of foreign exchange 
for Uruguay in spite of all the well-known arguments re­
garding the long-run unfavorable movement of terms of trade
of agricultural products and raw materials versus manufac- 
7tured goods.'
Howard S. Ellis, Ed., Economic Development for 
Latin America (Londont Macmillanr™T^53Ty,'^7™3IJ91
6Ibld., p. 324*.
?As mentioned in the foregoing chapter, lumber may 
offer better possibilities than most manufacturing for 
import substitution in Uruguay, and in time could become 
a good product for export.
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In addition to the question of export diversifica­
tion by product, is the diversification by country of des­
tination. Besides the narrower range of products presently 
being exported, there appears to be some tendency for geo­
graphical concentration, too. There were seven recipients 
of more than 5 per cent of total exports in 1957» and only 
six in 1963. (See Table 5.)
However, the existence of many buyers would do 
little to protect the country against market risk, because 
of the nature of the products exported. All of Uruguay's 
major exports face a worldwide market with uniform prices, 
so whether sales are to one countrj7, or to several has lit­
tle effect on the prices received. The only market protec­
tion available to Uruguay is to become more efficient in 
agriculture and to further enlarge the number of exportable 
products. Programs to lower agricultural costs and to di­
versify exports along lines indicated by comparative advan­
tage offer the best hope for the future.
Imports
Uruguay imports a broad range of products. Con­
sumer goods, raw materials, and capital goods are all im­
ported in quantity, and in the past twenty years almost all 
classifications have shown substantial increases as well as 
marked cyclical movements. However, in certain areas, im­
port substitution has occurred as domestic production has 
Increased, particularly in construction materials and
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metallic raw materials. (See Table 6.)
If the economy is to function satisfactorily, most 
of Uruguay*s imports will have to be continued at a high 
rate, despite exchange shortages. The country is deficient 
in most raw materials, so there is no chance for import sub­
stitution there. Facilities for producing capital goods 
are limited, and the country is too small to support an 
economical capital goods industry, so there is little like­
lihood of import substitution in this area. Consumer goods 
represent the best hope for Import substitution.
Over the past twenty years consumer goods imports 
have in fact shown a slight decrease, but only because of 
tight restrictions and large decreases in imports of con­
sumer non-durables. Imports of consumer durable goods have 
increased about as much as any classification. Since con­
sumer durables have most of the attributes of investment 
goods (both in production and use), it is likely that the 
country will'.not specialize in this line.
The relative importance of imported raw materials 
to Uruguay is revealed by the following data: In I96O-I961
imports provided 10 per cent of Uruguay*s consumer goods,
15 per cent of fuels, 56 per cent of raw materials and con­
struction materials, 1^ per cent of ma.chines and equipment 
for agriculture and industry, and 5 per cent of communica­
tions and transportation investment.8
8CIDB, op. cit., I, 91.
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Since import substitution has occurrred in building 
materials, consumer non-durables, and non-metallic raw 
materials, the economy apparently has been developing along 
line of comparative advantage despite the pressure for 
import subsidization from pressure groups. However, the 
favoritism accorded particular groups has almost certainly 
affected the rate of domestic development by special en­
couragement of certain imports and discouragement of others. 
The most important developments in the country's 
imports are the decrease in wood and newsprint imports 
(see above and Chapter III), the high and highly varis.ble 
level of imports of automobile and truck parts for assembly 
and booming machinery imports. Import data are summarized 
in Table 6, and import patterns are predictable and seem to 
show some improvement in recent years. The partial data 
available for the first months of 1965, compared with 196 ,̂ 
seem to indicate that further improvement was taking place
Qin the import/export balance. The country is so small, 
though, that time series are erratic, and as we will see in 
the following chapter, it is difficult to separate statis­
tical pattern from random movement.
Financing and the Foreign Balance
The foregoing sections have shown what has been 
going on in the country's imports and exports. Now the
9Banco de la Republica, Suplemento Estadistico,
op. cit., (October 1965) Ano. 22, No's. "255-56-57» P. 36.
13^
question is, why? The answer is a complex of legal and 
market forces. During the first half of the 1960’s, trade 
policies have been somewhat liberalized but are still de­
signed to reduce imports and to increase demand for domes­
tic output.10 This has been forced by years of trade def­
icits and shortages of foreign exchange, and the policies 
have taken the following formsi11
Import Restrictions. Imports into Uruguay are sub­
ject to a number of taxes. First, there is a basic import 
duty, normally some percentage of the aforo, the official 
valuation by the customs people. Second, there may also be 
ad valorem surtaxes and miscellaneous taxes based on some 
percentage of the aforo. Third, most imports are also sub­
ject to another surtax of 50 per cent of the sum of all 
other taxes plus the port handling charge. Fourth, there 
may be an "analysis fee*1 plus an additional one per cent 
surtax on the accumulated taxes and charges. All of these 
import taxes and fees may easily total as much as 110 per 
cent of the CIF value of the imports, and these do not yet
10Pendie, og. ait., p. 105.
■L1William E. Spruce, Foreign Trade Regulations of 
Uruguay (OBR 63-1^2; Washingtons ITT S. 'fepartment' of Com­
merce, 1963)> Pp. 7.
Mildred P. Burr, Basic Data on the Economy of Uru­
guay (OBR 63-1^8; Washington:' 13757 Dep't. of' ’Commerce," 1'963)
Bank of London & South America, Ltd., Quarterly 
Review, V, Wo. 1 (January 1965), 36-^.
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ipinclude surcharges. J Such large taxes would have an im­
portant effect on the quantity of imports even where the 
demand is relatively inelastic, and have no doubt been the 
reason for the change in the country*s importing pattern.
Exchange Surcharges. Exchange surcharges are levied 
on all but the most essential imports, and they vary from
20 per cent to 300 per cent of the CIF value, depending on
13the essentiality of the import. (See Table 8.) Imports 
of goods in the higher categories of surcharge; i.e., the 
least essential imports, are further subject to prior de­
posits of 200 per cent of their CIP value. These prior 
deposits are repayable after six or nine months, depending 
on the product, from the date intention to import was reg-
nilistered with the Central Bank. Finally, there Is a 6 per 
cent remittance tax and a tax of one-half of one per cent 
when goods are not shipped on Uruguayan flag vessels. (Re­
call the small size of the country's merchant marine; see 
previous chapter.) However, when shipment of 20 per cent 
surcharge items is made on Uruguayan vessels, the additional 
one-half of one per cent is dropped, as is the 6 per cent 
remittance tax of one-half of the 20 per cent surcharge.*^
12Spruce, op. cit., pp. 1-2.
13lbid., p. 2; Burr, op. cit., p. 7; Bank of London op. oit., p. ~3'7.
1^Spruce, op. cit., p. 2.
15Ibid.
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Once the goods are inside the country, they are sub­
ject to a 9 per cent sales tax plus, in the case of auto- 
mobiles and furs, additional 25 per cent luxury sales tax. °
So although the Exchange Reform Law of December 1959 
abolished multiple exchange rates, it is clear that the 
present system of import regulations can be as selectively 
applied as multiple exchange rates ever were. For example, 
certificates of exemption from taxes may be obtained from 
the Ministry of Finance on certain industrial, agricultural 
and construction machinery, so long as it is not domestic­
ally produced. Other imports which may get certificates of 
exemption are medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, tele­
phonic and telegrephic equipment, and petroleum products.̂
The Exchange Market. Besides the restrictions and 
limitations imposed by tax, tariff, and regulations, the 
exchange market imposes its own limitations on trade. Dur­
ing 1963 and 196^ the Central Bank was forced for political
reasons to hold the exchange rate constant while domestic
1 flprices approximately doubled. This policy was reasonably 
conceived. The idea was that if traders knew that they 
could depend on a constant exchange rate, they would not 
carry large stocks of imported goods, nor would they
^ Ibld., pp. 2-3.
17'Burr, op. cit., p. 7» Spruce, op. cit., p. 2.
13Bank of London, on. cit., p. 38.
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speculate in foreign exchange.
However, as Haberler has pointed out, an exchange 
rate need not cha.nge to cause misfortune; it is enough that 
traders expect the rate to change.^ This is what happened 
in Uruguay prior to the Hay 1963 devaluation and again dur­
ing the 1963-1965 period. The consensus was that the Bank 
would be unable to hold the rats. So the attempt had the 
reverse effect of encouraging specula,tors to come into the 
market. The result was that the Central Bank was oversold 
by some $200 million when the inevitable devaluation in 
Hay of 1963 changed the peso-dollar rate from 11:1 to
PC)18.50:1, resulting in a loss which the Central Bank ar­
gues is the responsibility of the government, and is there­
fore a state debt. It is unlikely the government will 
21agree.
After the Hay 1963 devaluation, several moves were 
taken to secure the position of the peso. Hie Central Bank 
limited exchange for profit remittances and for travelers. 
This decision was made in July of 1963 and had the effect 
of splitting the market into two segments. After a second 
devaluation to 13.70 pesos to the dollar, the Bank made 
another decision which completed the split of the exchange
19Gottfried I-Iaberler, Prosperity and Depression 
(New York: Atheneum, 1963), ppV
^Bank of London, op. cit., p. 36.
~  ~  2"1 ,Ibid.
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market. The bank decided to withhold sales to exchange for
22any use other than the most essential imports.
The Bank of the Republic was then left selling at a 
low, subsidized price to importers of essential Imports, 
while the rest of the banking industry sold at higher prices 
set by the market to other exchange users. This division 
of the market was contrary to the provisions of the Exchange 
Law; however, there was no recourse under the Law, because 
it did not require the Bank of the Republic to sell ex­
change at subsidized prices.^
During 1964, Uruguay’s exchange position worsened,
so that the 1964 trade deficit was $19.4 million (U.S. dol-
?4lars) compared with $11.7 iw 1963, and the situation was 
in fact even more severe than the trade deficit indicated, 
because import registrations rose sharply while export re­
gistrations fell.2^
The Central Bank was oversold by some $336.4 mil­
lion and was experiencing difficulty in supplying exchange 
at the official rate. Because of that difficulty,
22rbid., pp. 36-37.
23Ibld., pp. 37-38.
oh,^ Ibld., p. 39; Banco de la Republlca, og. cit., 
p. 36. There is some discrepancy between the two sources, 
probably due to the use of preliminary data by the Bank 
of London.
-'Bank of London, op. cit., p. 39.
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Import registrations were suspended in January, 1965*
The gravity of the exchange problem and the difficulty of
solving it were shown by the fact that import registrations
27were not reopened for over two months.
Largely because of the undervalued official rate of 
exchange, many wool exporters preferred not to sell their 
stocks at all, because of the governments retention of too 
large a part of their earnings. The decreased value of the 
major export worsened the exchange situation. The export­
ers' reason was based on three factors: (1) the aforo,
(i.e., the official value), was relatively high; (2) ex­
porters had to exchange the official value of their wool 
exports at the official exchange rate; and (3) the official 
rate was undervalued. Therefore, since only any balance 
above the aforo could be exchanged on the more lucrative
n pfree market, many wool exporters declined to sell.
These large, unsold wool stocks were the largest single 
factor in the country's international insolvency.
In January, 1965, the country moved to reduce the 
size of wool stocks, by reducing the aforo and thereby 
giving exporters a larger balance to exchange on the free
26Ibid., p. 37.
2?Ibld.
In i960 wool exporters were in effect being taxed 
over half the value of their sales, according to Taylor, 
op. cit., p. 260.
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market.2^ Reducing the aforo did stimulate exports and 
thus eased the pressure on the peso somewhat, but evidently 
not enough to solve the basic problem, for another deval­
uation (to 24 pesos to the dollar) was announced, in March,
1 9 6 5 .30
A special mission was scheduled to visit the United
States to negotiate refinancing of some obligations, but a
banking crisis in the first half of 19&5 caused the closing
of four banks, which led to a bank holiday and the conse-
31quent postponement of the proposed mission. The bank 
failures resulted from the country's exchange difficulties 
and they in turn worsened the exchange difficulties by 
further shaking public confidence.
At the time of this writing, it appears that the 
country has done about as much as it can by regulation.
What is needed is to increase exports, not to impose stric­
ter regulations on imports. The economy must import to 
operate efficiently and further restrictions on imports 
must ultimately reduce efficiency.
Transfers. There is a small positive balance of net 
transfers out of the country. However, the figure is not 
significantly large. (See Table 7.)
^Retentions (i. e., the tax rate itself) had al­
ready been reduced to the lowest legal limit. Bank of 
London, op. cit., p. -
3°lbid., p. 129.
-^Ibid., pp. 130-132; Fortune (Sept. 19^5)» p. 65*
14-1
Capital Plows* Uruguay has received Important 
amounts of foreign investment in the past, and overseas 
investment may become more important in the future when the 
Latin American Free Trade Association becomes more of a 
going concern. (See below.) There is no inventory of for­
eign Investment in the country.-^2 But estimates are that 
Uruguay has received perhaps $65 million of U.S. private 
investment. This is evidently larger than the present 
amount of British investment, and other European countries 
have invested other, indefinite amounts.(Despite the 
present predominance of U.S. investment, earlier overseas 
investment came mainly from Britain.)
The entry and exit of capital has been highly ir­
regular, but has generally shown a positive balance. (See 
Table 7.) Uruguay offers no guarantees to foreign invest­
ors but they have been treated no worse than private Uru­
guayan investors. So it is possible that Uruguay could be­
come a popular haven for investors wishing to operate with­
in the protected walls of LAFTA and have available a well- 
educated labor force.H o w e v e r ,  despite the possibility 
of increased future investment, there are no indications
32Burr, oj>. cit., p. 5*
3 3 rbid.
3^0ne question is what effect years of dependence on 
welfare and bumbling bureaucracy may have had on labor pro­
ductivity, The answer may be '’much" or ’'none”, but the 
problem defies objective analysis.
that the movement, if it oocurs at all, will be of suffi­
cient size to materially affect the trade deficit, and it 
is in the nature of praying for an economic miracle, to 
expect that capital flows will cure the problems of the 
foreign sector.
The effect of foreign aid is marginal, but some re­
cent aid projects were a §6 million Agency for International 
Development (AID) loan, and an §8 million Inter-American 
Development Bank (ID3) loan, both for housing. The Exp or t- 
Import Bank provided the Bank of the Republic §5 million in 
credit for business loans. The Inter-American Development 
Bank made a $^.1 million loan for an East-west highway, 
while World Bank loaned $18.5 million for a North-South 
highway.35
Trade Agreements. As one Uruguayan commentator put 
it, "The country should now try to stimulate growth toward 
the outside, for the possibilities of growth from-within 
have been practically exhausted."3^ ghe implications of 
this sentence are significant, and are perhaps illustrated 
by the fact that only 3 per cent of the country’s exports 
are not of agricultural origin,33 even though most of
~^Ibid., p. 6.
3^Snrique Iglesias, "Desarrollo Economico del Uru­
guay," la Consulta Uruguaya de Iglesia y Sociedad, 196A (?) 
p. '“^Author's 'translation.)
1^3
the country's economic effort has been to expand manufac­
turing at the expense of agriculture. Certainly, the fact 
that total agricultural output was higher sixty-five years 
ago than it is today is evidence of a lack of emphasis on 
agricultural expansion,yet export patterns obviously 
show that the country has an overwhelming relative advan­
tage in agriculture, especially stockraising. How have 
these considerations entered into the country's formal 
trade agreements? For a final look at Uruguay's foreign 
sector, one might consider it from the standpoint of outside 
relationships through two trade agreements, GATT and LAFTA.
Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-- 
GATT— Uruguay has granted certain reciprocal tariff conces­
sions. The country has supported GATT; however, there has 
been a realization that although such reciprocal agreements 
will improve world trade in general, they may at the same
time damage the terms of trade of a country in a low or in­
termediate stage of development.-^
For this reason, Uruguay joined GATT and endorsed it
in principle, but at the same time came out strongly for
-^Taylor, og. cit., p. 138.
39Ragnar Nurske, "International Trade Theory and 
Development," Economic Development for Latin America, H. S. 
Ellis, Sd., assisted by tlenry C . Wal'licFT Proceedings of a 
conference held by the International Economic Association, 
(London: Macmillan, 1962), Chapter 9, pp. 2^0-2^1.
w
regional trading arrangements.^0
Partly as a result of Uruguay*s interest and initia­
tive, the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was 
formed, with headquarters in Montevideo. Unfortunately, 
Uruguay * s intermediate stage of development in Latin Amer­
ica has reduced the benefits of LAFTA affiliation. Under­
developed countries get special concessions. Industrialized
nations get a protected market. Being neither, Uruguay re-
iJdceives the benefits of neither.
Despite some feeling of betrayal regarding LAFTA 
and even some talk of withdrawing, Uruguay has been faith­
ful as a member. For example, the recent exchange sur­
charge increases do not apply to imports from other LAFTA.
h pmembers, so long as they appear on the concession list.
Uruguay is not alone in the unfortunate middle of 
the LAFTA scale of industrialization— Peru, Columbia and 
Chile are in a somewhat similar stage. This problem was 
recognized late in 19^3 &t the third yearly conference. At 
that time, some special consideration for the four countries 
was discussed, but so far no arrangements have been made.
It was this failure more than any other single thing that
Uruguayan Institute of International Lav/, Uruguay 
and the United. Nations, National Studies on Internatiohal 
Organization"TNew York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1958),pp. 120-122.
^Bank of London, op. cit., pp. ^1-^2.
^2Ibid.
1^5
caused the extreme dissatisfaction with LAFTA among Uru­
guayans.^ Perhaps the sweetest use of this adversity 
would "be for the country to concentrate on agricultural 
efficiency.
Summary and Conclusion
Uruguay has long had close restrictions on foreign 
trade, and the 1959 removal of multiple exchange rates has 
not had the effect of freeing trade. A wide variety of 
costly import duties still allow as much individual prefer­
ence as ever.
At the same time, exports have become more and more 
restricted. Export taxes in the form of retentions of for­
eign exchange to exporters have been reduced to the lowest 
legal limit, so there is little more to be done to improve 
the situation except to change the regulations by eliminat­
ing retentions. Improvement in the country’s export situa­
tion must come in the form of greater efficiency of produc­
tion.
One factor which has helped somewhat to reduce the 
large unfavorable foreign balance is the inflow of capital. 
This may become more important in the future, as more com­
panies want to operate within LAFTA. Since Uruguay gener­
ally accords private foreign capital the same treatment as
^ihid
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private domestic capital, it could be a logical place for 
foreign investors wishing to operate within LAFTA. So, 
even though trade agreements have not been much aid to UTu* 
guay so far, LAFTA may be <a help in attracting capital.
Aside from capital requirements, Uruguay’s unfor­
tunate foreign trade situation has not been improved by 
the country’s long-standing stagnation, even though defla­
tion or recession has long been a classical remedy for a 
trade deficit. Perhaps the reason for the lack of any 
beneficial results in the foreign sector from domestic 
stagnation may be as follows: The classical remedy is
supposed to result in lower prices— especially in the ex­
port sector*— by acting through the product market. However, 
to the extent that inflation is of the cost-push variety 
(i.e., inflation originating at some level other than the 
product market), then the source of the inflation may be 
insulated from the effects of the supposed cure. Since the 
Uruguayan inflation stems from large-scale welfare payments, 
it is, indeed, proof against reversal due to factors opera­
ting in the foreign sector.
However, some improvement in the form of a relative­
ly lower export sale price is needed immediately. The coun­
try is too dependent oh foreign trade to permit further cuts 
in imports. The scarcity of foreign exchange and gold makes 
a favorable balance in trade a necessity. In the following 
chapter we will survey cycles and trends, and make a few
Vv?





Terras of Trade and Purchasing Power 
Prom Exports 
Base 1961 ■ 100
Physical Purchasing
Selected Terms of Volume of Power Gener­
Years Trade Exports ated by Exports
1935 89.9 108.3 97.4
1936 121.1 90.9 110.1
1937 144.5 90.2 130,3
1938 106.3 96.1 102.2
1939 93.7 101.3 94.91940 98.8 99.5 98.11941 102.6 93.9 96.31942 104.3 59.3 61.8
1943 85.2 105.8 90.1
1944 80.6 99.5 80.2
1945 86.5 112.7 97.51946 95.5 108.9 104.01947 113.6 88.9 101.01948 128.9 87.6 112.9
1949 128.3 94.5 121.2
1950 144.9 • 117.7 170.5
1951 168.3 78.7 132.5
1952 124.6 91.1 113.5
1953 130.7 119.3 155.91954 135.5 113.0 153.1
1955 114.7 90.3 103.61956 101.1 114.8 116.1
1957 105.9 67.3 71.31958 93.2 88.5 82.5
1959 95.6 63.3 60.5I960 106.9 71.6 76.51961 100.0 100.0 100.0
CIDE, ££. pit., I, 91.
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TABLE II
Balance of Trade 
(In thousands of dollars)
Year Imports Exports Balance
1958 134,651 155,091* 20,440#1959 214,133 97,798 - 116,335I960 244,440# 129,400 - 325,040
1961 209,072 174,714 - 34,3581962 230,484 153,432 - 77,052
1963 176,900 165,206 - 11,694
^Includes exports of gold for dollars 16:468




Classification of Exports by Economic Sector of Origin (Constant, 1961 dollars per capita)
Manufactures
Year
Crops Livestock Sand,stone 
& mining
Pood Textiles Clothing
1935 7.1 37.8 0.6 41.3 4.6 MM1936 9.8 29.4 0.6 34.1 3.9 M m»
1937 6*6 28.3 0.6 38.3 3.2 MM1938 6.8 33.8 0.8 34.1 5.5 «MM1939 12.7 31.4* 0.6 33.2 8.2 MM1940 7.5 35.0 0.1 30.3 9.1 MM1941 5.3 28.0 0.5 33.4 8.3 ..1942 4.0 7.3 0.5 24.1 8.9 0.1194*3 2.5 26.8 0.4 40.4 10.8 0.41944 2.3 29.1 0.6 30.6 9.6 0.5194*5 2.1 29.0 0.6 31.8 19.7 1.11946 4*.8 24.6 0.6 30.2 15.1 0.9
194*7 1.5 30.2 1.0 15.9 12.6 0.3194*8 1.5 24.3 1.0 23.0 7.9 0.1194*9 5.0 22.2 1.1 27.2 5.8 M M1950 0.1 42.2 0.1 27.6 9.7 . .1951 1.5 15.6 0.2 26.4 9.2 --1952 2.7 20.3 0.1 23.1 12.8 —1953 2.2 33.9 0.4 21.1 21.1 MM1954* 5.5 23.8 0.3 28.1 16.8 MM1955 10.9 18.4 0.1 7.9 21.0 . .1956 11.8 25.2 0.2 14.7 23.7 ..1957 3.6 10.7 0.1 15.0 11.3 MM1958 7.2 24.6 m m 9.8 15.4* MM
1959 1.6 12.4 MM 8.5 16.2 ..I960 «*m 12.5 0.1 13.7 14.8 ..1961 0.4 19.5 0.2 13.2 16.3
(continued on next page)













































1935 9.6 MM 5.1 mm mm 1.0 107.11936 7.6 MM 2.5 mm mm m m 0.6 88.61937 mm mm 7.4 MM 1.8 0.1 mm mm 0.6 86.71938 — 7.1 MM 2.7 MM MM 0.3 91.01939 — 6.5 M_ 1.4 0.1 0.1 0.3 94.61940 6.1 MM 1.8 0.1 0.1 0.7 91.1-1941 0.1 7.5 M M 1.7 0.1 . 0.1 0.5 85.41942 0.1 6.9 MM 1.0 0.1 0.2 53.11943 0.1 3.4 M M 2.5 0.2 0.8 93.41944 0.1 9.3 M M 2.6 0.4 0.1 0.3 86.31945 0.3 7.5 MM 3.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 96.41946 0.1 5.7 MM 5.0 0.3 0.3 0.4 92.0194? 0.1 7.2 M. ■ 4.9 0.1 m m . 0.4 74.21948 MM 7.4 0.1 6.6 MM rnm  mm 0.2 72.31949 mm mm 8.6 MM 4.9 0.1 -M 1.8 76.81950 - m 9.6 M . 4.3 .. M. 0.5 94.4
1951 0.4 5.6 MM 3.1 0.1 MM M M 62.21952 0.1 8.8 MM 3.0 m m MM MM 71.1
1953 m m 8.6 MM 4.4 MM MM MM 91.81954 7.1 MM 4.2 WM 0.1 0.1 85.71955 __ 6.2 0.3 2.6 MM M M 0.3 67.51956 7.3 MM 1.7 M««« MM 0.1 84.71957 mm mm 5.3 MM 2.9 MM MM M M 49.11958 -- 4.4 0.1 1.9 m m mm M. 0.1 63.71959 M M 4.6 m m ' 1.7 MM MM M M 44.9i960 0.1 5.8 0.9 2.1 m M MM MM 50.21961 0.12 6.4 0.2 2.7 0.1 “ “ 0.1 64.2
CIDE, op. Cit*, I, 90*
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TABLE IV
Development of the Manufacturing Sector in Foreign Trade





992 I.063 2,365 1,046 1,860 761
4,4998,78111,487





500 540 1,100 480 
770 310
2,2504,0504,740
CIDE, Q£. cit., I, 58.
TABLE V
Exports by Country of Destination 
(In thousands of dollars)
Country 1957 1958 1959 I960^00^ C7/o "0oo§ 7° 0 0 0 <5 % 'CfOoll %
West Germany 8,934 7.0 8,952 6.4 9,148 9.4 11,970 9.3Argentina 415 0.3 1,226 0.9 357 0.4 2,370 1.8Belgium Lux* 2,998 2.3 1,307 0.9 1,901 2.0 4,071 3.2Brazil 8,?65 6.8 9,020 6-5 1,378 1.8 307 0.2Czechoslovakia 2,673 2.1 4,276 5.1 3,393 3.5 1,078 0.8Spain 2,295 1.8 5.545 3.9 1,926 2.0 2,203 1.7United States* 12,493 9.7 10,699 7.7 11,669 11.9 19,806 15.3France* 5,485 4.3 10,347 7.5 2,349 2.9 8,297 6.4United Kingdom* 21,781 17.0 21,686 15.7 9,874 10.1 32,346 25.2Low Countries* 30,050 23.4 14.103 10.2 9,527 9.7 17,038 13.2Hungary 272 0.2 2,062 2.1 5,476 5.6 1,174 0.9Italy 8,032 6.3 4,432 3.2 4,182 4.3 6,099 4.7Japan 958 0.8 377 0.3 127 0.1 73 0.1Poland 1,345 1.0 1,42? 1.0 2,876 2.9 3,034 2.3U.S.S.R. 1,782 1.4 16,267 11.7 8,4l4 8.6 1,522 1.2Sweden 1,761 1.4 1,361 1.0 587 0.6 1,960 1.5Switzerland 4,798 3.7 6,007 4.3 3,256 3.3 1,333 1.5Yugoslavia 1,273 1.0 3,614 2.6 5,083 5.2 1,367 1.2East Germany 1,627 1.3 2,l6l 1.6 1,211 1.2 1,995 1.5Other 10,485 8.2 13,024 9.4 14,573 14.9 10,397 8.0
Total 128,248 100.0 138,622 100.0 97,798 100.0 129,400 100.0
C OiJTII'jUniD Ok* I'jEXT PAGE
Banco de la Bepubllca, (August-September» 1964), p. 48.
TABLE V - continued
Country 1961
1962 19630oo$ % 066$ 066$ %
West Germany 14, 856 8.5 15,160 9.9 12,070 7.3Argentina 1,830 1.0 1,627 1.1 916 0.6Belgium Lux* 5,680 3.2 6,141 4.0 4,209 2.6Brazil 1, 8*1-2 1.1 3,006 1.9 9,692 5.9Czechoslovakia 4,788 2.7 3,005 2.5 3,645 2.2Spain 5,253 3.0 3,035 2.0 4,537 2.7United States-* 24,613 14.1 24,379 15.9 19,227 11.7Frances- 10,885 6.2 8,396 5.4 8,097 4.9United Kingdom-5- 45,137 25.8 27,689 18.0 42,464 25.7Low Countries* 19,974 11.4 15,259 10.0 18,599 11.2Hungary 1,134 0.6 1,682 1.1 726 0.4Italy 11,827 6.8 7,957 5.2 10,695 6.5Japan 3,968 8.3 1,041 0.7 5,157 3.1Poland 1,605 1.0 2,904 1.9 2.392 1.4U.S.S.R. 920 0.5 12,000 8.3 3,722 2.3Sweden 1,596 0,9 3,030 2.0 £,675 2.8Switzerland 1,933 1.1 1,353 0.9 1,249 0.8Yugoslavia 1,403 1.0 ;554 0.4 1,386 0.8East Germany 3,530 2.0 2,200 1.4 535 0.3Other 11,954 6.8 11,356 7.4 11,255 6.8Total 174,716 100.0 153, 100.0 165,206 100.0
^Includes exports of gold for dollars
Banco de las Republica (August-September, 196*0, P. **-8#
TABLE VI
Classification of Imports by Economic Sector 
(in constant 1961 pesos per capita)
Year Consumer Goods Raw Materials Fuels & LubricantsCurables Nondurable s Subtotal Nonme tal lie Metallic Subtotal
1942 17 99 116 336 41 377 431943 9 76 85 278 38 316 631944 7 92 99 252 52 304 5219^5 13 83 96 314 64 378 721946 41 94 135 364 82 446 601947 87 105 192 464 85 549 691948 60 96 156 382 90 472 911949 58 114 172 357 80 437 301950 70 104 174 366 120 516 931951 91 110 201 441 133 574 1121952 56 108 164 298 80 . 378 117
1953 36 78 114 34° 91 431 1171954 54 94 148 460 132 592 128




CIDE, og. cit., I, 93.
TABLE VI - continued
Capital Goods
Transpor tati on Industrial Agricultural Overall
Year Construction & Communications Equipment Machinery Subtotal Total
194-2 42 ' 6 42 8 56 639194-3 34 1 28 8 37 5351944 47 5 28 7 40 5421945 69 16 64 13 93 7081946 88 50 . 130 13 193 9221947 81 123 183 31 337403 1,2281948 80 63 250 91 1,2021949 70 33 208 37 278 1,0461950 96 69 255 53 368 1,2471951 108 143 288 80 525 1,5201952 71 12 6 209 51 286 1,1161953 78 49 182 36 267 1,0041954 110 102 265 54 421 1,3991955 77 4o 224 26 290 1,1061956 52 58 n o 19 I87 912
1957 57 62 129 31 222 1,0801958 32 19 61 4 84 5901959 28 19 89 2 110 767i960 28 25 72 32 129 9751961 31 67 110 38 215 908
CIDE, op« cit., I, 93.
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TABLE VTI
Capacity to Pay and Capacity to Import 
(Capacity to pay in the exterior)
Purchasing Power Prom Exports 
Exports of*
Goods and Terms of Year Services Trade Subtotal
. s
Entry of Capital Total
(millions of dollars In 1961 prices)1942 125.7 19.4 145.1 0.9 146.01943 204.1 -15.6 188.5 45.0 233.51944 195.6 -13.7 181.9 49.3 231.2W 5 224.0 - 6.5 217.5 26.0 243.51946 217.5 10.6 228.1 16.5 244.61947 187.3 40.3 227.6 17.5 245.11948 184.8 63.7 248.5 22.3 270.81949 189.0 64.4 253.4 12.1 265.51950 238a 130.2 368.3 29.5 397.81951 165.6 105.0 270.6 4.6 275.21952 179.4 47.1 226.5 69.8 296.31953 224.2 69.1 293.3 21.6 314.91954 213.6 76.3 289.9 13.5 303.41955 174.9 23.5 198.3 1.6 199.91956 228*3 10.3 238.6 19.6 258.21957 149.4 22.4 171.8 60.6 232.41958 203.8 - 3.5 200.3 8.4 208.71959 384.4 - 8.7 175.7 19.9 195.6i960 183.1 - 3.5 179.6 77.6 257.21961 224.3 224.3 28.9 253.2 
-ivrrr~n /rrfff”mm,m'
CIDE, 2£,* dt» f I) 92.
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TABLE VII - continued 
Gross Outflow
Year Exit of Capital
Net transfers to the 
Exterior Subtotal
Capacity to Import
Per capita Total in dollars
1942 10.7 13.8 24.5 121.5 62.31943 2.7 13.4 16.1 217.4 110.01944 2.3 11.8 14.1 217.1 108.31945 2'. 5 14.0 16.5 227.0 111.71946 2.3 16.8 13*1 231.5 112.4194? 11.9 7.2 19.1 226.0 108.21948 4.4 6.7 11.1 259.7 122.61949 36.2 5.4 41.6 223.9 104.21950 19.8 '5.3 25.1 372.7 171.1
1951 8.6 3.7 12.3 262.9 119 .11952 5.9 4.7 10.6 285.7 127.61953 15.5 5.3 20.8 294.1 129.61954 25.5 5.5 31.0 272.4 118.3
1955 22.5 4.8 27.3 172.6 74.01956 8.7 4.4 13.1 245.1 103.51957 11.9 4.3 16.2 216.2 90.21958 27.3 3.5 30.8 177.9 73.2
1959 9.4 3.1 12.5 183.1 74.4I960 12.8 3.6 16.4 240.8 96.71961 9.0 3.5* 12.5 240.7 95 A
^Sutject to revision
CIDE, ££. oit., I, 92.
i6o
TABLE VIII 
Import Surcharges by Date
Group* 9/29/60 V 15/63 11/20fQ * % of total**
A nil nil nil 32$
B nil 20$ 30$ 1+3%
C nil 20$
or or 60$ 60% 6%
D 1+0% 60% 90% 10%
E 75% 100% 150% 3%F 150% 150% 225% 2%
G 150% 300% 300$ l+%
-^Products are grouped according to their essentiality*
■^Proportion that each group represented in total imports in 1963 and the first nine months of 196^.
Bank of London & South America, Ltd*,




The development of the foregoing chapters has been 
mainly expository; the purpose of this chapter is to round 
out the description by offering a primarily statistical 
presentation of the state of the Uruguayan economy, and to ■ 
discuss likely future developments.
First, consideration will be given to the trend of 
economic activity. Then, cyclical patterns will be studied. 
Third, the foreign economic relationships will be examined. 
Finally, reasons for the economy’s overall behavior will be 
projected.
As in earlier chapters, the statistical data are 
presented in tables in Appendix I. In addition, graphs are 
presented in Appendix II, and the derivation of the graphs 
are presented in Appendix III.
The data released by the government's Commission for 
Investment and Economic Development (Comlslon de Inversion y 
Desarrollo Economica)— cIDE'1'— are generally well regarded,
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since the personnel of the CIDE are generally considered to 
be one of the better statistic-collecting groups in Latin 
America* Therefore, CIDE data and the Association of Banks* 
data^ will be used to the greatest degree possible.
TRENDS
Aggregate
Data are available from 1935 to 1961 for total GNP, 
and from 1935 to 1962 for the per capita figures. (See 
Tables 1 and 2, Graphs 1 through 12, and the derivation of 
the graphs in the statistical annexes to this chapter.)
There is general agreement that the economy’s performance 
has been poor between 1961 and the time of this writing; 
however, few figures are available in a form which permits 
continuing the series. Therefore, recent performance, when 
presented, is shown only tentatively as a dotted continua­
tion of the functions.
Over the series, the trend of total GNP has averaged 
between two and three per cent annual increase. The least 
squares regression line was Y = 8,568.6 + 308.3x, and. so the 
trend of Uruguay*s economy in the aggregate has been posi­
tive, even though the growth rate has been low. However, 
during the past few years, since the 1957 peak, the economy 
has been performing very sluggishly. (See Graph 1.)
^Taylor, op. cit., p. 5^» refers to the figures of 
the Association of Banks as most reliable.
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Per Capita
Changing the focus from aggregate to per capita 
GNP by sector gives a better perspective on the economy.
The figures of the Association of Banks are convenient, be­
cause they are a single compatible, deflated series. Fur­
thermore, they very nearly use the breakdown of Chapter IV; 
that is, primary, secondary, and tertiary industries. The 
only discrepancy is the inclusion of mining and quarrying 
in the manufacturing category.
Primary Industries. (See Graphs 2, 3j ^.)
Over the period of the analysis, the trend in per capita 
farm output has been rising, but this is largely because 
of booming output in the mid-50*s. If these years were 
eliminated, the trend would show little increase, and in 
any case, output in the farm sector has not in recent years 
approached its peak of 1955 and 1956• And over the longer 
run (65 or 70 years), agricultural output may have actually 
declined. (See Chapter III, page 89.)
Stockraising had no boom years to pull its trend 
line up, and so overall the production of livestock from 
1935 to 1962 was down. The decline is ominous, since the 
livestock industry is a main source of foreign exchange 
and offers the greatest relative advantage to the country. 
Along with declining production, domestic consumption has 
been increasing, so continued decreases in the industry can 
only mean a worsening of the already extremely difficult
exchange situation. This is a fundamental problem of in­
sufficient output not to be solved by law or decree. How­
ever, since the country is so well endowed naturally for 
stockraising, the potential exists for a dramatic improve­
ment in the future. Overall, output in the agricultural 
sector has shown a weakly rising trend. (See Graph ^.)
Secondary Industries. Excepting public utilities 
(which, as we shall see, is a special case), output in the 
secondary sector shows the highest rate of change of all 
the sectors of Uruguay’s economy, with a least squares 
trend of Y = ^8.92 + 2.2?6x over the period studied. Con­
struction and manufacturing (the figures on manufacturing 
output include mining and quarrying) both showed dynamic 
growth. This should not be viewed too optimistically, 
however. Remember that Uruguayan manufacturing grows in 
an extremely protected environment, and this has two impli­
cations: First, the industry would probably wither under
competition; and second, the value of output Is overstated 
relative to the more competitive sectors of the economy.
On the other hand, a part of the decline in con­
struction must be disregarded, since the 1962 construction 
figures include only private building, and public construc­
tion averages around 7 per cent of the total. (See Chapter 
III*)3
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The output of the secondary industries appears to 
he progressing far faster than the national average, but 
part of the growth is due to inflated figures, and much of 
it could not survive unprotected. As we note below, the 
terms of trade have been changing in favor of the indus­
trialized exporters vis-a-vis the agricultural exporters, 
such as Uruguay. In the same way, the terms of trade be­
tween the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of the 
domestic economy have been changing in favor of the indus­
trial sector. This development may be inequitable, but it
4may also be helpful for economic development, if the manu­
facturing conforms to comparative advantage so that in the 
long run the industry can become competitive.
Tertiary Industries. The tertiary sector— services 
and distribution— in contrast to the stagnating primary 
sector and the apparently thriving secondary sector, is very 
uneven. Output of public utility services has grown at the 
fastest rate of any segment of Uruguay's economy. (See 
Graph 9.) This is due to two thing’s: The series started
very low, so any increase would be statistically significant 
and the government's programs specifically encouraged utili­
ties output as socially beneficial. (See Chapter II.) Mean­
while, output of communications, warehousing, and transport­
er.For an excellent discussion of this point, see 
Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development (New York: Morton, 
I960), pp. 382-3831
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ation services (all excellent indicators of general busi­
ness activity) has been extremely sluggish. (See Graph 8.)
Overall, the increase in the tertiary industries 
has been slower than either the primary or secondary indus­
tries. (Compare Graphs 7, and 11, along with the data 
on these series in Appendix Hi.)
Per Capita Output. Over the entire period of the 
analysis from 1935 through 1962, per capita output has 
shown a rising trend according to a least squares line.
(See Graph 12.) However, after 1955^ and 1956^ up through 
the latest information available, per capita output has 
fallen, and any increases (See Graph 1) have been due sim­
ply to more workers.
There is another, alternative interpretation of 
these data, which is even less hopeful than the generally 
prevalent gloomy view of Uruguay's economy. A sine curve 
fits the 1935-1962 period rather well, and this could mean 
that there is no tendency to long-run per capita growth at 
all, but rather that during the time for which data are 
available, the country passed through the trough, recovery, 
and peak of one Kondratieff-type cycle. (See Graph 13.)
According to this interpretation, Uruguay's economic
5CIDS, op. cit., p. 23.
6Association of Banks; see Table 2.
7a sine curve has no particular significance except 
that it fits the data well and gives a regular cycle.
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activity (in per capita terms) may be expected, to continue 
to decline until around 1978, when a recovery should occur. 
There would seem to be a consensus (certainly it is the 
writer's view) that this sort of mechanical, deterministic 
concept is unwarranted, because planned action can alter 
the course of economic cycles. In this case, though, the 
pattern of activity over the years for which data are avail­
able was so striking as to warrant mention, if not belief. 
Regardless, a fifty-year cycle is a good transition from 




For the shorter cycles as well as the longer, a 
longer series of data would be helpful, but even without 
that, smoothing the gross national product data by means of 
a three-year moving average shows a marked cyclical pattern 
around the trend line, with a single complete cycle requir­
ing approximately twenty years, from 1938 to 1958. From 
1950 on, the economy has been performing below the trend, 
and so if that pattern is repeated, Uruguay's GNP should be 
starting its recovery at the present time.
The most recent data indicate tentatively that the 
aggregate gross national product has begun to grow again 
even though the per capita figure continues to fall.
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(However, developments such as the strike, state of siege, 
and new-style executive, will affect the economy.) But 
one cannot yet assess their effect. One significant point 
regarding Graph 14 is that more than twice as long was re­
quired for the move up above the trend line to the crisis 
in 1956 than was required for the downturn. This appar­
ently means that the economy has certain built-in features 
which tended to retard recovery and to hasten a decline. 
This possibility will be considered further in the fourth 
section of this chapter.
Sector Analysis
Primary Industries (Agriculture)• In farming and 
stockraising (as in most of the other individual sectors), 
cyclical patterns are not so clear as in the overall GBP 
data. Perm output was up in 1961, down in 1962, and up 
again in 19^3» indicating that agriculture has recovered 
from the "i960 drought, and perhaps also that the agricul­
tural advancement schemes mentioned in Chapter V have begun 
to show results, it does appear that crop farming has 
bottomed out. However, the industry may follow the saw­
tooth pattern of the mid-^O’s before recovering finally. 
(See Graph 15.) This will depend as much on the weather as
The precise nature of developments since 1962 are 
difficult to determine since only provisional data are 
available past that year. (See Table 2.) There are cer­
tain indicators published in 19&5 by ^he Bank of the Repub 
lie, but they are mixed, so no definite conclusions can be 
drawn from them. See Banco de la Republica, op. cit.,
pp. 62-65*
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on development schemes and market conditions.
The livestock industry also appears to he exper­
iencing a recovery from its prolonged poor performance.
(See Graph 16.) It is a sort of economic tragedy that the 
industry in which the country has the greatest relative 
advantage is also the only industry to show a declining 
trend. The system of export taxes called retentions (ex­
plained in the previous chapter) has worked to the detri­
ment of the stockraising industry, without being used to
develop substantially other sectors of the economy. The
stockraisers were the dominant class in a sense (see Chap­
ters II and IV), but at the same time, through retentions, 
they have been esqploited by other sectors of the economy 
and have not shared even the modest growth the other sectors 
have achieved.
There finally seems to be a realization that the 
comparatively most advantaged sector should be encouraged, 
not badgered, so retentions have been cut; weed and pest 
eradication programs started; and tax reforms have been 
discussed to make better management and mechanization pro­
fitable for ranches and for farms as well.
Apparently, for all these reasons, the cycle in
agriculture may be turning. One reason for such a tenta­
tive statement of a hopeful situation is that the agricul­
ture in Latin America as a whole has been projected into a
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general downturn,^ but a more fundamental reason is that in 
Uruguay agriculture alone is turning up. Because of the in­
terrelationship of the various sectors, weakness of the 
other sectors could be transmitted through the market and 
cut off the agricultural recovery. (See Graph 17.)
Secondary Industries (Hanufacturing and Construc­
tion. Manufacturing has followed the general pattern of 
the total GNP around the trend— the same slow recoveries 
and sharper downturns. If the pattern of the 19^0*s is 
repeated, the cycle should begin a recovery within the 
next couple of years. However, it is difficult to define 
the bottom of the cycle. The factors retarding growth and 
causing the upper turning point are easier to pin down.
(See Graph 18.)
The secondary industries have experienced growth, 
but they have shown strong cyclical movements, and the 
recent cyclical movement has been even more strongly down 
in construction than in manufacturing, (see Graphs 18 and 
19, and Table 3)> with the result that during the cyclical 
downturn the secondary industries (Graph 20) have been a 
drag on the entire economy.
Tertiary Industries (The Service Industries)• Cy­
clical weaknesses in manufacturing and in construction are
^Economic Research Service and Foreign Agricultural 
Service, The World Agricultural Situation, Foreign Agricul­
tural Economic Report" Ko. 22 (Washington': United States
Department of Agriculture, 1965), p. 26.
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reflected in (and also in turn, reinforced by) weaknesses 
in the industries which service them. (See Graph 21.) All 
three of these sectors— manufacturing, construction, and 
the transportation-warehouslng-coramunications group— have 
all performed at a slower pace than the average of the econ­
omy. (See Tables 2 and 3, and Graphs 19> 20, and 21.)
The "other services" classification has shown a 
tendency to slump, along with transportation, warehousing, 
and communications. (See Graph 23.)
Under the sponsorship of the national government’s 
UTE, output of public utilities has increased continuously 
regardless of the cyclical behavior of other sectors of 
the economy. (See Graph 22.) This increase has occurred 
mainly in production of hydroelectric power. But despite 
the increases in public utilities output, the output of 
total services has recently followed the cyclical downturn 
of the economy generally. (See Graph 2^.)
Total output per person has followed a clear cycle, 
as has total GNP, though the per capita, figure has shown a 
more slowly increasing trend, and the decline since the late 
1950’s has been faster than that of the total GNP figures. 
(See Table 2 and Graph 25*)
THE FOREIGN SECTOR 
As the previous chapter pointed out, Uruguay’s diff­
iculties in the foreign sector are In great part reflection 
of other, more fundamental economic problems, so that as the
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domestic economy stagnated, foreign economic relations be­
came increasingly difficult. However, there is a second 
part of the problem— the terms of trade, over which the 
country has no control. The country’s major exports are 
determined by comparative advantage; the country’s imports 
are determined by its needs; price levels for exports and 
imports are determined in world markets, which Uruguay is 
too small to dominate or even to influence noticeably.
Furthermore, the government has been unable to dom­
inate domestic producers, Taylor10 recounts the situation 
in 1956 and 1957 when the Federacion Rural, piqued by the 
government’s rejection of its demands, fomented large-scale 
smuggling of beef and wool into Brazil, It is significant 
that exports have not recovered to 1950-1955 levels. (See 
Table 5.)
But smuggling in the 1950*s was not a new problem.
There were other specific cases where similar large-scale
smuggling forced the government to compromise with stock- 
11men, and the extreme difficulty of eliminating this sort 
of operation Is shown by the fact that prominent members of 
a smuggling ring arrested in 1959 were also members of a 
special police detail assigned to stop the Illegal traf­
fic.12




The government has also been unable to control wool 
exports. VJhen the combination of prices, retentions, and 
the exchange rate seems unfavorable to sheepmen, they have 
simply held the fiber off the market.^ According to Tay­
lor "these actions . . .  literally brought the country to
1the verge of bankruptcy." With this sort of result, it 
is difficult to conclude that government regulation of the 
foreign sector has worked to public benefit, particularly 
when poor market results are combined with a declining 
trend in livestock production, for which repressive poli­
cies are also partly to blame.
So domestic economic difficulties, government trade 
regulations, and stockraisers* actions all had their effect 
on the foreign sector; but what of the terms of trade per 
se? How did the relationship between export and Import 
prices evolve in recent years? CIDE sums up the situation 
in these words:
The terms of trade were extremely unfavorable 
during the war and then evolved favorably— or less 
unfavorably if you prefer— in the immediate postwar 
years until the point of greatest advantage during 
the Korean conflict and arrived at a point of maxi­
mum benefit for the country in 1950. Since that 
time, there has been an uninterrupted deterioration 
in the terms of trade.13
13Ibid., p. 260; Bank of London & South America, 
Quarterly Review V, (January 1965), 39.
■^Taylor, op. clt., p. 5̂ .
•^CIDE, op. cit., p. 85. (Author*s translation.)
17^
The terms of trade have had a profound effect on 
national well-being. Since the foreign sector is so im­
portant to the economy— not only in mere size but also in 
the variety and nature of goods traded— the progressively 
more unfavorable terms of trade have had an effect which 
can be seen in the fact that the fall in per capita income 
has been greater than the decline in per capita produc­
tion.16 (See Table 6.)
The influence has been only one way. The worsening 
terms of trade have reduced national income, but lower out­
put has not noticeably improved the terms of trade. The 
result is that there is no valid cyclical pattern in the 
terms of trade data (see Table 6), but rather a steady de­
terioration since 1951* Q-s prices of imported manufactured 
goods have climbed relative to prices of Uruguay*s export 
sales of raw materials. There is no reason to expect that 
there is a cycle operating here, nor is there any reason to 
think that there will be a change in the increasing substi­
tution of synthetics for wool and leather. *'The country 
cannot in any manner expect that solutions will come from 
outside.,t1? However, this is not to deny that Latin Amer­
ica should be a good market for Uruguay’s exports within 






Now that the economic survey of Uruguay has "been 
concluded, it remains to sift through the facts to see how 
an educated, alert, and socially progressive nation could 
allow its economy to deteriorate so. This paper presents 
no economic plan, nor is it offered as a theory of economic 
stagnation or arrested development. However, certain de­
ficiencies in the Uruguayan economy demand notice and may 
be suggestive for other economices in a similar stage of 
economic development, with similar welfare goals. "By 
committing itself to the achievement of more rapid econ­
omic expansion, a government commits itself to change the 
nation*s savings (or investment) ratio and its capital/out­
put ratios— usually both,"1®
How has Uruguay's government responded to the chal­
lenge of economic stagnation? First, through extensive 
welfare programs it has committed itself to changing the 
nation's savings and investment ratios— but in the wrong 
direction for development. Second, the "capital/output 
.-ratios depend upon the economic wisdom in new investment
•^Wildred Malenbaum and Wolfgang stolper, "Political 
Ideology and Economic Progress: The Basic Question," re­
printed In Laura Randall, ed., Economic Development— Evol- 
ution or Revolution? (Boston: Heath, 17̂ 6̂ ),' p. 18."
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allocation as well as the vigor with which the nations 
human resources are applied to already existing capital.
The lack of any working development plan— even for invest­
ment in the government sector— and welfare plans which re­
move a large percentage of workers from productive work, 
take care of the second aspect of development. . Little 
systematic attention is given the "economic wisdom in new 
Investment allocation*’ as it applies to overall economy, 
and the "nation's human resources" are effectively withheld 
from application to the other factors of production try 
welfare programs.
Have the country's policies completely stymied the 
country? No, because Uruguay is presently in an intermed­
iate stage of development. It is neither ^underdeveloped* 
in the sense of the UN definition (very low per capita in­
come) nor according to most theoretical definitions (which 
stress characteristics such as relatively high agricultural 
employment). Uruguay's Income per capita is one of the 
highest in the area, and the country's GNP is produced 
mainly in the secondary and tertiary sectors. (See Table 2 
at end of Chapter III.) Uruguay is underdeveloped rather
^ibid.
20At the time of this writing, a lengthy ten-year 
development plan was being prepared. A copy was not avail­
able to the writer, but reports were that features such as 
welfare reform and import restrictions were proving politi­
cally unpopular. Time, LXXXVI (November 19, 1965), 59.
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in the sense of arrested development and falling per capita 
income, so the impact of economic mis-management has fallen 
on the country’s potential economic growth.
Despite limited resources, the country has a very 
respectable development potential, and this is all the more 
true if it is considered as a part of the Latin American 
Free Trade Association. The availability of Latin America's 
resources and markets presents Uruguay with excellent econ­
omic potential by eliminating the country's two strictest 
impediments to economic expansion. However, growth can 
occur.; only if certain structural problems are overcome.
This section will analyze the structural economic problems 
facing the country, first from a general standpoint and 
then by sector, including some ideas on possible future 
developments.
Financial Factors
Business Credit. After the conservative Blancos 
won their first election in ninety-three years in 1959> they 
reversed some of the Colorado economic policies. The Colo­
rado party favored urban industries at the expense of rural 
groups. The Blancos on the other hand tended to favor agri­
culture, and not to encourage industrialization for fear of 
social change.^ Multiple exchange rates were one of the
21Norman Ingrey, "stability Maintained, Uruguay Vote 
Near Center," Christian Science Monitor (December 5» 1962), 
P* 3.
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22devices which injured agricultural interests. The elim­
ination of multiple exchange rates in one step in December 
1959 encouraged output but also encouraged dealer over­
stocking.
Financing became tight and ended the inventory
cycle upswing. At the same time that the inventory cycle
turned down, a slump occurred in construction,23 then the
second industry, after food and beverages. Builders had
been constructing high-cost cooperative apartments and had
saturated the market. Meanwhile, inflation had increased
building costs per square meter from $82 in i960 to §137
in 1961. Since private bank loans were available for sic
months to a year at the longest, they were no help to the 
2 ij.builders. At the same time, the State Mortgage Bank had 
to reduce its lending, because it was forced to buy some of 
its own bonds to get them off the market.2^
In this land of freewheeling inflation, it is some­
thing of a paradox that businesses have long been hampered 
by shortages of credit. But compounding these difficulties, 
which caused severe downturns in both building and inventory 
cycles, the International Monetary Fund requested the Bank
22John Gerassi, "Uruguay Expects Recession to Stay," 




of the Republic to curtail credit and limit re-discount- 
ing.2  ̂ The International Monetary Fund’s concern with in­
flation was quite understandable, but at the same time, it 
was unfortunately true that economic output was effectively 
limited internally without further discouragement from out­
side.
The conservative nature of bank financing has been 
discussed in Chapter IV. These strict rules were later 
liberalized In mld-1963 to permit bank credit to expand and 
contract more in accordance with the needs of trade, but 
at the time of the IMF recommendation, business credit was 
already subject to restraints internal to the system.
Consumer Credit. From 195^ to 19^3 consumer credit 
was subjected to restraints similar to those imposed on 
business credit. However, in a larger and more meaningful 
sense, the government itself provides a vast amount of con­
sumer credit, since about a third of the potential work 
force receives some pension, and a like number of households 
depend on regular Income from the government. Therefore, 
much of the government’s credit is channeled to consumers.
In the normal course of the forced saving process, 
credits are created for investors who use the credits to 
buy capital goods. This inflation of investors’ purchasing 
power means that they can enter the market to buy goods made
26Ibid.
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of resources which otherwise would have been devoted to con­
sumer goods. This process increased the society's output 
capacity in the long run. But in the short run, this pro­
cess will cause some inflation and divert goods from con­
sumers, who have a smaller proportion of the purchasing 
power and hence of total output initially. However, the 
possibilities for consumption are greater later when the 
new productive capacity is created. But this process has 
been reversed in Uruguay. Credits have been created on 
balance, not for producers, but for consumers. For a given 
total of goods and services available at any time, a great­
er proportion goes to consumption than would in the absence 
of transfer payments and government credits.
One unfortunate similarity between the well-known 
forced saving and the Uruguayan "forced dis-saving" or 
"forced consumption" is that both create inflation. The 
difference is that "forced saving" promises incr^ised out­
put later as recompense, while Uruguay's version promises 
the reverse: a constantly lagging national output as re­
sources are diverted from capital formation into consumption.
Inflation. However, the inflation remains. During 
the 1930's, prices rose at an annual rate of 3 per cent. By 
the 19^0*s and early 50's, the rate was 5 per cent. By the 
late 50's and early 60’s, the annual rate of inflation was 
over 20 per cent and that had jumped to 30 per cent for 
1963. As inflation became worse, output tended to stagnate. 
This stagnation tends to support the idea that moderate
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inflation may be safe and even economically energizing, but 
that immoderately rapid price increases (perhaps over 10 per 
cent) are usually accompanied by poor economic performance. 
(See Table 7 for data on Uruguay’s inflation.)
Pressure for inflation comes from a number of pres­
sure groups. Each such group sees its own well-being in 
getting a larger share of a constant output.2"'7 However, 
inflation can only occur with the consent of the monetary 
authorities. They must give in to the pressure. The power 
to adjust the stock of money is the power to indulge infla­
tion or to deny it. So far, the monetary authorities have 
seen themselves forced to sustain inflation— "true infla­
tion, which occurs when prices increase, independently of 
whether production occurs or not, in a self-feeding pro-
rtQcess."^0 Attempts to retard inflation through rules regu­
lating profit margins have been virtually ineffective2  ̂be­
cause the vehicle for this "self-feeding" process has been 
the quantity of money and the government budget.
Government Finance. The primary features of public 
finance in recent years have been the large proportion of 
government expenditures in the total, and the growing an­
nual deficit of the central government. Without counting
2?CIDE, op. cit., p. 29.
28Ibid.
2^Bank of London & South America, Fortnightly Re­
view, 28 (July 13, 1963), 599.
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the industrial or commercial entes autonomos, the national 
government accounts for some 20 per cent of aggregate final 
demand. In addition, any losses of the entes autonomos must 
be defrayed by the national government.
The evolution of the government deficit is shown in 
Table 8. Although the budget has consistently shown a defi­
cit, it was never planned in the past. The 1965 j 1966, and 
196? budgets are the first with planned deficits. This is 
suggestive. It is one more indication that more inflation 
is imminent.
Prospects. Uruguay’s financial future seems to in­
volve mainly inflation. The increased bank credits for bus­
iness will add to the inflation; between 1955 and mid-196^ 
private bank credits doubled and there was an increase of
30some 1*1-00 per cent in the Bank of the Republic’s credits. 
Furthermore, all the present recipients of pensions, welfare 
payments, and housing subsidies will continue to be eligible 
for their payments, which will continue to feed inflation.
Sources of inflation are great and groining, and the 
projected government deficit through 1967 seems to acknow­
ledge this fact. The one means for stopping inflation would 
be to tax. But the political balance is too fine for one 
party or the other to be able to push for unpopular measures 
and, at the same time, there is the danger that the economy
30Banco de la Republica, Suplemento Estadistico de
la Revlsta Sconomica, 21 (August - Sept ember 196*J-J, 23.
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would not successfully entertain deflationary measures.
Just as inflation has not resulted in greater output, it is 
likely that deflation could reduce output.
Commodity ("Real”) Factors
The dilemma facing' Uruguay in controlling inflation 
is a reflection of the country's dilemma in trying to in­
crease output. And productive investment for economic dev­
elopment is often generated by forced saving, but this sort 
of consumer exploitation would be unpopular in Uruguay.
Under the prevailing conditions, consumers are favored and 
protected. One way that Uruguay could divert resources from 
consumption to future development would be to tax workers' 
subsidies. But taxing subsidies is foolish welfare econo­
mics. It is to take simultaneous steps, forward and back­
ward. However, given the existence of the subsidies and the 
practical impossibility of removing them, it might be nec­
essary foolishness.
Another theoretical possibility would be to hold 
workers' subsidies at their present levels and make avail­
able additional credits for development. Another round of 
inflation would then take care of redirecting some resources 
out of consumption into investment. This theory would seem 
to be politically difficult, since a concerted effort of 
both parties would be required. This cooperation would be 
difficult but not impossible. In the past the "pacts of the 
parties” (see Chapter II) have been used when vital interests
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were at stake. Fighting inflation could he a matter of sur­
vival. In the long run, for a country in Uruguay's position 
per capita income cannot stay the same, as it could in a 
more primitive society. In Uruguay, Income must either rise 
or fall, and more specifically income will continue to fall 
if high consumption continues to cut into investment; It 
will rise if capital investment can increase at the expense 
of consumption.
Sector Analysis
Private vs. Public. It appears likely that public 
investment will continue to grow relative to private, be­
cause private motivation remains weak, whereas the govern­
ment's sudden willingness to admit a deficit beforehand is 
likely a signal that more action and less caution may be 
expected. HotMever, this is not an either/or question. If 
increased government expenditures are believed to be part of 
a practicable development program, it is likelier to smoke
out available private investment which is now going into
31precautionary balances or leaving the country. So, pro­
bably one should not conclude that if public investment 
grows, private investment must thereby be reduced. Both 
are apt to move together, but government investment will 
probably move first and private follow after a lag, and 
then only if private investors feel that the economy will
-^CIDE, op. cit., I, 84-: Bank, op. cit., (July, 
1965), p. 126. --- --
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develop.
So far, there is no development plan in operation.
The CIDE study was the basis for one, but it has not been 
implemented to date. This delay may be due to the realiza­
tion of the political and economic costs of development.
But, although the costs of development are high, the cost 
of the alternatives--long-run stagnation and impoverishment-- 
ere higher. Perhaps the most important lesson for Uruguay 
is not that public expenditures are harmful, but that in­
vestment needs to be emphasized over consumption regardless 
of the source.
Primary Industries. In spite of their recent slug­
gish performance, the primary industries are still the only 
Uruguayan industries which have a competitive advantage in 
the world market. This advantage is indicated by the fact
that only 3 per cent of the country*s exports are nonagri- 
32cultural. it would be preferable to encourage agricul­
tural mechanization without land reform, because extensive, 
mechanized techniques would be the most efficient. The pro­
grams mentioned above are aiming at this goal.
Influential stockmen*s associations have long been 
involved in Improving the breeds of sheep and c a t t l e , E x ­
tension programs are involved in eliminating pest and weed
3sIbid.5 p. 86.
^Taylor, op. cit., p. 53.
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infestations and in encouraging better farm and ranch man­
agement. All of these measures, in conjunction with pro­
posed tax reforms to encourage mechanization, should in­
crease agricultural output.
Less optimism may be warranted by the recent flurry 
of interest over the discovery of an iron ore deposit near 
Valentines, for it will develop into something commercial 
only if techniques are available to exploit it. (See Chap­
ter II.) At the time of this writing, potential developers 
had concluded that economic exploitation would be Impossible 
at present. If this is true, then no matter how helpful 
steel and iron exports would be, no amount of encouragement 
or public investment will make production economic.
The Interest and spirit shown may be the most impor­
tant part of the Valentines discovery. If part of this 
interest can be transferred to the other primary Industries, 
there is room for hope. If the interest was mainly the wish 
for a windfall— wealth through iron ore, deus ex machina, 
economic strength through luck without cost or effort— then 
hope for the future may dwindle proportionally.
The Secondary Sector. Manufacturing will be a cru­
cial area for economic development. Presently a large pro­
portion of GNP is being produced in the secondary industries 
and this means that the country lias achieved a certain 
structural transformation towards maturity. Now the sec­
ondary industries themselves must become more competitive. 
Raw materials may be slightly cheeper under LAFTA, but the
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biggest part of efficiency increase and cost reduction must 
be achieved Internally; then LAFTA may provide the market. 
Perhaps the improved market may encourage Uruguayan pro­
ducers to achieve greater efficiency under LAPTAt'tfeantlthpy 
have so far.
A certain amount of external investment may develop 
as foreign firms become interested in producing within the 
LAFTA areas. Uruguay's history of not systematically dis­
criminating against foreign businesses will help, although 
the country's tendency to discriminate against capital in 
favor of labor will make foreign Investors leery.
The Tertiary Sector. As the secondary sector 
developed, the tertiary sector developed along with it. A 
quantitative structural balance between the secondary and 
tertiary has likely been reached, and so the service indus­
tries will probably not grow in proportion to manufacturing 
and construction, but will move in the same direction. How­
ever, the number of people employed in the tertiary sector 
should increase relative to agriculture as agricultural out­
put per worker increases and agricultural workers are freed 
for other sectors of the economy.
Tourism is one exception. Host development plans 
have hopes for tourism to develop, and Uruguay has much to 
recommend it to visitors. Already a brisk tourist traffic 
comes from Argentina and Brasil, and if the country were 
more accessible by air from the rest of the world, no doubt 
the tourist industry could be even more important.
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Another particular service industry which has been 
encouraged and should be further encouraged, is shipping. 
Since Uruguay will have to remain a trading nation, it 
should carry a greater share of its trade in its own ves­
sels.
Conclusions
Uruguay's economy has been stalled for years. The 
trend has been weakly up over the years for which data are 
available, and one interpretation of the data would indic­
ate that there is no long-term growth at all. Probably the 
real trend is lower than the least squares regression line 
the thirty years of data, show, but not so low as the pro­
posed horizontal line.
There has been a convergence of several cycles 
turning down together in the past few years, which has 
aggravated a bad situation.
Some of the more important factors which have ar­
rested economic development in Uruguay may be identified—  
but only for the special case of Uruguay— because, unfor­
tunately, traditional economic theory offers no generally 
accepted theory of arrested development. "Everything de­
pends on everything else” is perhaps the only permissible 
generalization in economics, so some of the points are in­
terrelated and overlap. However, they are presented separ­
ately in the following summary:
(1) Mainly through its extensive welfare programs,
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the country has committed itself to Increasing consumption 
rather than investment, while the obvious strategy for eco­
nomic growth would require the opposite,
(2) The rate of inflation has been too high to stim­
ulate development. And since the inflationary pressure has 
come from consumption programs rather than from investment, 
the effect has been pure inflation— price increases without 
any tendency to increase output.
(3) Economically inefficient urban industry has been 
encouraged at the expense of relatively efficient agricul­
ture— particularly stockraislng. Long-run comparative ad­
vantage would indicate that agriculture should be given a 
higher priority than urban industry.
(*0 At the same time, agriculture has been becoming 
less efficient, with output stalled for the last six or 
seven decades. Little investment has gone into agriculture, 
and most of that little has been designed to reduce employ­
ment rather than to increase output. More agricultural 
investment should be made— and the effort should be to in­
crease output rather than reduce employment. This program 
will.require considerable effort, particularly on the part 
of the government, because tax laws and foreign exchange 
regulations should be designed to encourage the "right*' 
sort of investment rather than the reverse, as is now the 
case.
(5) Finally, the welfare burden which the country
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has imposed upon itself is too heavy. Too large a part of 
GNP is diverted to welfare, and too large a part of the 
potential work force is diverted from productive employment, 
both as pensioners and as pension administrators.
In order to achieve growth, the country will have to 
institute the indicated changes which will be politically 
quite difficult because they conflict with the country*s 
welfare philosophy. However, the alternative is constantly 
falling national Income, which will ultimately be even 






Uruguay's Gross National Product 
at 1961 Market Prices
Total Per person
Value in Index Value Index
millions of Bases in Base:
Year pesos 1955=100 pesos 1955= 100
1935 8,524 53.7 4,821 70.91936 8,821 55.6 4,920 72.4
1937 9,580 60.4 5,270 77.5
1938 9,118 57.5 4,947 72.8
1939 9,019 56.9 4,826 71.01940 9,184 57.9 4,846 71.31941 9,349 58.9 4,864 71.61942 8,442 53.2 4,331 63.7
19431944
8,623 54.4 4,364 64.2
9,7 28 61.3 4,854 71.4
1945 9,942 62.7 4,893 72.01946 11,030 69.5 5,354 78.8
1947 11,772 74.2 5,635 82.91948 12,036 75.9 5,683 83.6
1949 12,531 79.0 5,834 85.81950 12,910 81.4 5,927 87.2
1951 13,982 88.2 6,332 93.2
1952 13,899 87.6 6,208 91.3
1953 14,839 93.6 6,537 96.2
1954 15,647 98.7 6,797 100.0
1955 15,861 100.0 6,796 100.0
1956 16,241 102.4 6,861 101.0
1957 16,488 104.0 6,879 101.2
1958 16,059 101.2 6, 6ll 97.3
1959 15,878 100.1 6,454 95.0i960 16,092 101.5 6,463 95.11961 16,488 104.0 6,538 96.2
Resumen de los Prlnclpales Aspectos de la Actividad 
EoonomTca del~"T7ruguay en el Ano I963. ?JirEed”Trom cIBS with 
d.8.t0. from til© Banco d6 1q B©publ 1cb#
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TABLE II


















1935 75.1 95.4 89.8 63.1 33.0 69.9
1936 89.4 91.0 90.5 63.0 38.7 70.8
1937 74.1 99.5 92.4 73.2 52.9 78.2
1938 101.1 94.1 96.0 55.3 54.5 70.8
1939 99.6 97.5 98.1 51.0 55.6 69.71940 81.4 100.3 95.0 53.7 50.8 69.31941 64.9 100.7 90.7 56.6 68.2 69.91942 81.2 55.1 62.3 54.0 44.1 56.0
1943 68.4 67.5 67.8 54.4 36.7 57.51944 94.7 89.5 91.0 57.7 48.5 69.51945 63.5 93.7 85.3 57.4 61.3 68.51946 80.9 95.6 91.5 67.9 74.7 77.7
1947 72.7 95.2 89.0 68.8 78.5 77.61948 97.2 96.4 9 6.6 70.0 79.5 81.1
1949 105.7 99.0 100.9 77.0 82.5 8 6.71950 95.0 102.5 100.3 80.2 85.2 88.4
1951 119.5 100.1 105.5 88.6 88.9 95.0
1952 111.0 97.7 • 101.4 88.0 95.3 93.8
1953 115.6 102.6 106.1 101.1 89.9 101.6
1954 135.5 97.8 108.4 106.0 100.3 106.0
1955 133.3 98.8 108.4 104.3 105.4 105.91956 124.8 98.6 105.9 108.2 109.1 1.07.3
1957 113.5 94.0 99.4 108.9 110.1 105.31958 114.2 91.5 97.8 106.8 103.4 102.8
1959 90.1 92.1 91.5 103.9 106.7 99.3i960 70.2 98.0 90.2 102.8 115.2 99-31961 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1962(3) 95.3 83.4 86.5 98.2 85.2(4)
rc'r*
92.0
(1) Includes: quarries and mines. (2) Includes: commerce, .
ownership of dwellings, banks, insurance and other financial 
intermediaries, general government and other services.
NOTE: Until 1954, the indexes were generally based on
economic indicators; after 1955, they were obtained by 
complete investigations. (3) Provisional data. (4) Includes 
only private construction.
Association of Banks, Resumen.
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1935 90.6 21.3 76.7 77.0 73.8
1936 92.5 22.2 78.6 78.8 75.2
1937 102.8 24-.8 81.1 82.6 80.6
1933 97.4 27.4 78.2 79.5 75.6
1939 85.1 29.1 77.9 77.2 73.91940 87.2 31.6 78.2 77.9 74.11941 85.9 33.3 78.4 78.0 74.41942 74.2 32.5 76.5 74.5 66.2
19^3 74.0 31.6 77.2 75.1 67.21944 77.8 35.0 80.1 78.1 74.2
1945 81.7 37.6 81.4 79.8 74.8
1946 93.0 39.3 85.9 85-3 81.91947 105.5 59.0 92.1 93.1 86.21948 96.2 4-8.7 92.5 91.5 86.9
1949 100.4 53.0 91.0 91.1 89.21950 102.8 51.3 92.3 92.5 90.7
1951 108.7 59.0 97.9 98.2 96.81952 103.0 64-.1 96.0 95.9 95.0
1953 103.2 68.4 98.9 98.5 99.81954 110.4 72.6 102.1 102.3 104.0
1955 106.8 77.8 102.6 102.3 103.9
1956 107.2 82,9 103.1 103.0 104.9
1957 107.0 88.0 105.8 105.3 105.31958 98.5 94-. 0 100.5 99.9 101.2
1959 96.6 88.0 118.5 98.4 98.8i960 101.7 92.3 98.0 98.4 98.81961 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1962 96.4 108.1 98.9 98.8 96.1
Association of Banks, Resumen.
TABLE III
Index of Real GNP by Sector 
Base=196l
(Provisional - subject to modification)
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 i960 1961 1962 1963
Crops 123.3 117.2 107.9 110.0 88.1 69.2 100.0 96.5 107.7Stockraising 91.4 92.6 89.3 88.1 89.7 96.7 100.0 84.5 99.8Fishing 41.9 63.2 71.4 . 53.0 68.8 92.8 100.0 — 100.0
Manufacturing 96.7 101.5 103.6 103.0 101.5 101.8 100.0 99.5 95.0Construction 97.5 102.3 ■-19̂ .7 99.7 104.0 113.8 100.0 86.3 72.7Commerce 98.6 96.1 104.5 89.7 86.2 91.6 100.0 101.1 97.3Transport and 
Warehousing 100.7 102.0 102.6 94.3 93.5 100.4 100.0 96.3 91.8Communicatlons 88.6 92.3 95.0 97. 7 99.1 99.5 100.0 108.7 115.7Utilities 71.7 77.5 83.6 90.0 85.9 90.5 100.0 109.5 110.2Housing 82.6 86 .2 89.1 91.9 94.8 97.3 100.0 103.7 106.1Services 95.8 99.4 100.6 101.4 102.6 99.4 100.0 98.0 97.7
GNP 96.2 98.5 100.0 97.4 96.3 97.6 100.0 97.3 97.0
Banco de la Republica, (June-July, 1964-); 21, 83
TABLE IV
Manufacturing Output Index by Branch of Activity
(Base=196l)
Activity 1955 .1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962
Pood 11*+. 3 115.8 10*+.l 105.8 93.0 101.5 100.0 101.7Beverages 91.3 91.0 89.0 95.5 88.8 9*+. 6 100.0 115.1Tobacco 7*+.6 ?8.*+ 9*+. 5 97.7 98.2 100.*+ 100.0 108.9Textiles 113.2 l*+0.*+ 123.1 117.7 125.3 96.7 100.0 89.1Clothing 83.0 98.2 11*+. 9 128.*+ 122.2 10*+.*+ 100.0 87.9
Wood products 160.0 158.3 16*+.*+ 133.1 126.6 102.2 loo.o 103.1Furniture 98.5 99.0 121.8 99.1 82.8 87.1 100.0 92.5Paper 59.9 *+9.*+ 117.1 107.5 112.5 131.8 100.0 103.8Printing 87.2 85.*+ ' 105.7 112.5 99.5 123.6 100.0 95.2Leather 120.7 119.0 10*+.6 119.2 111.8 9*+. 5 100.0 109.2Rubber goods 39.3 86.*+ 81.5 120.7 90.6 13*+. 2 100.0 —Chemicals 8 6.*+ 76.9 101.2 97.9 99.0 96.2 100.0 93.9Construction materials 101.5 89.9 90.0 89.8 88.8 99.1 100.0 111.0Metals 81.7 88.3 107.1 108.9 111.1 ll*+. 2 100.0 91.3Metallurgy 125-9 105.0 l*+0.8 111.9 123.1 11*+. 2 100.0 88.8Metallurgical machines l*+3.2 162.1 135.5 103.8 11*+. 8 119.0 100.0 97.5Electrical goods 102.6 91.6 125.3 109.6 117.6 123.0 100.0 116.9Transportation & equip. 67.9 59.8 70.5 63.8 69.5 82.5 100.0 86.1Plastic goods *1-7.6 6*+.*+ 55.8 70.7 81.2 88.9 100.0 10*+.*+Manufacturing generally 96.6 101.5 103.6 102,8 101.2 101.3 100.0 99.5
















(annual averages in millions of dollars at current prices)
1942/44 85.1 47.2 37.9 21.3 16.6 18.1 34.719̂ 5/1̂ 9 161.4 144.4 17.0 -21.7 - 4.7 5*6 0.9
1950/54 243.5 205.2 37.7 -46.2 - 8.5 13.3 4.8
1955/59 159.6 165.6 - 6.0 -34.4 -40.4 6.8 -33.61960/62 152.5 189.4 -36.9 -13.3 -50.2 57.3 7.1
1945/61 183.9 173.4 10.5 -31.5 -21,0 12.4 - 8.61955/61 157.5 171.0 -13.5 -28.0 -41.5 16.6 -24.9
1961 174.7 180.8 - 6.1 -11.5 -17.6 19.9 2.31962* 153.4 199.6 -46.2 -15.6 -61.8 89.6 27.8
^Estimated.
CIDE, 0£. cit., I, 27.
TABLE VI 
Merchandise Terms of Trade
Year













1942 55.8 53.5 104.3 32.5 52.4 62.01943 54.1 63.5 85.2 31.5 62.2 50.61944 56.1 69.6 80.6 32.7 68.2 47.91945 61.9 71.6 86.5 36.0 70.1 51.4
1946 80.3 84.1 95.5 46.7 82.4 56.7194? 104.6 92.1 113.6 60.9 90.2 67.51948 116.3 90.2 128.9 67.7 88.3 76.6
1949 116.0 90.4 128.3 67.5 88.5 76.21950 123.6 85.3 144.9 71.9 83.5 86.1
1951 171.8 102.1 168.3 100.0 100.0 1Q0.0
1952 131.2 105.3 124.6 76.4 103.1 ?4.0
1953 129.3 98.9 130.7 75.3 96.9 77.71954 126.0 93.0 135.5 73.3 91.1 80.5
1955 116.1 101.2 114.7 67.6 99.1 68.2
1956 107.6 106.4 101.1 62.6 104.2 60.1
1957 115.6 108.2 105.9 67.3 107.0 62.9
1958 100.4 107.7 93.2 58.4 105.5 55.4
1959 97.9 102.4 95.6 57.0 100.3 56.8
i960 103.4 96.7 106.9 60.2 94.7 63.5
1961 100.0 100,0 100.0 58.2 97.9 59.4
TABLE VII

















Financial Position of the Central Government (in millions of pesos)
Year Revenue Expenditure Balance
1961 2,059.3 2,217.3 - 158.21962 2,065.0 2,874*. 8 - 809.8
1963 2,275.6 3,261.1 985.51964 (estimated) 3,300.0 4,4-00.0 1,100.0
1965 (planned) 5,24-3.0 6,608.0 1,365.0
1966 (planned) 6,725.0 8,197.0 1,472.0
1967 (planned) 8,350.0 8,643.0 293.0
Bank of London & South America, Ltd., op. cit. (January, 
1965), P. 43. —
Chapter V
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Chapter V
STATISTICAL APPENDIX III 
Derivation of Graphs
Derivation of
Year Y *1 ,r2
1935 0 8,524 0 01936 1 8,821 8,821 1
1937 2 9,580 19,160 41938 9,118 27,354 9
1939 4 9,019 36,076 161940 5 9,134 45,920 251941 6 9,349 56,094 361942 7 8,442 59,094 49
1943 8 8,623 68,984 64•1944 9 9,728 87,552 81
1945 10 9,942 99,420 100
1946 11 11,030 121,330 121
1947 12 11,772 141,264 144
1948 13 12,036 156,468 169
1949 14 12,531 175,434 1961950 15 12,910 193,650 225
1951 16 13,982 223,712 2561952 17 13,899 236,283 289
1953 18 14,839 267,102 3241954 19 15,847 297,293 361
1955 20 15,861 317,220 4001958 21 16,241 341,061 441
1957 22 16,488 361,856 4841958 23 16,059 369,357 529
1959 24 15,378 381,072 576i960 25 16,092 402,300 6251961 26 16,488 428,688 67635T 339774 ^ 479ZZ73S5 •677m"
Trend Line Graph x
I) E(Y) = Na = bS(x)
II) E(xy) = 03 (x) + bS(x2)
I) 339,742 = 27a + 351b
II) 4,922,565 = 351a + 6,201b
I) 339,742 (13) = (13).(27a) + (13)(35lb)
1) 4,416,646 = 351a + 4,563b
II) 4,922,565 - 351a + 6,201b
“ 3tT5",mr=-- ----
a = 8,568.6 
b = 308.8 
Yq_ = a + b(x)
Yx = 8,568.6 + 308.8(x)
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Derivation of Trend Line Graph 2
Yo Per Capita Farming Output at Constant Factor Cost Index: Base 100 1961
Year VJ\ ~2 x y2 „2A
1935 0 75.5 0 01936 ■ 1 89.*f- 8,9.k 1
1937 2 7^.1 lk8.2 *;-
1938 -3 101.1 303.3 0s
1939 k 99.6 398.*4- 1619*4-0 5 81.2 *4-06.0 2519*4-1 6 6k. 9 389.k 36
19*4-2 7 81.2 568.k *4-9
19*4-3 OU 68.*4- 5k 7.2 6*4-19E4 9 9k,7 852.3 81
19*4-5 10 63.5 635.0 10019*4-6 11 80.9 889.9 121
19*4-7 12 72.7 872.*4- l*4-*4-19*4-8 13 97.2 1263.6 169
19*4-9 1*4- 105.7 1*4-79.8 1961950 15 95.0 1*1-25.0 225
1951 16 119.5 1912.0 256
1952 17 111.0 1887.0 289
1953 18 115.6 2080.8 32*̂
195*4- 19 135.5 257^.5 361
1955 20 133.3 2666.0 *4-001956 21 12k.Q 2620.8 *4-*l-l
1957 22 113.5 2*4-97.0 k8k1958 23 11*4-. 2 2626.6 529
1959 2*4- 90.1 2162.^ 576i960 25 70.2 1755.0 6251961 26 100.0 2600.0 6761962 27 95.3 2573.1 729
373 5535“. 1 38223A "6930"
I) E(Y) = ha + bE(X)
II) E(XY) + aS(X) -5- bE(X2)
I) 2668.1(13.5) = 28a(13.5) + 378b(13.5)
I) 36,019.35 = 378a + 5103b
II) 38,223.50 = 378a + 6930b
~T;m f7T5"=------- TSZ75
b = 1.206x
2668.1 = 23a + 455.87 
a = 79.01 
Y = a + b(X)






















Derivation of. Trend Line Graph 3
Yo Stockraising Output per Capita at Constant Factor Cost
Index: Base 100 1961
V"3 3
,,2iv
95.4 0 091.0 91.0 1
99.5 199.0 494.1 282.3 9
97.5 390.0 16




93.7 937.0 10095.6 1,051.6 121
95.2 1,142.4 14496.4 1,253.2 16999.0 1,386.0 196
102.5 1,537.5 225100.1 1,601.6 256
97.7 1,660.9 289102.6 1,846.8 324
97.8 1,853.2 36198.8 1,976.0 400
93.6 2,070.6 441
94.0 2,068.0 484
91.5 2,104.5 52992.1 .2,210.4 57698.0 2,450.0 625100.0 2,600.0 676
83.4 2,251.3 7297627.6 35,805.7 6,930
I) E(Y) = Ha bE(X)
II) E(XY) = aE(X) + bS-(X2) ,
I) 2,627.6(13.5) = 28a (13.5)
I) 3,5472.6 = 373a + 5,103b
II) 35,357.0 = 373a + 6,930b
"7T”TT5TS^-------
b = -.063
2,627.6 - 28a - 23.916
a = 94.69
Y = a + b(x)






















Derivation of 'Trend Line Graph 4 
Y^ Total Agricultural Output (Crops Livestock) 
At Constant Factor Cost Index: Base 100 1961
v2
89.8 0 0
90.5 90.5 192.4 184.8 496.0 288.0 998.1 392.4 16
95.0 475.0 25
90.7 544.2 36
62.3 436.1 4967.8 542.4 6491.0 819.0 81
85.3 853.0 100
91.5 1006.5 12189.0 1068.0 14496.6 1255.8 169
100.9 1412.6 196100.3 1504.5 225105.5 1683.0 256101.4 1723.8 289106.1 1909.8 324
108.4 2059.6 361
108.4 2168.0 400
105.9 2223.9 44199.4 2186.3 484
97.8 2249.4 529
91.5 2196.0 57690.2 2255.0 625
100,0 2600.0 767
86.5 2335.5 7292(638.3 36468.6 6930
E(Y) = Na + bE(X)
E(XY) = aE(X) -1- bE(X2)
2638.3(13.5) = 28a (13.5) + 378b(13.5) 
35617.05 = 378a + 5103b
38,223.50 = 378a + 6930b 
" 2,606745 = 1827b
b = 1.426 
2638.3 = 28a + 539.028 
a = 74.974 
Y = a + b(X)
Yzj, = 74.974 + 1.426(X)
Source: Table 4
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Derivation of Trend Line Graph 5
Y, Manufacturing Output (Including Mines and Quarries) 
4 At Constant Factor Cost Index: Base 100 1961
Year V"u'-. Y5 -J X2
1935 0 63.1 0 0
1936 1 63.0 63.0 1
1937 2 73.2 146.4 41938 3 55.3 165.9 Qs
1939 4 51.0 204.0 161940 5 53.7 268.5 251941 6 56.6 339.6 26
1942 7 54.0 378.0 491943 8 54.4 435.2 64
1944 9 57-7 519.3 811945 10 57.4 574.0 100
1946 11 67.9 746.9 1211947 12 68.8 825.6 144
1948 13 70.0 910.0 1691949 14 77.0 1,078.0 196
1950 15 80.2 1,203.0 225
1951 16 83.6 1,417.6 2561952 17 88.0 1,496.6, 289
19531954
18 101.0 1,819.8 324
19 106.0 2,014.0 361
1955 20 104.3 2,086.0 4001956 21 108.2 2,272.2 441
1957 22 108.9 2,395.8 4841953 23 106.8 2,456.4 529
1959 24 103.9 2,493.6 576i960 25 102.8 2,570.0 6251961 26 100.0 2,600.0 6761962 27 98.2 2,651.4 729
jtz 2 j 2-2̂0,1' 34,130.2 6,936
I) E(Y) = Na + bE(X)
II) E(XY) = aE(X) + bE(X2)
I) 2,220.1(13.5) = 378a + 5,103b
I) 29,971.35 = 378a + 5,103b
II) 34,130.20 = 378a + 6,930b
4,l58'.8^''= 17S27B
b -- 2.276 ,
2,220.1 = 28a + 860.32
a = 48.92 
Y = a + b(X)
Y^ = 48.92 + 2.276(X)
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Derivation of Trend Line Graph 6
Construction at Constant Factor Cost 
Index: Ba.se 100 1961
Year X -6 '/r
1935 0 33.0 0 0 I) E(Y) = Ha + bE(X)193 6 1 38.7 38.7 1 O
1937 2 52.9 105.8 4 I D E(XY) = aE(X) + bE (X )1938 3 54.5 163.5 91939 •4 56.6 226.4 16 I) 2145.2(13.5) = 28a(13.5) + 378b(l3.5)1940 5 50.8 254.0 251941 6 58.2 349.2 36 I) 28960.2 = 278a + 5103b1942 7 44.1 308.7 49
19^3 8 36.7 293.6 64 II) 34126.7 = 378a + 6930b1944 9 48.5 436.5 81 5166.5 = 1827b1945 10 61.3 613.0 1001946 11 74.7 821.7 121 b = 2.83
1947 12 78.5 942.0 1441948 13 79.5 1,033.5 169 2145.2 = 28a- + 1069.741949 14 82.5 1,155.0 196
1950 15 85.2 1,278.0 225 a = 38.41
1951 16 88.9 1,422.4 256
1952 17 95.3 1,620.1 289 Y = a + b(X)
1953 18 89.9 1,618.2 3241954 19 100.3 1,905.7 361 Y< = 38.41 + 2.83(X)
1955 20 105.4 2,108.0 400
1956 21 109.1 2,291.1 441 * Includes only private construction
1957 22 110.1 2,422.2 4841958 23 103.4 2,378.2 529 ir7T Preliminary data
1959 24 106.7 2,560.8 576i960 25 115.2 2,880.0 625 Source: Table 61961 26 100.0 2,600.0 676
1962*f- 27 85.2£; 2,300.4 729























Derivation of Trend Line Graph 7
Yn Manufacturing Output Plus Construction 
At Constant Factor Cost Index: Base 100 1961
Y? XY? X2
69.9 0 0 I) E(Y) = Na + bE(X)70.8 70.8 1 O78.2 ,156.4 4 II) E(XY) = aE(X) + bE(X )70.8 212.4 969.7 278.8 16 I) 2,369.9(13.5) = 283,(13.5“) +
69.3 346.5 2569.9 419.4 36 I) 31,993.65 = 378a + 5,103b56.0 392.0 49
57.5 460.0 64 II) 34,971.20 - 378a + 6,930b69.5 625.5 81 2,977.55 = 1,827b68.5 685.O 100
7? .7 854.7 121 b = 1.63
77.6 931.2 144
2,369.9 = 28a + 6l6.481.1 1,054.3 16986.7 1,213.8 196 a = 62.6388.4 1,326.0 225
95.0 1,520.0 256 Y = a + b(X)93.8 1,594.6 289101.6 1,828.8 324106.0 2,014.0 361 Y7 = 62.63 + 1.63(X)
105.9 2,118.0 400
107.3 2,253.3 441
105.3 2,316.6 484 Source: Table 7102.8 2,364.4 529
99.3 2,383.2 576
99.3 2,482.5 625100.0 2,600.0 6?692.0 2,484.0 729
2,369.9 34,971.2 6,930
378b(13.
Derivation of Trend Line Graph 8
Yq Transportation, Warehousing, and Communication 
At Constant Factor Cost Index: Base 100 1961
Year X Y8 XYg X2
1935 0 90.6 0 0 I)
1936 1 92.5 92.5 1
1937 2 102.8 205.6 4 XI)1938 3 97.4 292.2 9
1939 4 85.1 340.4 16 I)1940 5 87.2 436.0 251941 6 85.9 515.4 36 I)1942 7 74.2 519.4 491943 8 74.0 592.0 64 II)
1944 9 77.8 700.2 81
1945 10 81.7 817.0 1001946 11 93.0 1,023.0 121
1947 12 105.5 1,266.0 1441948 13 96.2 1,250.6 169
1949 14 100.4 1,405.6 196
1950 15 102.8 1,542.0 225
1951 16 108.7 1,739.2 2561952 17 103.0 1,751.0 289
1953 18 103.2 1,857.6 3241954 19 110.4 2,097.6 361
1955 20 106.8 2,136.0 400
1956 21 107.8 2,251.2 441
1957 22 107.0 2,354.0 4841958 23 98.5 2,265.5 529
1959 24 96.6 2,318.4 576i960 25 101.7 2,542.5 6251961 26 100.0 2,600.0 6761962 27 96.4 2,602.8 729
378 2,686.6 37,513.7 6,930
1.244.6 = 1,827b 
b ~ .68
2.686.6 = 28a + 257.04 
a = 86.77
Y = a + b(Xj
Y8 = 86.77 + .68(X)
Source: Table 8
+ 373b(13.5)
Derivation of Trend Line Graph 9
Yg Electricity, Gas, Water and Sanitation Service 
At Constant Factor Cost Index: Base 100 1961
Year \rw X9 XYg X"
1935 0 21.3 0 01936 1 22.2 22.2 1
1937 2 24.8 49.6 41938 3 27.4 82.2 9
1939 4 29.1 116.4 161940 5 31.6 158.0 251941 6 33.3 199.8 361942 7 32.5 227.5 491943 8 31.6 252.8 64
1944 9 35.0 315.0 81
1945 10 37.6 376.0 1001946 11 39.3 432.3 1211947 12 59.0 708.0 1441948 13 48.7 633.1 169
1949 14 53.0 742.0 1961950 15 51.3 769.5 225
1951 16 59.0 944.0 2 $61952 17 64.1 1,089.7 289
1953 18 68.4 1,231.2 3241954 19 72.6 1,379.4 361
19 55 20 77.8 1,556.0 400
1956 21 82.9 1,740.9 441
1957 22 88.0 1,936.0 4841958 23 94.0 2,162.0 5291959 24 88.0 2,112.0 576i960 25 92.3 2,307.5 6251961 26 100.0 2,600.0 6761962 27 108.1 2,918.7 729
378 1,572.9 27,061.8 6930
I) E(Y) - m + bE(X)
II) E(XY) = aE(X) + bE(X2)
I) 1,572.9(13.5) = 28a(13.5) + 3?8b(13.5)
I) 21,234.15 = 378a + 5103b
I!) 27,061.80 - 378a + 6,930b
6,827.65 = 1,827b
b = 3.74 
1,572.9 = 28a + 1,413.72 
a = 5.69 
Y = a + b(X)
Yg = 5.69 + 3.7MX)
11
Derivation of Trend Line Graph 10
Yi0 Other Services at Factor Cost 
Index; Base 100 1961
Year X Y10 ^10 X2
1935 0 76.7 0 0 I)1936 1 78.6 78.6 1
1937 2 81.1 • 162.2 4 II)1938 3 78.2 234.6 9
1939 4 77.9 311.6 16 I)1940 5 78.2 391.0 251941 6 78.4 470.4 36 I)1942 7 76.5 535.5 491943 8 77.2 617.6 64 II)1944 9 80.1 720.9 81
1945 10 81.4 814.0 1001946 11 85.9 944.9 12L
1947 12 92.1 1,105.2 1441948 13 92.5 1,202.5 1691949 14 91.0 1,274.0 196
1950 15 92.3 1,384.5 225
1951 16 97.9 1,566.4 256
1952 17 96.0 1,632.0 289
1953 18 98.9 1,780.2 3241954 19 102.1 1,939.9 361
1955 20 102.6 2,052.0 4001956 21 103.1 2,165.1 441
1957 22 105.8 2,327.6 4841958 23 100.5 2,311.5 529
1959 24 118.5 2,844.0 576i960 25 98.0 2,450.0 6251961 26 100.0 2,600.0 6761962 2? 98.9 2,670.3 729
378 2,540.4 36,586.5 6,930
E(Y) = Na + bE(X)
E(XY) = aE(X) + bE(X2) 
2,540.4(13.5) = 28a(13.5) - 
34,295.4- = 378a + 5,i°3l3
36,586.5 = 378a + 6,930b
2,291.1 = 1,827b
b = 1.25 
2,540.4 = 28a + 472.5 
a = 73.14 
Y = a + b(X)
Y10 = 73.14 + 1.25(X)
378b(13.5)
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Derivation of Trend Line Graph 11
Y u  Tertiary Industries at Constant Factor Cost 
Index: Bs.se 100 1961
Year X Y11 **11 X2
1935 0 77.0 0 01936 1 78.0 78.0 1
1937 2 82.6 165.2 41938 3 79.5 238.5 9
1939 4 77.2 308.8 161940 5 77.9 389.5 251941 6 78.0 468.0 36
1942 7 74.5 521.5 49
19^3 8 75.1 600.8 641944 9 78.1 702.9 81
1945 10 79.8 798.0 1001946 11 85.3 938.3 121
1947 12 93.1 1,117.2 1441948 13 91.5 1,189.5 169
1949 14 91.1 1,275.4 1961950 15 92.5 1,387.5 225
1951 16 98.2 1,571.2 2561952 17 95.9 1,630.3 289
1953 18 98.5 1,773.0 3241954 19 102.3 1,943.7 369
1955 20 102.3 2,046.0 4001956 21 103.0 2,164.0 441
1957 22 105.3 2,316.6 4841958 23 99.9 2,297.7 529
1959 24 98.4 2,361.6 576i960 25 98.4 2,460.0 6251961 26 100.0 2,600.0 6761962 27 98.8 2,667.6 729
378 2,512.2 36,027.8 6,930
I) E(Y) = m + bE(X)
II) E(XY) = aE(X) + bE(X2)
I) 2,512.2(13.5) = 28a(13.5) + 378b(13.5)
I) 33,914.7 = 378a + 5»l03t
II) 36,027.8 = 378a + 6,930t»
2.113.1 = 1,827b
b = 1.16
2.512.2 = 28a + 438.48 
a = 74.06
Y = a + b(X)
Y11 = 7^.06 + 1.16(X)
Derivation of Trend Line Graph 12
Y-.p GNP (at Constant Factor Cost) Index: Base 100 1961
Year X Y12 CT12 X
1935 0 73*8 0 01936 1 75*2 75.2 1
1937 2 80.6 161.2 41938 3 75*6 226.8 91939 4 73*9 294.7 161940 5 74.1 370.5 251941 6 74.4 446.4 361942 7 66.2 463.4 491943 8 67.2 537.6 641944 9 74.2 667 *8 81
1945 10 7^.8 748.0 1001946 11 81.9 900.9 12119^7 12 86.2 1,034.4 1441948 13 86.9 1,129.7 1691949 14 89.2* 1,248.8 1961950 15 90.7 1,360.5 225
1951 16 96.8 1,548.8 2561952 17 95.0 1,615.0 2891953 18 99.8 1,796.4 3241954 19 104.0 1,978.0 3611955 20 103.9 2,078.0 4001956 21 104.9 2,202.9 4411957 22 105.3 2,316.6 4841958 23 101.2 2,327.6 5291959 24 98.8 2,371.2 576i960 25 98.8 2,470.0 6251961 26 100.0 2,600.0 6761962 27 96.1 2,594.7 729
378 2,449.5 35,563.1 6930
I) E(Y) - m  + bE(X)
II) E(XY) = aE(X) = bE(X2)
I) 2,449.5(13.5) = 28a (13.5) + 3?8b(13.5) 
I) 33,068.25 = 378a + 5,103b
H )  35,563*10 = 378a + 6,930b 
2,494.85 = 1,827b'
b = 1.37 
2,449*5 = 28a + 517*86 
a = 68.99 
Y = a + b(X)
Y12 =  68,99 +  1 * 3 7 { X )
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Year Graph 1*
Three Year Moving Average
Graph 2** Graph 3** Graph 4** Graph 5** Graph 6*#
193 6 8,975.0 79.6 95.3 90.0 66.4 41.51937 9,173.0 88.2 94.9 93.0 63.8 48.71938 9,239.0 91.6 97.0 95.5 59.8 54-.71939 9,107.0 94-. 0 97.3 96.4 53.3 54.0194-0 9,2l4-.0 81.9 99.5 94.6 53.8 55.3194-1 8,991.7 75.8 85.3 82.7 54.8 51.0194-2 8,805.3 71.5 74-.4 73.6 55.0 46.3194-3 8,931.0 81.4 70.7 73.7 55.7 43.1194-4- 9,4-31.0 75.5 83.6 81.4 56.5 48.8194-5 10,233.3 79.7 92.9 89.3 61.0 61.5194-6 10,914-. 7 72.4 94.8 88.6 64.7 7!.5194-7 11,612.7 83.6 95-7 92.4 68.9 77.6194-8 12,113.0 91.9 96.9 95.5 71.9 80.2194-9 12,4-92.3 99.3 99.3 99.3 75.7 82.41950 13,14-1.0 106.7 100.5 102.3102.4 81.9 85.51951 13,597.0 108.5 100.1 85.6 89.81952 14-, 24-0.0 115.4- 100.1 104.3 92.6 91.41953 14-,795.0 120.7 99.4- 105.3 98.4 95.21954- 15,4-4-9.0 128.1 99.7 107.6 103.8 98.51955 15,916.3 131.2 98.4 107.6 106.2 104.91956 16,196.7 123.9 97.1 104.5 107.1 108.2
1957 16,262.7 117.5 94.7 101.0 108.0 107.51958 16,008.3 105.9 92.5 96.2 106.5 106.71959 16,009.7 91.5 93.9 93.2 104.5 108.4i960 16,152.7 86.8 96.7 93.9 102.2 107.31961 — 88.5 93.8 92.2 100.3 100.1
-̂ Source: Table 1
**Source: Table 2 0 fj
Z
Three
Year Graph 7* Graph 8*
1936 73.0 95.31937 73.3 97.61938 72.9 95.11939 1 69.9 89.91940 , 69.6 86.11941 65.1 82.41942 61.1 78.0
1943 61.0 75.31944 64.5 77.81945 71.9 84.21946 74.6 93*4
1947 78.8 98.21948 81.8 100.71949 85.4 99.81950 90.0 104.3
1951 92.4 104.81952 96.8 105.0
1953 100.5 105.51954 104.5 106.8
1955 I 106.4 108.11956 106.2 107.0
1957 105.1 104.21958 102.5 100.7
1959 100.5 98.9I960 99.5 99.41961 97.1 99.4
*Source: Table 2
Year Moving Average
Graph 9* Graph 10* Graph 11* Graph 12*
22.8 79.024.8 79.327.1 79.129.4 78.1
31.3 78.232.5 77.732.5 77.433.0 77.9





79.2 76.580.0 77.179.8 76.778.2 74.577.7 74.176.8 71.6
75.9 69.375.9 69.277.7 72.181.1 77.0
86.1 81.090.0 85.0
91.9 87.4
91.7 88.993.9 92.295.5 94.297.5 97.298.9 99.6101.0 102.6








Uruguay had a brave beginning, a political vision, 
and adequate economic resources in its flat, fertile land 
and its well-educated, European population. Virtually all 
of Uruguay’s land is arable, compared with only about 5 P©** 
cent in Latin America as a whole. Furthermore, the climate 
is temperate, unlike the "typical'5 Latin American tropical 
climate.
However, despite all advantages, Uruguay’s economy 
has been stagnating for over a decade, and recently, per 
capita income output has actually fallen. Severe inflation 
has accompanied stagnating output and has compounded the 
country’s economic difficulties, particularly in foreign 
trade.
Uruguay must trade to live. . The country is defi­
cient in many items which must be imported. These Imports 
must be paid for with exchange earned from exports. However, 
rapidly rising domestic prices combined with necessarily 
more sluggish adjustments in the rate of exchange and de­
creasing productivity have combined to reduce the ability of 
stockraisers, the country’s major exporters, to compete in 
the world markets. In large part, the country’s agricultur­
al stagnation is due to misconceived government programs 
which have favored comparatively disadvantaged urban indus­
try over agriculture, and stockraising in particular.
Stagnation has been the economic problem. Unlike
2^3
the more usual sorts of underdevelopment, Uruguay is rather 
a case of arrested development. The ingredients of a thriv­
ing economy are present, hut the country*s economic potential 
has not heen realized because the ingredients have not been 
used effectively.
The government has entered enthusiastically into 
the economic life of the country. But the role of govern­
ment has not been to encourage investment, savings, and 
growth; rather the government has mainly encouraged consump­
tion through a broad welfare program. The result has been 
to reverse the forced saving of a developing economy, con­
verting the process into "forced consumption," and conse­
quently arresting the country’s economic development. Fur­
thermore, a significant part of the potential work force is 
deactivated through the pension programs, both as pensioners 
and as administrators.
Continual inflation has been required to finance the 
statutory claims made under the welfare programs. This in­
flation has weakened not only the general economy, but also 
the welfare program itself. Constantly rising prices have 
led to constant demands for larger benefits, and most of 
the population is in sympathy with those demands.
A downturn in certain key segments of the economy 
during the last few years has virtually wrecked the already 
weakened economy. The result has been the sad spectacle of 
general strike and martial law. One may hope that this 
final blow may prove to be the shock required to make
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